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Preface by the Project Management
The sustained reduction of climate gas emissions associated with the generation,
conversion and utilization of energy is clearly becoming an ever more important task
in energy and environmental policy . Different strategies are conceivable in order to
fulfil this mission . The aim of the IKARUS Project (Instrumente für Klimagas-
Reduktionsstrategien - Instruments for Greenhouse Gas Reduction Strategies) was
to provide a set of tools with which strategies can be developed and reconstructed
(making conceptual use of the various technologies) and also tested with respect to
their internal consistency and examined with regard to their economic impacts .
Corresponding to the great complexity of the task in hand and the technological
range of energy applications, the set of instruments is very extensive . It consists of
two parts : a data base with a comprehensive data collection and several computer
models of various types .
The relational data base in ORACLE with a graphics interface has a twofold function
as a supplier to the model and as an independently usable information system. It is
subdivided into a technology data base, model data base and general data base .
The data were collected in six data subprojects for the reference year of 1989 and
estimated for the years 2005 and 2020 . The technology data base contains
technological, economic and ecological data on representative technologies ranging
from primary energy extraction up to final energy use, supplemented by
commentaries, graphics, structural diagrams and characteristic curve fields . The
reliability of the data is represented and annotated by an assessment diagram so
that a reconstructible, comprehensive basis for strategy discussions capable of
finding consensus can be provided in accordance with the objective . In addition to
the individual technologies, aggregated "mixed technology" data were generated as
input data for the optimization model mentioned below and stored in the model data
base . In order to keep this aggregation sufficiently flexible with respect to optimizing
the energy supply and utilization system the user is provided with some aggregation
tools, developed in the data subprojects, upstream of the optimization model in the
interface of the data base . Finally, the general data base contains exogenous
quantities from the models such as inquiries about energy services, application limits
and inventory data for technologies, as well as background information for designing
user inputs and interpreting model results .
The central feature of the developed models is a technology oriented,, linear
optimization model, which simulates the energy flow in the Federal Republic of
Germany by means of about 2000 (aggregated) technologies . The "placeholder
concept" of the model permits these technologies to be exchanged . The model
determines optimum-cost energy technology structures for the sample years of 2005
and 2020 under predefined boundary conditions, e.g . upper and lower application
limits for technologies and, above all, upper limits for emissions . The
macroeconomic information system, MIS, serves to verify the economic
compatibility of the model results and also provides general data on economic
development . A simulation model permits a comparison of energy technology
chains providing a certain predefined energy service . Sector-specific simulation
models for "space heat", "electricity and district heat", "transport" and
"industry and small consumers" are applied both for detailed studies in the
respective sector as well as (in addition to the tools mentioned) for the production of
aggregated technologies in the optimization and chain model .
The "Verification" project was integrated into IKARUS as a link between the
national project and the international environment, enabling the examination of
technologies and methods for verifying the compliance of states party to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change .
The BMBF's (Federal Ministry of Education and Research) contractor was the
Research Centre Jülich (KFA), which performed two of the subprojects and
undertook the project management . Subcontracts were placed for the remaining
work. Nine equal partners contributed to the development of IKARUS in
"subprojects" with more than 50 subcontractors . The nine subprojects, the
institutions responsible and sectors of work are as follows :
Subproject 1 :
Research Centre Jülich (KFA), Programme Group Systems Analysis and Technology
Evaluation (STE) : model development - optimization model with macroeconomic
embedding, chain model, submodels for space heat, electricity and district heat,
transport .
Subproject 2 :
Special Information Centre (FIZ), Karlsruhe : data base - conception and
programming .
Subproject 3 :
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin : primary energy - extraction
of domestic fossil energy carriers, foreign trade with energy carriers, renewable
energy sources .
Subproject 4 :
Institute for the Energy Economy and Efficient Energy Use (IER), University of
Stuttgart : energy conversion, storage, transport and distribution .
Subproject 5 :
Chair of Energy Economy and Power Plant Engineering, Technical University of
Munich : households and small consumers - space heat, domestic appliances,
process heat.
Subproject 6 :
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems Engineering and, Innovation Research (ISI),
Karlsruhe : industry - energy-intensive single industries, branches of industry, lines
of business . Submodel industry and small consumers .
Subproject 7 :
Technical Control Board (TÜV) Rhineland Safety and Environmental Protection,
Cologne: passenger and goods transport by road, rail, water and air .
Subproject 8 :
Research Establishment for the Energy Economy (FfE), Munich : cross-sectional
technologies - intersectoral and interindustrial technologies for energy conversion .
Subproject 9 :
Research Centre Jülich (KFA), Programme Group Technology Assessment (TFF) :
verification measures within the Framework Convention on Climate Change .
The reports drawn up as part of the project have been available from the Central
Library of the Research Centre Jülich (KFA) since 1994 . These reports are intended,
on the one hand, to ensure the general availability of reliable data and, on the other
hand, provide access to the results of the project to those who are only interested in
closely defined subsectors .
After its completion, the set of instruments will be distributed on CD-ROM by the
Research Centre Jülich (KFA) and the Specialist Information Centre Karlsruhe (FIZ)
(data base only) . Updated versions are planned, in the first instance, for 1997 and
1999. Information, training and in-depth discussion meetings on selected subjects
are on offer to users of the instruments and all other interested parties .
G . Stein, IKARUS Project Management
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International Verification of Agreements on Climate Protection
Two results were particularly obvious at the International Rio Conference (United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED) in 1992 . On the one
hand, it became apparent that the environmental aspect had quite generally become
one of the major topics of national and international policy. The introduction of new
national laws and international treaties reflects to an increasing extent this growing
environmental awareness . On the other hand, it can be seen from the protracted
negotiations on bringing the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) into
being how complex this issue area is and how controversial the topics are . This
complexity and controversy is also reflected in discussions on verification aspects of the
International Greenhouse Gas Convention .
The subject of this study can be summarized in the question of how the states'
commitments laid down in an agreement on climate protection can be verified . This may
involve the Framework Convention on Climate Change in its present or an amended
form, or special protocols on climate protection, e.g . for individual sectors . To put it
negatively, the question is what are the states' commitments worth if they are not
verified .
Why has this issue been included in the IKARUS Project as a separate subproject?
Although IKARUS is a set of instruments for analysing national (German) reduction
strategies, nevertheless this mission cannot be tackled without taking the international
situation into consideration . Subproject 9 thus represents the link between international
developments and the national IKARUS Project leading to the following interactions :
" IKARUS permits an improved understanding of the complexity of the energy
system, the major source of greenhouse gases, as well as of the feasibility of
reduction strategies .
" The development of the data base for IKARUS comprises a fine structure and a
resolution of the energy system which is also of interest for verification .
On the other hand, insights applicable to the IKARUS Project arise
from
international discussions on the standardization of greenhouse gas inventories .
The modelling and simulation of energy aspects, particularly on the submodel
level, may make a contribution towards verification .
It should be noted that over and above the energy sector, Subproject 9 also considers
the sectors of forest, land use and agriculture, which are important for greenhouse gas
emissions, so that approaches for the verification of (future) agreements can also be
identified here .
What is verification, how does it differ from monitoring?
There are many definitions of verification [cf . Efinger 1990, p . 50ff], but they all have a
common core . Verification is a political process of "confirmation" by means of which the
states' party to the treaty wish to make "certain" that the contractually agreed
standards, rules and goals are complied with or achieved by all the states involved . To
this end, they make use of technical and other instruments, processes and methods,
which - ideally - should either be applied reciprocally by the states themselves or by
an international panel (an organization) appointed for this purpose .
International greenhouse gas verification can in general be assigned to the category of
verification of environmental agreements . Whereas verification is a well-worn topic in
international arms control and disarmament policy, it represents a relatively new issue
with respect to international environmental agreements since their approaches are
subjected to stronger dynamics . This can also be observed for the process of the
framework convention . The 1992 Rio Conference and its results represent a first
culmination in this development, initially establishing a discussion stage . However, in
the discussions . of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC-FCC) this topic was further developed and refined
in the two subsequent years as well as in the preparations for the first Conference of the
Parties in 1995 . The same is true of the technical and organizational aspects of
The verification of environmental conventions in general and climate agreements in
particular displays differences especially in comparison to arms control and
disarmament verification . An evident difference can be immediately read off from
Table 1 . This table makes it clear that in contrast to the international verification of
other fields, such as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or the prohibition of the
possession and manufacture of chemical weapons, in the case of greenhouse gas
verification it is not possible to establish a general quantitative record and thus, for
example, a comprehensive measuring technique for verifying the greenhouse gases
(GHG) released by the states . In contrast, for instance, to international fissile material
safeguards, verifications of plausibility or consistency play the central role in
greenhouse gas verification . However, the findings presented here also indicate that
measuring techniques for recording individual elements of the data base or satellite-
assisted information gathering can make a positive contribution towards implementing
verification under certain restricted conditions .
The following basic issues which need to be addressed were identified for the study.
They comprise questions
greenhouse gas verification . Nevertheless, the Rio results must continue to be regarded
as an initial orientation line .
In the present study, a graduated concept is established for the verification of climate
agreements, in the course of which it is assumed that in creating a climate protection
regime, the FCCC provisions will be tightened up and more countries will take on
reduction commitments . This may be implemented by amending the FCCC itself or -
more probably - by means of protocols .
of the necessity for and density of greenhouse gas verification ;
of an appropriate national declaration ;
of the feasibility and applicability of verification concepts, methods and techniques ;
of the organization required to implement these verification measures .
Table 1 :
	
Essential verification measures in various treaty systems
The study is structured by these issues. In a summarizing final chapter, a graduated
verification system will be outlined which can be adapted to the tightening up of climate
agreements demanded by some states and many scientists .
Sector International Verification Essential
treaty objects verification
and relevant measures
quantities
nuclear Non-Proliferation nuclear material nuclear material
Treaty ;t~ 103 tonnes balancing
chemistry Chemical Weapons toxic and other ad-hoc inspections
Convention substances
106 tonnes
climate Framework greenhouse gases plausibility and
Convention on 109 tonnes consistency checks
Climate Change
2	
The Verification Problem within the Framework of the Climate
Convention and its Future Development
The development of a verification concept must be preceded by a clarification of
important terms and the analysis of the general verification problem and its causes . In
contrast to monitoring, which represents a scientific analysis of the condition and
development of a problem area (identified by a treaty), verification aims at examining
compliance on the part of states in specific issue areas regulated by treaty [Lang 1994] .
In the issue area of climate protection, monitoring is, for example, concerned with
measuring the global atmospheric concentration development of the GHGs. The
Mauna-Loa curve of the atmospheric C02 concentration is an example of such
monitoring, which is intended to provide information enabling a problem to be better
understood (scientifically) . Verification deals with the question of whether the release of
GHGs declared by states (pursuant to a treaty) or the asserted implementation of
climate protection measures actually conforms to reality, i .e. whether emissions have
been reduced and measures implemented. In this connection, information obtained for
the purposes of monitoring may be of signficance. However, as a rule this data does not
fulfil the demands of verification, i .e . of providing information about the national origin
over time . Compliance must also be distinguished from the effectiveness of an
agreement . Thus, for example, a treaty strictly adhered to by all participants may not
solve a problem if the provisions are not sufficiently stringent . In contrast, more
stringent provisions which may not be fully complied with may be less efficient with
respect to the protective goal .
Verification is influenced by the specific political and technical boundary conditions in
the respective issue area . However, it is also, and quite fundamentally, an expression of
a basic challenge of organizing and maintaining cooperation between states in an
international system which does not recognize any central governmental authority
("governance without government" [Young 1992, p . 253]) . This need for cooperation is
above all the outcome of international interdependences and of increasing pressure
with at the same time a reduced ability to cope unilaterally with this challenge on the
part of those actors who continue to play a central role in the international system,
namely the states . There are, moreover, growing capacities for action in order to deal
with these problems . It is apparent that particularly in the issue area of climate
protection international cooperation is necessary, at least between the 20 largest
emitters responsible for more than 80% of emissions . The task of verification is to
determine whether and how reliably states are engaged in these contractually regulated
cooperative efforts and with what results.
2 .1
	
Factors determining verification
Verification problems are not new and occur in international politics on numerous
occasions and in many issue areas [Lang 1994], frequently under other guises . This is
true, for example, of economic agreements in which compliance with customs
regulations or subsidy practice is verified, of human rights conventions, where
verification is analysed by state agencies in the form of international fact-finding
commissions, occasionally also of environmental treaties if national reports on
contractual implementation are discussed at international conferences, and above all of
arms control and disarmament treaties which, from the historical .point of view, represent
the starting point and, relative to the frequency and intensity of verification, are still at
the heart of all international verification efforts . Verification problems are encountered
wherever the state actors are not prepared to rely on mutual assurances of compliance
(mainly contractual) with agreed standards, rules and targets [Efinger 1990]. This
verification need is expressed in a desire for information in order to measure the actual
behaviour of a state against its commitments . Verification is therefore intended to
provide certainty about whether and to what extent agreements are complied with by all
participating states, or whether they are being violated . Certainty is achieved when the
need for verification and verification capability can be harmonized, i .e . when states
actually receive the information which they would like in order to satisfy their thirst for
knowledge (cf. Fig . 1) .
This need for knowledge may have different levels, i .e . states may demand more or less
information and require more or less verification . This verification demand is a function
of three factors :
(I)
	
The political relevance of a problem, i .e . the significance of an issue area for the
"national interest" from the perspective of the decisive actors . The same hierarchy can
be observed in all political systems : The issue area of security (disarmament, arms
control) has a high rank and the need for verification is very high as a rule since the
actors perceive that a great deal is at stake. The need for verification is considerably
lower in the issue area of the environment since environmental problems do not
(perhaps as yet) occupy the same level as security problems [AusubelNictor 1992] .
(II) The standards on which verification is based, i.e . the politically defined demands
made by decision makers on the intensity of verification . They express the degree of
mistrust in the "opposing" parties and their interests, and define, implicitly or explicitly,
the reasons why a state violates agreements - i .e. whether the violations are
intentional and specific or the consequence of a lack of ability to comply with the treaty .
(III) The degree of openness of the political system and the autonomy of society is
concomitant with different information requirements ; open societies generally demand
more information and verification than closed societies.
In order to satisfy the need for verification, i .e . to achieve "certainty", a corresponding
verification capability is necessary arising from the following factors :
(I) The verification suitability of the "objects" to be verified, which are more or less
suitable for registration and verification . Thus as a rule, large immobile objects which
only exercise one function can be more easily verified than small mobile objects with
intermittent multifunctions . Processes are also more difficult to verify than objects, which
only need to be discriminated and are often only "counted" .
Fig. 1 :
	
Factors determining verification
After : [Efinger 1990, p . 82]
(II) The availability of appropriate instruments and methods for verifying compliancy .
Two aspects must be considered, firstly, whether the necessary instruments and
methods are technically or systematically available and not prohibitively expensive .
Secondly, which of them are suitable for what tasks, in which connection the required
verification density and the features of the verification "objects" are also of significance
making them more or less suitable for the application of certain verification techniques
and methods . Verification suitability cannot therefore be determined completely
independently of the verification instruments and methods .
(III) Finally, the willingness of the state and society to grant other countries or
international organizations insights into their actions also influences the prospects of
success for verification . It can generally be said that the opportunities for information
gathering and verification increase with the degree of openness .
If there is a great demand for verification and if this meets with a corresponding
verification capability and if the agreement between contractual commitment and action
(compliance) is verified meticulously then this is defined as high verification density.
Low density characterizes a verification system that only permits superficial insights into
the states' behaviour . Density cannot only be judged by the number and type of
instruments etc. used for verification . A quite central aspect of density is the intervention
CERTAINTY
Verification 'capability Verification demand
Verification suitability of the "objects" Relevance of the issue area
Verification instruments and methods Verification standards
Political and social willingness to accept Political system and society
these instruments and methods
in the sovereignty of a country associated with the application of such instruments. This
is termed intrusiveness .
However, the need for verification and verification capability are not constants but
rather the results of their constitutive factors . These latter can once again be influenced
to a varying extent . Although the verification suitability of an object is also influenced by
the availability and selection of verification techniques and methods, nevertheless there
are "inherently" more or less suitable objects, whose features are often predefined and
which can only be altered to a limited extent or not all . In contrast, there is scope for
action with respect to the need for verification and the development of those verification
instruments and methods which are dependent politico-technical variables . The
verification need is quite essentially dependent on the degree of international mistrust
and the political relevance of the contractually regulated issue area. It is possible to
"learn" through cooperation and confidence building.
Certainty is not an absolute but rather a relative concept . The relation between the
demand for verification and verification capability determines the extent of certainty that
countries may achieve about the behaviour of others . If the verification demand is high
and the capability low there is a lack of certainty ; if the demand is low but the capability
high then absolute certainty is obtained. There are different degrees of certainty
between these two extremes [Efinger 1990] . A low-density verification system can
therefore also create "certainty" . The degree of certainty which appears adequate is
associated with basic assumptions about the latent (non)compliance of states as well as
the reasons for this, and is influenced by a political perception process in which the
risks must be weighed up. On the one hand, there is the possibility that states may
violate the treaty provisions without being detected and thus obtain advantages. If
states regard the advantages associated with an undetected violation as the greatest
danger to their interests, then it may be assumed that they would not wish to conclude a
treaty . On the other hand, states must consider and weigh up for themselves the
negative consequences of a lack of contractual regulation for the problem in question .
Verification thus has the task of creating "certainty" that the participating states fulfil
their commitments or of ensuring that treaty violations are detected (detection function).
What is meant by "certainty" is a socio-political arrangement, a perception which is
determined in concrete terms by the actors in the issue area . However, verification also
has further functions . Successful cooperation in verification can contribute to confidence
building, the realization that knowledge about the functioning of the system is also in
one's own interest since weak points in one's own system of information gathering and
evaluation may be detected (knowledge, information and learning function).
Furthermore, it can also contribute towards creating and extending the participating
actors' capacities to control processes (capacity formation) [cf . Victor 1994]. Although
verification usually focuses on the detection function, nevertheless the sequence and
significance of the above-mentioned functions is not the same in all issue areas nor is it
predefined in the historical course of creating a verification system . "Evolutionary"
verification systems may by all means be designed in such a manner that the
knowledge and information function, as well as capacity formation, is the primary factor
and that the detection function only becomes relevant at a later point, possibly together
with the tightening up of the material regulations (provisions) of an agreement . This is to
be expected with the FCCC, where verification in order to demonstrate compliance will
probably only attain prominence with the introduction of joint implementation projects .
2.2
	
Compliance by states
1 0
As the discussion on Fig . 1 showed, the actors' assessment of general compliance by
states has a great influence on the demand for verification . If compliance is regarded as
fairly high then there will be less demand for verification (and vice versa) . In the
following section, the question will therefore be posed of the findings available about
compliance by states from the perspective of the two most important schools of thought
on international relations, namely neorealism and institutionalism .
Whereas in the issue area of arms control, compliance has been regarded as relevant
by politicians right from the beginning and has thus been a topic for the political
sciences [Efinger 1990], it has only been systematically analysed in the issue area of
environmental protection since the early nineties [Ausubel 1992 ; Fischer 1991 ;
EPA 1990], without politicians having devoted comparable attention to the subject. The
verification of environmental treaties has become relevant for research (and will
probably soon receive more interest from politicians) since the number and significance
of environmental protection agreements has increased (Table 2) .
Three reasons are given for this increased attention to verification [Sands 1993, p. 368] :
problem pressure, i.e, a growing consumption of resources has resulted in increasing
emissions and environmental pollution to which politicians must react; pressure of
costs, i.e . environmental protection agreements exert pressure to make high
investments so that bypassing the treaties would lead to competitive advantages (at
least on occasion and in certain sectors), verification should therefore also contribute
towards preventing "eco-dumping" ; effectiveness, i.e . the nature and scope of the
commitments increasingly influence core areas of economic activity. Politicians, who are
gradually becoming aware of these problems, are reluctantly beginning to devote more
attention to the verification problem in environmental agreements .
Even if the extent of compliance by states in general and in the environmental sector in
particular has only been roughly estimated as yet [Chayes 1993 ; AusubelNictor 1992],
nevertheless the results are in agreement with the theory that the majority of states fulfil
most of their commitments more or less reliably . Whereas all schools of thought
basically agree on this point, attention is (correctly) also drawn to the fact that in central
issue areas some serious treaty violations (nonproliferation of nuclear weapons) and
generally a lax attitude to commitment can be perceived in the environmental field .
Nevertheless, on the average compliance is certainly the rule although the reasons for it
are open to dispute. (Neo)realism and institutionalism are opposed to each other in this
point and argue about whether compliant behaviour is influenced at all by treaties and
the norms etc. laid down in them ("whether treaty-induced compliance ever occurs",
[Mitchell 1992, p. 26]) . The background to this is a basic lack of agreement between
institutionalism and realism concerning the nature and functioning of politico-social
systems and the behaviour of actors .
1 2
Table 2 :
	
Multilateral environmental agreements of the last 40 years
* incl . agreements on the protection of wild animals ;
*"waste, space etc. [Brenton 1994, p. 90]
The theory of realism transfers the assumption of economic theories - that all actors
are egoistical and wish to maximize their benefits - to the international system : policies
and their results, for example treaties, are a reflection of the international distribution of
interests and power, which crystallizes in relations between states . Accordingly, states
only comply with treaties as long as it is in their interest to do so or a "hegemonsc" state
forces the other nations to comply. If in reality there is a high level of compliance then
according to this school of thought this only shows how accurately the treaties reflect
the international constellations of power and interests, or else how successful the
"hegemonist" is : treaties are dependent variables, their existence and the norms laid
down in them do not influence compliance .
Treaty 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s, Total
Oceans 4 4 14 8 30
Atmosphere 0 0 1 4 5
Nature -
conservation*
1 1 3 2 7
Nuclear 0 4 1 2 7
Antarctic 1 0 1 2 4
Others*" 0 2 6 2 11
Global, overall 5 9 12 7 33
Regional, overall 1 2 14 14 31
Total 6 11 26 21 64
In contrast, institutionalism proceeds from the possibility that actors recognize and
pursue the public interest or common good and that this orientation is supported by
international provisions and treaties . Treaties do not only reflect power and interests but
they also alter the behaviour of states and their relationships, and encourage them to
act in accordance with the agreed norms . Accordingly, treaties are independent
variables whereas the states' behaviour represents a dependent variable to a certain
degree [Mitchell 1992] . Representatives of institutionalism [Chayes 1993] specify further
reasons for the states' disposition towards compliance:
1 3
It is efficient to follow agreed norms . Since decisions always consume resources,
administrations cannot regularly analyse for all agreements whether a contractual
violation would be worthwhile . Organization theory reaches the same result when
it emphasizes that bureaucratic systems discharge their duties in an established
routine, which also includes the implementation of treaties . Deviations from this
bureaucratic efficiency can only be achieved with great political effort. Admittedly,
it is apparent here that politics and society do play a role . At least as far as the
decision-making processes are concerned, centralistic dictatorships are more
easily able to break out of the routine than federal, democratic constitutional
states .
The interests of the states involved are precisely defined for the long term in a
common learning process, also involving international actors, before concluding a
treaty so that compliance reflects a compromise supported by all parties. If
compliance is slight then this expresses an unfair balance of interests . Attention is
therefore drawn to the negotiating processes for material regulations .
"Pacta sunt servanda", treaties which have been concluded must be complied
with . This basic norm of international law is in the interest of all states since only in
this way can vital stability and predictability be maintained in the international
system . Furthermore, international interest groups emerge who have an interest in
compliance by their respective nation for economic or other reasons and who urge
compliance on the national authorities .
1 4
A critical assessment of the present state of the art in international relations
[Rittberger 1990] comes to the conclusion that neither of the two theories can claim to
give plausibly and empirically reliable reasons for (non)compliance . It is difficult for
realism to explain why states still comply with treaties even if the interest and power
positions (structure) of those involved have changed, whereas institutionalism has
problems in explaining the by no means unique contractual violations in general and the
"accumulations" of infringements with respect to location and subject . (Some states
seem to violate treaties more often and breach of commitment is more frequent in some
issue areas than others .) The question remains open of whether this is related to the
intensity of verification, the probability of detecting the violation and thus to the
possibility of sanctions . Corresponding evidence that reliable safeguards and credible
threats of sanctions lead to increased compliance would support the explanatory power
of the realistic theory .
This clash of theories, which still remains to be settled, is not an academic exercise and
has serious implications for the conception of verification systems since the realists
expect an opportunistic defiance of treaties so that the participants in the issue areas
regarded as relevant would have to remain vigilant to obtain the highest possible
degree of certainty about the behaviour of all parties . The need for verification is very
high and verification would therefore have to be very dense and intrusive .
Institutionalism, which bases its arguments on consistent, predictable compliance with
agreements on the part of states, would in contrast be satisfied with a small degree of
certainty and a low verification density and would cut back the demands made on the
organization of the verification system on the international level .
2.3
	
Reasons for treaty violations
A uniform understanding of treaty violations has been assumed so far . However,
institutionalism mentions further causes of treaty violations which are given less weight
in the theory of realism [Chayes 1993]. The need for verification changes depending on
which of the reasons for noncompliance is regarded as decisive :
1 5
1 .
	
In principle, the possibility of international treaty violations is acknowledged by all
schools of thought . They may serve directly to achieve advantages or avert the
disadvantages which may arise if commitments are fulfilled . A violation of
commitments is an intentional act of considered government policy . In the political
discussion and in the theory of realism, treaty violations are generally regarded as
the expression of such a specific policy directed towards the states' own
advantage. Intrusive verification is justified and has its field of activity here . It is
intended to detect unambiguous signs of deviant behaviour at the earliest possible
stage and insist on the correction of this behaviour, if necesssary by means of
negative incentives (international enforcement, dispute settlement, cf.
[Sands 1993]) . The percentage of all violations represented by this type of treaty
violation is not clear.
2 . Capacity shortage in implementing treaties . In arms control, the commitments
agreed in the treaty are addressed directly to the states . They have to reduce
weapons systems, dispense with weapons tests or subject themselves to other
restrictions . As a rule, only the state itself has armed forces, it alone is responsible
for implementing the provisions and also has direct access to the objects to be
controlled, which are government organs . In the majority of cases, the state is in a
position to fulfil its commitments if so inclined, i .e . it has the capacities to
implement the treaties or can make these capacities available relatively rapidly .
Capacity problems are the exception, but they do indeed occur. There are, for
example, technical problems in destroying chemical weapons or in making nuclear
weapons material unusable . The problems are often rooted in the specific politico-
economic inadequacies of the respective state . In many other agreements,
however, not least in the case of environmental protection, although the states are
the contracting parties nevertheless the provisions are directed towards
influencing the behaviour of social entities, e.g . industry or individuals, whose
activities are responsible, for instance, for greenhouse gas emissions . (Emissions
of GHGs directly attributable to government action are estimated to be in the range
of a few percent and largely arise in the military sector (including the production
and maintenance of the military hardware and infrastructure)) . In order to alter its
behaviour in such a way that it corresponds to the overall result of the treaty goal,
each state must undertake intermediate steps in order to reach the "lower" level of
3.
	
A time delay in the implementation of agreements can be observed for many
environmental treaties . This is closely connected with the problems discussed in
the previous paragraph and may be expected at an earlier point if more time and
resources are required for the implementation of commitments . In this case, there
may be "latecomers" whose compliance may be regarded as low at an early point
after the treaty comes into force . This might simply involve difficulties during a
transition period and should not be regarded as a violation of the treaty. A decision
on effective compliance can therefore not simply depend on a single event but
rather on a longitudinal analysis taking into consideration the dynamics of
compliance .
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social actors : legislation, administrative regulations, implementation and
safeguards (national enforcement, cf. Sands 1993) . There are no comparable
problems of various levels in arms control . Thus, for example, in implementing
environmental agreements many deficits in regulative governmental capacities
may be revealed, there may be a lack of scientific and technical competence to
develop implementation strategies and instruments, and deficiencies in the
bureaucratic implementation and safeguarding capabilities or inadequate financial,
technical and staff resources may become apparent .' Such problems are by no
means rare and the contracting parties often make efforts to take remedial action .
For instance, financial, technical and administrative support for "developing
countries" in fulfilling their commitments is incorporated in the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its amendments, as well as in
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which only refer to the
determination of greenhouse gas emissions and the drafting of programmes to
combat the anthropogenic greenhouse gas effect . A special problem arises in
"transition economies", the former stated-controlled economies, whose politico-
administrative systems are in part still inadequate so that it is difficult to estimate
the actual implementation of environmental agreements [Kotov 1994] .
See (Jänicke 1993) for the debate on the possibilities and limitations ofgovernment action, particularly in the environmental sector .
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4 .
	
An attitude of government policy lying between intentional treaty violations and
those due to lack of capacity may be termed unwillingness to implement, or a lack
of readiness . This does not involve falsification or the lack of ability to implement
the treaty, but rather passive refusal (without this becoming too apparent) to
implement the necessary steps or to perform them with the diligence required - a
type of behaviour which may be very difficult for the other parties to detect .
5. Finally, "normative inexactitudes ("ambiguity') in the sense of a vagueness or or
broad interpretation of commitments" [Lang 1994, p . 822] may lead to violations,
i .e . the parties' commitments are not defined clearly enough in the contractual
agreements. This involves a subtype of unintentional violations .
Treaty violations may therefore also be the result of a well-meaning but incompetent
policy so that it should not be assumed that the state is unwilling to comply with the
treaty. If the capacity-related or the "time lag" violations are dominant, and not
intentional treaty violations due to lack of willingness or intentional violations, then on
the basis of confidence in the readiness of the state to comply with its commitments,
verification could be designed to be less intrusively exposing and instead more
implementation-oriented and corrective . Admittedly, this would necessarily assume that
all states had a basic interest in solving the problem and regarded the treaty provisions
as a fair compromise . This refers back to the two schools of thought and their
explanatory power for the origin of international treaties .
It must be remembered that although those schools of thought regarding international
relations recognize a general need for verification of international agreements, also in
the issue area of the environment and particularly for climate protection, nevertheless
they represent different positions in the central quesiton of how dense this verification
should be and the emphasis to be given to various models of treaty violation .
2.4 Verification within the framework of a climate convention and its
protocols
On the basis of the recognition of the basic need for verification concerning a climate
convention, a specific analysis should determine the required verification density in a
pragmatic manner .
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International cooperation in protecting a global common is particularly difficult since all
relevant participants must contribute towards the protective goal and at the same time
there is an incentive to take on the position of a free-rider and personally contribute
nothing towards protecting the global common but to profit from other countries'
successful protective measures . Climate is a global common of this type [cf.
Utsch 1993] . Furthermore, countries are affected to a different extent by measures for
climate protection and some countries - according to much less precisely informed
speculations - could even profit from climate change and its consequences [cf.
Fischer 1992 ; Oberthür 1993] .
These special features also characterize the determination of the necessary verification
density, which is the result of several factors :
1 .
	
The extent of the mutual uncertainty on the part of states concerning compliance
with a convention . In the case of a climate convention, uncertainty about
compliance is relatively high in comparison to other environmental treaties
[Efinger/Breitmeier 1991]. The reasons for this are : a) If almost all countries are
members of the climate convention, then the sheer numbers increase the chance
that violations of the provisions will remain undetected . b) The states have
different scales of preferences tending towards either climate protection or
economic growth. This arouses uncertainty concerning compliance if the two goals
come into conflict . c) A large number of governmental and non-governmental
actors are contracting parties or are affected by the national implementation of a
convention ; a large number of measures must be implemented and their success
controlled . d) Supplier countries wish to obtain evidence from recipient countries
that the funds transferred for climate protection have been used appropriately . e)
Results of (conceivable) programmes on the joint implementation of climate
protection measures must also be verified as well as the envisaged ????-based
compensation models for the optimum distribution of funds among countries where
the greatest reduction in GHG emissions can be achieved . f) The states have
different agrees of ability to control the implementation of agreed policies ; there is
a lack of methods, g) There may be countries which regard themselves as
"winners" with respect to climate change or as "losers" of a protective strategy and
which have been forced into the climate convention without any intention of
complying with the provisions .
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2 .
	
The dominant conflict type [Efinger/Breitmeier 1991] . Typologies concerning the
subject of a conflict assume that the way in which countries act is determined by
the nature of the subject : The climate (convention) issue area is one of the type of
conflicts concerning means or interests with respect to absolutely valued goods
and is therefore less competitive and comparatively open to cooperation . (In the
case of conflicts about means, the aims are not in dispute but rather "only" the
means of achieving the goal . Conflicts of interest about absolutely valued goods,
such as sufficient food, clean water, pure air, offer good chances of being solved
since these goods - within limits - can be increased and have their own value for
each actor, quite irrespective of how much the other parties possess.)
Consequently, distrust concerning the behaviour of other states and thus the need
for verification is lower than in the issue area of (international) security and arms
control where questions of power represent an important aspect, i .e . relative
goods. Zero-sum games are frequently encountered here . Nevertheless, the
drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 60 to 80 % required by many
scientists (for the highly industrialized countries) could result in such serious
impacts on the economy and patterns of trade that conflicts about relative goods
(shifts in power) may arise . Within the framework of such a strict (still very
hypothetic) convention, which would be a medium for modifying international
power structures, there would be a great incentive to deviate from commitments .
Consequently the verification density would increase together with the regulation
density of the convention .
3. The significance of the issue area. After the first oil shock, the concept of
(international) security was supplemented by an economic dimension (economic
security) . Today the "ecological dimension of security" is emphasized, not least
with a view to the consequences of the climate problem for politics and science
[Sands 1993 ; critical attitude : Daase 1992] . In the case of security-relevant
problems, there is a desire for more, and more precise, information about the
actual behaviour of the other states . Only in this way can it be ensured that some
contracting parties are not clandestinely evading the costs and burdens of a
climate convention . This is closely related to the problem of free-riders .
4 . The consequences of a convention violation . Relative to the individual event,
these consequences would be of less objective relevance than a violation in the
case of arms control treaties . "Clandestine" emissions of several million tonnes of
carbon (C) would be of marginal significance in view of global anthropogenic
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releases in the order of six billion tonnes of C . A verification system for a climate
convention therefore need not display the density regarded as necessary for arms
control where every atomic warhead and every carrier system counts . From the
perspective of climate policy, however, the individual violation is not a problem but
rather the signalling effect of such an event or indeed even the suspicion that
there might be substantial undetected violations. The entire climate regime might
collapse (domino effect) . The detection of less serious, persistent violations must
therefore be ensured .
As a result, it may be established that the need for verification in the issue area of
climate protection is initially low and mainly concentrated on violations resulting from
capacity shortages or implementation delays (time lag) . One reason for this is the low
regulation depth of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which only contains
a few, fuzzily formulated material commitments [Oberthür 1993 ; Fischer 1992] providing
hardly any starting points for verification . The verification system for the Framework
Convention on Climate Change therefore displays a low verification density and
concentrates on verifying the completeness, transparency and reconstructibility of
national emission declarations or on compliance with certain criteria in drawing up the
declarations (e.g . consideration of emission factors) . There is no independent
verification of the correctness of the declared data . If a dynamic climate protection
regime should develop and protocols with extensive, precisely timed and burdensome
commitments for the reduction of greenhouse gases should be agreed then there will
probably be a moderate verification need which would also pay increasing attention to
the elements of international treaty violation . Verification density will increase and will
also have to consider the correctness of national data on emissions etc. Verification
density would then probably be somewhere between the intrusive safeguarding of
disarmament agreements and the low verification density which has characterized most
environmental protection treaties to date.
The following discussion .assumes a need for verification above the present level and
implicitly assumes more stringent regulations with a firmer timetable and incorporating
more countries and more emission sectors for the limitation and reduction of GHG
emissions than the present (slight) regulation density . Based on this assumption, the
question arises of the instruments and methods which can be used to verify such a
strengthened climate convention and whether some of them may already be able tocontribute towards verifying the present meagre commitments .
3.1
	
National declaration
3.9.9 Declaration commitments
In the FCCC, commitments with respect to communicating information on the
implementation of the treaty (national report) are laid down in Article 4(1) and Article 12.
They are considerably more extensive for highly developed industrial states than for
other countries and, to the extent that they directly refer to the countries' own emission
problems, comprise the following information :
- a national register of anthropogenic GHG emissions (apart from substances
covered by the Montreal Protocol) from sources, taking into consideration their
degradation by sinks ; for this purpose comparable methods are to be applied ;
- a precise description of policies and measures resolved for the fulfilment of
commitments ;
- an estimate of the impacts of these policies and measures on anthropogenic GHG
emissions and the development of sinks, i .e . forecasts or scenarios of the effect of
measures and policies ;
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3 Elements of Verification in a Climate Convention and its
Protocols
Declaration and verification are directly related to each other so that any discussion of
verification problems also requires a consideration of the declaration on which they are
based . The declaration records what the states have done and what they intend to do . It
is a (in part quantified) activity and planning report which is the starting point for and
subject of international verification . What the states have to declare is generally
described in the treaty. Verification refers to these declarations . It is facilitated if not
only subject matter but also forms and methods are predefined serving as a guide for
the states in compiling their reports. This is also the case within the framework of the
FCCC and if the commitments are to be expanded, the demands made on such terms of
reference will also increase . For this reason, before undertaking a detailed analysis of
methods and techniques of verification, attention will be directed to the national reports
and important terms of reference with respect to their structure .
Article 4(3,4,5) also contains a commitment to provide information on the
special provision of assistance and aid to "developing countries" in
connection with the Convention .
- further information which may be
useful .
A summary of these commitments can be
found in Table 3.
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If one takes a look at the national reports
compiled in 1994 then it is immediately
striking that a dominant role is played by
statements on (future) measures and
policies, and their (conceivable or probable)
results . Based on experience with
verification in general and with reporting
commitments in other environmental
agreements, this concentration on
qualitative aspects is unusual . It can only
be explained by the present status of
regulations within the framework of the
FCCC which does not lay down any targets
or timetables with respect to emission goals
even for developed industrial countries.
Apart from a compilation of present
emissions, quantitative aspects are hardly
required . Emphasis is still placed on
policies and measures which at some time
or another should lead to a reduction in
GHG emissions . If, as assumed here, the
FCCC should develop into a real climate
protection regime and if emission
reductions should be specified in terms of
time and quantity, then the quantitative
declaration will also take on central
significance and greater weight in the
national reports . However, on the basis of
the present commitment catalogue this will also be the case at least in the medium term .
Implemented policies and measures must after all at some time lead to a limitation or
reduction of GHG emissions, they must at some time become quantifiable. As far as the
reduction of GHGs is concerned, they are proof of the success or failure of policies and
Main Elements of
Information Contained
in National Communications
(1) Inventories
Emission estimates (by
gas, by main sourcelsink
activities) *)
Emission factors (by gas,
by main source/sink
activities)
Activity data *)
Method description
Discussion of data quali-
ty/uncertainty
(2) Policies and Measures
Description
Identification of
individual measures,
type, objective and
their status .
Benchmarks and how
effects are to be
monitored over time.
How the measure is
functioning .
(3) Proiections and Effects
of Measures for the Year 2000
Gas bygasfor C02,
CH4, N20 emissions and
C02 removals (separate)
- projection
- total effects
- individual effects
Model descriptions and
quality discussion
Key assumptions (1990
and 2000
*) Data points that can be
checked against independently
_published estimates .
Table 3
measures . The qualitative sections of the national report will undoubtedly retain their
significance but will gradually recede into the background in favour of quantitative
emission declarations. This actually all comes out against making the compilation of
GHG inventories the centre of activities by international organizations at present . If,
however, as will be shown, they receive the greatest attention then one reason for this
is that the compiling of a base line for the respective national GHG emissions on the
basis of comparable measures is accorded a central role . For only if they are more or
less reliable, comparable and capable of achieving an international consensus can
reduction steps be reconstructible . At the same time, their compilation according to the
most uniform possible method, while still remaining reconstructible, is a prerequisite for
verification, which is to be part of a more highly developed climate regime. If the
methods and procedures for determining emissions are inpenetrable, inadequate or not
comparable, then verification will fail since in this case only the inpenetrableness,
inadequacy or non-comparability can be established in the verification process.
3.9.2
	
Greenhouse gas inventories
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All these reasons plead the case for paying close attention to this central aspect of
declaration .
The regular compilation of reliable (national) emission inventories comprising all
essential sources (and sinks) is of central significance for the global restriction of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions which is the aim of the climate convention .
These inventories are the basis for assessing the effectiveness of national measures for
reducing greenhouse gas releases . Transparency and reconstructibility of the data and
methods on which compilation of the inventories is based are essential for international
comparability and verification . Even if commitments for limiting GHG emissions were
tightened up and extended to more countries, compiling the inventories would receive
central significance thus justifying more detailed consideration of these inventories.
In the following, the present status of international efforts towards developing uniform
methods of compiling inventories is examined . Furthermore, studies of the data base in
Germany will be discussed in order to provide an instance of the data quality currently
to be expected in national communications with the example of the situation in a highly
developed industrialized country .
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3.1 .2.1
	
IPCC/OECD method development
Probably the most important impetus for international method development emanates
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was set up in 1988
by the two United Nations organizations WMO (World Meteorological Organization) and
UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme) . The tasks first undertaken by the
IPCC in three working groups composed of experts cooperating worldwide are
- assessment of the scientific knowledge available on climate change,
- estimate of the socio-economic and other environmental impacts of climate change
and
- formulation of avoidance strategies .
The first comprehensive scientific report by IPCC was published in 1990 [IPCC 1990], a
supplement dates from February 1992 [IPCC 1992] . The second comprehensive report
is to be presented in advance at the 11th IPCC Plenary Session in Rome in autumn
1995 . A Special Report by the IPCC, containing amongst other aspects the global
warming potentials and the "Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories", will
be published at the Conference of the Parties in March 1995 .
In developing methods and establishing guidelines for compiling national greenhouse
gas inventories, IPCC is supported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which presented its first comprehensive report in August 1991
[OECD 1991] . This is to be regarded as the first milestone along the path towards
developing an internationally agreed methodology, so-called Guidelines, which initially
comprise the gases CO2, CH4, NMVOC (non-methane volatile organic compounds), CO,
N20 and NO.,, All known essential greenhouse gas sources influenced by man will be
covered, ranging from energy and industrial technology to the waste economy and the
sectors of food industry, forestry, utilization of biomass and the consequences of
modified farming methods . In February 1994, dispatch was started of the three-volume
"IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories" [IPCC 1994a] . This
revised version will be available for the Conference of the Parties in 1995 .
The methods developed by IPCC/DECD and internationally approved are to be
regarded as a proposal to the states ; they will not be bound to apply these methods .
According to the current treaty position, the states can also make use of their own
methods although they must ensure the transparency and comparability of the methods,
and thus of the inventories. With respect to verification, which is now also an IPCC
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topic, this means that it must be adapted to the respective national method of data
collection, which naturally increases the effort involved . An agency entrusted with the
task of verification will have to collect a vast quantity of information in order to assess
the various national communications . Such information should comprise energy
statistics, demographic and economic data, as well as details of structures and trends in
the industrial, transport or agricultural sector, i .e . as much data as possible which may
be used as indicators of the correctness and completeness of the declared inventories.
3.1.2.2
	
Method development within the framework of UNO activities
An important development in connection with IPCC/OECD method development, and
also related to it, may be the envisaged compilation of an "Emission Inventory
Guidebook" as outlined in the form of a proposal at the UN-ECE (United Nations
Economic Cooperation in Europe) Task Force Meeting on Emission Inventories in Delft,
The Netherlands, on 7 June 1993 [ECE 1993] . The aim of the Guidebook is to provide a
comprehensive summary of methods for determining the inventory of each gas to be
inventorized and all sources to be identified . This has also been undertaken with the
awareness that fulfilment of commitment to compile inventories undertaken within the
framework of various environmental agreements must not be made more difficult by
divergent methods.
Accordingly, the Guidebook should be designed in such a way that it covers the
inventory requirements of at least the most important international activities such as
those of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Fifth
Environment Action Programme of the European Community, or IPCC/OECD activities.
The following gases will be included : S02 , NO,,, NMVOC, CH4, CO, CO2, N20, NH3 and
to a certain extent heavy metal and POP (persistent organics) releases . One chapter
will deal with verification . A first incomplete draft of the . Guidebook was presented at a
UNECE/EMEP Task Force Meeting at Regensburg in June 1994 [ECE 1994]. The
second draft will be adopted at the next Task Force Meeting in Oslo in June 1995 .
The Guidebook is based on the source-oriented approach of the CORINAIR emission
inventory of the EU . However, close DECD/IPCC cooperation should ensure that the
approach will not only be applicable for one programme so that finally harmonization
can be achieved . As an initial step, software was developed to convert CORINAIR data
into IPCC inventories. It is hoped that the methods will be largely harmonized by 1996 .
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3.9.2.3
	
Data base for greenhouse gas emissions in Germany
The first national report by the Federal Republic of Germany [BMU 1994x] was
published in September 1994 thus fulfilling its obligation to compile a report after
ratifying the FCCC of Rio de Janeiro . In its Chapter 3 "Inventories on Anthropogenic
Emissions and Determination in Stores and Sinks" it contains a summary of the
quantities of the gases CO2 , CH4, N20, CO and NMVOC released in 1990 as well as
individual data on the very long-lived (up to 50,000 a for CF4 ) gases CF4 , C2Fs and SF6.
An overview of the German 1990 inventories compiled according to sectors as well as
the assessment of the reliability of the data for the most important greenhouse gases
CO2 , CH4 and N20 - both taken from [BMU 1994] - is given in Tables 4 and 5 .
" Not included in total emissions
Source : Federal Environment Agency
Tab. 4 : Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990 in Germany
Germany
Former West Germany Area of the former GDR
Sources and sinks of
greenhouse gases
co,
Mt/a
CH,
kt/a
N,O
kda
NO,
as NO,
kt/a
CO
kda
NMVOC
not including
CFCs/CCs
kda
Total emissions 1 012 6 218 223 2 944 10 768 2 978
709 303 5 015 1203 183 40 2 377 566 7 131 3 637 2 234 744
1 . Energy-related 983 1767 . 33 2 923 10 104 1 679
687 296 1574 193 24 9 2361T561 652613578 1093 586
2. Industrial processes 29 11 100 21, 664 129
22 7 9 2 95 5 16 5 605 59 11-1 18
3. Use of solvents and 6 1170
products 5 1 1030 140
4. Agriculture 2043 80 n.a. n.a. n.a .
1497 546 55 25 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a .
5. Land use changes (-20)
and forestry" (-14) (-6)
6. Wastemanagement n.a . 2 397 4 n.a . n.a. n.a.
n.a . n.a. 1935 462 4 n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a. n.a . n.a
High-seas bunkerings" 8 0 n.a . 155 37 16
7 1 0 0 128 27 31 7 13 3
International 11 0 n.a . 50 58 9
air transport" I 11 I 1 0 0 n.a . n.a. 49 2 54 4 9 1
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Table 4 clearly shows the dominance of energy-related emissions for C02 accounting
for 97 % of total emissions . In contrast, only 28 % of the emissions are energy-related
for CH4, whereas the waste economy dominates with 39 %. In the case of N02, the
energy-related fractions with 15 % in comparison to agriculture (36 %) and industrial
processes (45 %) are of minor significance . Industrial N20 releases will also drop
significantly in future due to process modification at the two nylon producers.
With the exception of methane and N20, the data quality is only classified as E
(excellent) by the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA) for the energy-related
emissions . According to the UBA, this category is defined as having deviations of less
than ± 10 %. In contrast the ranges F (fair) and P (poor) are not quantifiable .
Insights into the data situation are provided by two studies commissioned within the
framework of IKARUS Subproject 9 from the Öko-Institut in Darmstadt . The aim of the
first study [Fritsche 1992] was to evaluate the data bases in Germany for energy-related
climatically relevant emissions .
Four data sources were available for the analysis, namely the Federal Environmental
Agency (UBA), the Programme Group Systems Analysis and Technology Evaluation of
the Research Centre Jülich (KFA-STE), the Öko-Institut e.V . and the Institute of Energy
and Environmental Research (IFEU) in cooperation with the Technical Control Board
(TÜV) Rhineland . Of these, only the data bases of the UBA and the Öko-Institut
provided information about the majority of greenhouse gas emissions from different
sectors, whereas KFA-STE only considered C02 from the combustion of fossil energy
carriers and IFEU/TÜV only the transport sector. Furthermore, according to these
findings, the data available for Eastern Germany are often unreliable or incompatible
with the data for Western Germany.
The analysis of the features and content of the four data bases showed that in general
no primary information was available but rather secondary data supplied by
"intermediate collectors" (e.g . from energy associations, the Association for Energy
Balances (AGEB), federal and state ministries and authorities) or originate from the
literature,
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" Qualitative evaluation of data accuracy
E Excellent
F Fair
P Poor
Source : Federal Environment Agency
Tab . 5 :
	
Assessment of the Data Reliability for the Most Important German 1990
Greenhouse Gas Inventories
Sources and sinks of greenhouse gases CO, CH, N,0
1 . Energy-related emissions E F F
A Combustion-related E F F
1 Energy generation and transformation E E F
2 Industry E F F
3 Traffic and transport E F F
4 Small consumers E F F
5 Households E F F
6 Agriculture and forestry E F F
7 Other E F P
8 Burning of biomass - P P
B Non-combustion-related E P F
1 Extraction and distribution of oil and gas E F F
2 Coal mining - P -
2 . Industrial processes F F F
A Iron and steel industry - F -
B Non-ferrous metal production F - -
C Chemical industry (inorganic) F F F
D Chemical industry (organic) - - E
E Nonmetallic minerals F - -
F Other - F -
3. Use of solvents and products - - F
A Painting - - -
B Degreasing and dry cleaning - - -
C Production and use of chemical products - - -
D Other - - F
4 . Agriculture - F P
A Fermentation - F -
B Animal waste - P P
D Agricultural soils - - P
E Burning of agricultural waste - - -
5. Land-use changes and forestry F - -
A Conversion of forest land to arable or pasture land - - -
B Conversion of grassland to arable land - - -
C Set-aside of agricultural land - - -
D Managed forests F - -
6 . Waste management - P P
A Dumpsites - P -
B Wastewater treatment - P P
C Other -
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The situation with the methods used for assessing the greenhouse gas emissions often
proved to be unfavourable . Frequently, only subjective estimates were available on the
basis of scattered information . This is generally true of CHa emissions from non-
energetic sources . The situation with respect to N20 emissions was even more
unfavourable . With a view to verification, this means that the lack of clear standards
may lead to difficulties in assessing the reliability of declared values.
Due to these methodological inadequacies, the 6ko-Institut placed major emphasis on
determining emission factors and also on methods of estimating the energy-related
emissions of C02 from the combustion of fossil energy carriers . To this end, the
characteristics of the fuels in question were described and evaluated . It became
apparent here that although in many cases values from different sources were not in
agreement thus leading to variations in emission factors (i.e. of the greenhouse gases
emitted in the mass per unit of converted energy), nevertheless, in comparison with
other greenhouse gases the quality of energy-related C02 emission data can be
regarded as good . In determining the completeness of the combustion process it was
assumed for the majority of emission processes considered that oxidation was
complete . This assumption is correct for plants with typical burn-up rates of 99 % and
more, and is also in accordance with the current IPCC approach of complete carbon
conversion . Only in Eastern Germany burn-up factors of as little as 80 % due to
unfavourable combustion conditions when using domestic lignite have been found - a
problem which, however, is becoming increasingly less significant with the current
restructuring and technological modernization taking place there .
The most important data source for calculating C02 emissions from the energy sector
has proved to be the Association for Energy Balances (AGEB) . The AGEB provides
consistent energy balances for Western Germany, which have also been extended to
the new federal states in Eastern Germany for the years after 1991 . The 6ko-Institut
study shows that the present AGEB methodology is capable of improvement,
particularly with respect to the completeness of data and allocation of calorific values to
certain fuels . If the improvements are made then a restriction of uncertainty for
energy-related C02 emissions in Germany in the order of less than t 5% is to be
expected .
The Öko-Institut furthermore expects that the uncertainties in the overall emissions may
be
	
reduced to values of about ± 1 % by solving the delimitation problems of
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transboundary traffic and also definition questions involved in C02.relevant
non-energetic consumption .
As noted above, the data uncertainties for other energy-related greenhouse gas
emissions are considerably greater, above all in the transport sector, but also in the
other final energy sectors . Improvements may result here from the IKARUS data .
Whereas the IKARUS project concentrates on energy-related greenhouse gas releases,
the topic of "verification within the framework of an international greenhouse gas
convention" cannot be restricted to this alone but must also include the other emissions
caused by man . In order to obtain an overall view of the data situation in Germany in
this respect as well, the Öko-Institut was commissioned with a further study on the data
bases of non-energy-related greenhouse gas emissions [Buchert 1993] .
The study is concerned with the trace gases C02, CH4, N20, NOx, NMVOC, S02 and
CO, as well as CFCs and CRCs, directly or indirectly influencing the climate, from the
sectors of industry, agriculture and forestry as well as waste management . Furthermore,
it points to other greenhouse gases, to which little attention has been paid as yet, but
which are becoming increasingly important due to their long atmospheric life (see
above) such as sulphur hexafluoride or tetra- and hexafluoromethane emissions
originating from aluminium production .
The UBA data base was the only German data base to be identified by the Öko-Institut
as comprehensive . Only publications on subsectors of greenhouse gas emission were
found from other institutions such as the Federal Ministries of the Environment or
Agriculture and Forestry, environmental agencies of the federal states, industrial
associations and research establishments .
On the whole, the Öko-Institut established that uncertainties in the data base are to be
estimated at about t 50% in the most favourable case, and that variation ranges -
about an unknown average - often exceed a factor of 2 .
It is considered possible that the data position for specific releases of S02, NOx and
CO can be improved for strong emitters in the next few years by means of continuous
measurements, whereas the Öko-Institut does not expect any significant improvement
for NMVOC, CH4, N20 and C02. There are still methodological problems with CFCs
and CHCs in converting consumption data to emission data (consideration of the
banking effect, e.g . by the confinement of CFCs in foams), in considering and assigning
stored transboundary quantities as well as in disposal .
A considerable need for research to improve the data situation has been identified in
the sectors of agriculture, forestry and waste management. Here greenhouse gas
inventories are based practically exclusively on estimates with a mainly small, often
foreign data basis .
The data problems are exacerbated, particularly in agriculture and forestry and for the
GHGs of C02 and CH4 , by the comprehensive approach laid down in the FCCC. It
envisages compiling a net emission balance for GHGs, offsetting emissions and sinks
against each other. Precisely the quantitative recording of sink capacities is difficult and
involves great uncertainties ; in some sectors no data at all are available yet (see
Table 5) . A verification of such data can only confirm the great uncertainty of the
estimates so that the comprehensive approach considerably complicates verification .
3.9.3
	
Global warming potentials
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The quantities of greenhouse gases released do not themselves give any indication of
their significance for the climate ; this requires a weighting with respect to their radiative
forcing .
The Global Warming Potential (GWP) was developed to obtain a manageable value for
political decisions and has now become accepted on an international level [IPCC 1990,
1992, 1994b] and, in spite of all its weaknesses, will continue in future to serve to
assess the radiative forcing of the various gases .
As a simple multiplier, GWP designates the radiative forcing of the released quantity of
the gas under consideration as a multiple of that of C02 ; i .e . it provides direct C02
equivalents and thus a direct yardstick for assessing the overall radiative forcing in the
optimization calculations of the technical measures determined . However, due to their
mutual influence, current GWPs are strictly speaking only valid for the atmosphere in its
present composition.
Publications by the IPCC [IPCC 1990 and 1992] contain a detailed description of the
concept of the global warming potential . The available current numerical values have
been compiled in a recently published "Summary for Policy Makers" [IPCC 1994b] ; a
a
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comprehensive report is expected in autumn 1995 . The following discussion is based
on the above-mentioned IPCC reports .
The GWP describes the integrated contribution to radiative forcing over a period of t
years (= induced radiation energy flux change at the tropopause) of the gas i for the
spontaneous release of a unit of quantity (1 kg) in comparison to that for the release of
1 kg of C02. It follows that:
GIT"P; _ fo aic;dt
fo aC02 CC02 dt
greenhouse effect from the released unit quantity
concentration of trace gas at time t after release .
Attention should be drawn to the fact that as indicated by the term "global warming
potential", the GWP is an indicator of possible impacts on climatic events worldwide . It
can thus only refer to gases whose lifetime or residence time (generally defined as the
period until degradation to the 1le-fold) permits a global mixing in the atmosphere, i .e . is
counted in at least years . However, attempts are being made to apply the GWP concept
to short-lived species such as NO., non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC)
or aerosols, although these methods are still under development.
In determining the GWP, a differentiation is made between direct and indirect global
warming potential . Direct GWPs refer to the direct greenhouse effect of long-lived trace
gases . [IPCC 1994b] includes C02 (residence time 125 t 75 a), CH4 (14.5 ± 2.5 a), N20
(132 a), various halogenated hydrocarbons with residence times of up to more than
1500 a as well as some extremely long-lived compounds, mainly fluorocarbon
compounds with residence times of up to 50,000 a (CF4) . Indirect GWPs, which must be
added to the direct GWPs, result from the formation of radiative forcing daughter
products during the chemical degradation of trace gases. If the "mother" trace gases are
themselves long-lived, i .e. if they are capable of global mixing in the atmosphere, then
the GWP approach is also appropriate for short-lived daughter products such as ozone
(days) or (tropospheric) water vapour (8 days),
	
as for example from methane
degradation . The same is true of the formation of long-lived daughter products from the
degradation of short-lived mothers, thus for example C02 formation during the oxidation
of CO (months) or non-methane hydrocarbons (days to months) . Whereas in the 1990
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IPCC report quantitative data were still given on the indirect GWPs, due to great
uncertainties they were only included in the 1992 report by indicating their plus or minus
sign . In the 1994 report only the GWP of methane - except for its conversion into C02 -
contains its indirect fraction as well .
The most recent GWPs from [IPCC 1994b] are compiled in Table 6 for the most
important long-lived trace gases, which cover approx . 85 % of the anthropogenic
greenhouse contribution . In comparison to the 1992 methane data the GWPs have
approximately doubled and have increased by up to approx. 20 % for other gases . The
typical uncertainty margin for GWPs is in the region of ± 35 %.
From [Bundestag 1990]. The remaining 15 % is distributed between ozone (7) and others
(this distribution can only give an idea of the relative weighting ; corrections are to be
expected on the basis of new findings). Indirect effects from the formation of tropospheric
ozone and stratospheric water vapour are included in the GWP of CH4, but not from the
formation of C02. The remaining GWPs only include direct fractions.
Table 6 :
	
Global warming potentials (GWPs) for the most important long-lived
trace gases relative to the mass (kg) of the input gas
Source : [IPCC 1994b]
The following remarks should be made on Table 6:
a) Due to the different lifetimes of the trace gases, the integration time (see formula
on page 30) plays an essential role in evaluating their relative radiative forcing . The
time horizon to be applied depends largely on the goal of the respective analysis . 100 a
is usual . As far as the residence time of C02 as a reference value is concerned, it is
specified in [IPCC 1994b] with a bandwidth of 50 to 200 a . It is to be assumed that an
Gas Contribution
to additional
greenhouse
effect [%]*
Lifetime
[a]
GWP for integration times
20 a 100 a 500 a
Positive or
negative sign of
the indirect GWP
[IPCC 1992]
C02 50 125 ± 75 1 1 1 -
CH4 13 14.5 ± 2.5 62 24.5 7.5 positive
N20 5 132 290 320 180 unknown
CFC 11 5 50 f 5 5000 4000 1400 negative
CFC 12 12 I 102 7900 8500 4200 negative
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average C02 residence time of 125 a was used in calculating the GWPs; a value which
is 5 a above that from [IPCC 1992].
b)
	
Although the indirect GWPs are only qualitatively mentioned in Tab. 6,
nevertheless they may possibly have a weight similar to the direct GWPs.
To date, the following major effective factors are known for the individual gases :
C02 behaves inertly in the atmosphere . However, due to its influence on
temperature distribution it could influence the chemical reactions of other trace
gases .
90 % of methane is decomposed to C02 and water vapour in the troposphere by
reactions with OH radicals, in the course of which ozone simultaneously results.
The latter and the water vapour arising during methane decomposition in the
stratosphere provide the major contribution to the indirect GWP.
Nz0 is decomposed by photolysis. No indirect effect is indicated .
The indirect greenhouse effect of the CFCs is largely based on the ozone
depletion they cause in the stratosphere . This effect is negative and may largely
compensate for the direct effect of the CFCs, although the geographical
distribution of ozone degradation is unequal .
The remaining gases mentioned above which are covered in the IKARUS project
(NMVOCs, NOx, CO and SOz ) have relatively short lifetimes : NMVOCs days to
months; NOx days ; CO months and S02 weeks. Qualitative data on direct radiative
forcing are only found in [IPCC 1990] for NOx , CO and SOz, where a low
effectiveness is specified for the last two . There are no data on NMVOCs.
The last-mentioned gases - with the exception of NOx , which contributes towards
additional OH radical formation - react with OH radicals ; they thus influence the
lifetime of trace gases, which also undergo a degradation reaction with OH radicals,
such as CH4 . NMVOCs and CO have C02 as their long-lived degradation product with a
correspondingly positive indirect GWP contribution .
The above-mentioned trace gases influence the formation of the greenhouse gas ozone
- largely in the troposphere - NOx being particularly dominant . The indirect contribution
of S02 is especially found in aerosol formation and thus also influences cloud formation .
According to [WMO 1991], the sulphate aerosols in the atmosphere cause a negative
greenhouse effect, which is confirmed by recent model calculations [IPCC 1994b] . In
any case, in the same way as their precursors, they have a short atmospheric lifetime
so that changes in emission are effective within a matter of weeks . It does not seem
possible at present to quantify the radiative forcing of SO2 .
Whereas the indirect effects for NOX , NMVOCs and CO were still quantified positively in
[IPCC 1990] in the ratio 150/31/7 (integration time 20 a), [IPCC 1992] only contains
qualitative statements about the positive or negative sign : positive for NMVOCs and
CO, and indeterminate for NO,,. [IPCC 1994b] does not contain any quantitative values .
In view of their nature, GWPs will defy verification within the framework of an
international climate convention . However, they will have a decisive influence on quality
demands in drawing up inventories of the various greenhouse gas emissions and their
verification . Particular attention should therefore be paid to their development .
3.2
	
Intemational verification
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As a verification of states' compliance, verification is directed in the first instance and
above all towards the national reports . i n which the states provide information about
their compliance . As already outlined, these reports, and this will probably not change
in future, have a quantitative and a qualitative side . The quantitative aspect provides
information about GHG inventories and reduction or stabilization targets . On a
qualitative level, measures and policies for climate protection are laid down . Both
aspects require verification . A first step is the verification of the completeness and
consistency of the GHG inventories . In a further step, it can be verified whether the
declared figures are actually correct and whether the measures have also been
implemented. A gradual transition can be achieved from a verification assuming treaty
violations due to capacity deficiencies and a merely delayed implementation towards a
denser verification system which also includes the possibility of intentional violations . In
this study it is assumed that the material commitments of the highly industrialized
member states of the FCCC will be tightened up both with respect to reduction
commitments and also a determination of precise timetables with respect to achieving
targets. It is also presumed that threshold countries and later also "developing
countries" will undertake some commitments with respect to limiting emissions and
protecting sinks . Recourse will probably be taken to the instrument of protocols, which
has proved its worth in international environmental treaty law and ensures high
flexibility by enabling rapid adaptations to new developments . The elements, techniques
and methods of a graduated verification system comprising the steps of form and
content verification will now be presented.
3.2 .1
	
Review of emission inventories
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International efforts towards developing the climate convention will in coming years
concentrate quite essentially on creating the data bases . Verification in the sense of
reviewing clear, verifiable environmental goals cannot be of significance yet since the
climate convention does not contain any such goals . As a quantitative target for
restricting GHG emissions it merely contains a target for "Annex I" countries of reducing
their anthropogenic release of C02 and other greenhouse gases not included in the
Montreal Protocol, individually or jointly, to the 1990 level . Jones [Jones 1993] draws
attention to the voluntariness of the agreement between sovereign states which does
not include any mechanisms for compelling compliance commitments. He designates
the "real" environmental goal as that which the individual signatory states aim at
themselves.
Nevertheless, verification is already of significance in developing the "Guidelines" for
the declaration of national greenhouse gas inventories by IPCC/DECD (OECD 1993a]
in a cautious manner taking into consideration current problems in introducing the
convention and not yet referring to international treaty violations .
The declared goal is, first of all, improving the quality of inventories,
connection the following is proposed in [Corfee 1994] in the first instance :
- eliminating simple errors based on misconceptions,
- verifying that consistent reporting procedures have been observed, and
- identifying the major uncertainties remaining after a third-party review,
in which
Initial experience is now available in the form of two studies coordinated by the
IPCC/DECD Secretariat . These involve
1 . an in-depth review of 25 provisional national reports by an association of OECD,
IEA and the Dutch National Environmental Institute (RIVM) as well as
2 . a detailed "transparency study" by eight countries .
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In the first case, it became apparent that the problems had been in part considerably
underestimated, above all with respect to comparability and transparency. A positive
aspect was that the countries concerned reacted constructively to enquiries and that in
no case did the reviewing agencies experience a defensive attitude on part of the
national experts they contacted . This interaction led to various improvements both of
the data and also of the methods and has probably improved the quality of the final
national reports .
As far as the transparency study is concerned, in which pairs of countries were to
examine their respective reports on a voluntary basis with regard to reconstructibility,
the greatest surprise was that only one pair of countries had actually cooperated . As a
rule, the studies merely consisted of a comparison of their own national results with
those which would have been obtained by applying the alternative IPCC methods,
which was, however, only one of the tasks set. From this experience, Corfee-Morlot and
Schwengels [Corfee 1994] draw the conclusion that - in contrast to previous INC
discussions which had favoured a review by teams of national experts - verification
should be the task of a transnational, central, well equipped secretariat .
This central agency is apparently increasingly favoured and within the framework of
joint implementation could fulfil an essential function . This also expressed, inter alia, in
[Beirat 1994], in which the Scientific Advisory Council on "Global Environmental
Change" of the German Federal Government recommends that "a supranational
institution (for example the FCCC Secretariat) should be entrusted with the promotion
and verification of joint implementation projects" .
3.2.2
	
Plausibility control through simulation models
One can attempt to verify declared data individually by investigating the process of their
origin . An additional verification possibility arises if data are related to each other . This
may involve cause and effect relations or else, for example, merely aggregation
relations . If they appear to be quantifiable one can attempt to mathematically simulate
them in a "model", which in the case of a more complex form is also known as a
"simulation model". If declared values from the greenhouse gas inventory, the catalogue
of implemented measures, or the national report within the framework of the climate
convention etc . can be substituted for the variables of the model, or some of them, then
fulfilment of the above-mentioned model relations provides an indication of the
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declaration's veracity. This therefore concerns a plausibility review. It may (and
possibly must) make use of the interrelations of the declared data as well as their
relation to undeclared data .
In verifying declared data with the aid of models it is assumed that the international
verifying institution has models adaptable to the specific countries . Two cases must
then be differentiated:
In the first place, it is conceivable that the country being reviewed has determined part
of the declared data from source data by means of the same or similar models . If this is
permitted in the relevant protocol of the convention and the country is committed to
specifying the nature of the data generation and thus the models used, verification is
then restricted (trivially) to reviewing these specifications . A continuation of this train of
thought would be to agree on the use of certain models to compile the declaration . If, for
example, impact data are expected in the declaration, then in view of the difficulties of
impact analysis this would be worth considering, since otherwise in the case of data
collection the required impacts would be filtered out from a wide range of interferences .
With such an arrangement, the international verifying institution would have to ensure
that the models were developed in accordance with the state of the art so that the
declarations remain as realistic as possible .
In contrast, actual verification making use of models is applied in the second case now
being discussed, namely if the declared values are directly determined, e.g . by
measurements, individual estimates or surveys . However, the discrepancies discovered
in the verification process are not only to be attributed to errors in the declared and
additionally required (undeclared) data but also to errors in the procedure . Above all,
the unreality of every model and the possibility of compensating for errors should be
mentioned .
As mentioned above, verification with the aid of models can therefore only provide an
indication of the truth but not a demonstration . A verification result deviating from the
declaration will therefore not immediately lead to the declaration being considered
untruthful . Above all, it will suggest the need for an in-depth examination, and in
particular the use of other verification methods for control purposes . On the other hand,
agreement with the declaration should not be overrated .
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Models only give an incomplete picture of reality because simplifications are necessary
for reasons of limited computing, storage or programming capacity, of manageability or
the restricted area of investigation, or because knowledge of the relationships (given in
the model as equations/inequations and parametric values) is deficient, or because
many influences cannot be quantified . Frequently used simplifications - as also in the
IKARUS optimization model discussed below - are linearization and time-
independence because reliable, more realistic information is not available and non-
linear or dynamic modelling would then simulate a pseudoreality . With time-consuming
causal relations between variables, the static model naturally leads to a greater
distance from reality on the part of the model, the greater the actual development is
removed from a steady state . In contrast, it is largely possible to prevent errors being
concealed by compensation if the opportunity is available of examining intermediate
results .
The values specified in the declaration are distributed differently, depending on the
model, between its inputs, intermediate results or final results . Input data generally have
to be supplemented in order to permit computer runs. The verifying international
institution must procure these missing values from publicly accessible statistics, its own
surveys, estimates etc.
Apart from the appropriateness of the modelled structure and behaviour, a model is the
more suitable for a certain verification task the more completely the declared values can
be recovered in it, and the more easily accessible and more reliable the additionally
required input variables are . Within the framework of this sketch, it is not possible to
systematically examine existing models with respect to their verification capability, apart
from the fact that the information to be declared has not yet been laid down .
Nevertheless, on the basis of IKARUS model instruments the possibilities of verifying
climate protection declarations will be made a little more concrete.
The IKARUS model instruments, whose structure and possible verification use are
outlined in Fig . 2, were compiled with the intention of analysing the efficiency of
greenhouse-gas-reducing measures and their economic impacts . Since both these
measures and also their success will probably be described in the declaration to be
verified the statically operating set of instruments can be used for an approximately
steady state of the economy and, applying the additionally required variables (see
above), for verification purposes . The entire energy supply system of the Federal
Republic of Germany is modelled so that a great deal of published energy information
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(possibly after appropriate preprocessing) can be used as a control . Sector-specific
technology models (called submodels) for electricity and district heat, space heat,
industry and small consumers, as well as transport, provide the degree of detail which
may be required for an appropriate description of greenhouse gas reduction measures .
With a higher degree of aggregation, an overall energy economy/technical model
ensures interlinkage of the subareas, but would not be operated here (as envisaged in
the IKARUS Project) primarily as an optimization but rather as a simulation model . The
demand for energy services is generated in special demand generators, which for their
part derive their key data from an economic input/output model, MIS, with 15 economic
sectors and in addition 9 energy sectors covered in detail . Demand modules for goods
and services, for investments and capital stock are included . Population trends are
predefined . International consistency is ensured by the adapted Manne-Richels model
"Global 2100" . These comprehensive instruments permit the inclusion in the verification
process of many important variables which directly or indirectly influence emissions .
The verification requirements will now be discussed in detail . The declared information
primarily involves:
1 .
	
data on the measures undertaken by the administration at a certain point in time to
reduce GHG emissions, e.g . enactment of laws on regulative or free-market
control,
2 . data on the realization of measures at a certain time, e.g . degree of
implementation of a mandatory thermal insulation standard for houses,
3 . data on current values for energy consumption and emissions,
4 . data on reduction targets and associated time horizons .
Whereas in the case of 1, 2 and 3, verification examines the veracity of data referring to
the past, in the case of 4 it has to estimate the plausibility of data referring to the future,
in particular the achievability of targets .
With respect to the subjects of these data, it can be said that the relations between 1
and 2 are largely determined by the behaviour of investors, availability of resources and
efficiency of the industrial sectors in question, which involves both delays as well as, in
general, only incomplete implementation of the targets, both of which depend on the
appreciation and thus acceptance of the targets, and also on various types of boundary
condition etc. The relations between 2 and 3 are mainly of a physical nature and not
subject to delay so that they can be well simulated by static models . However,
behavioural components cannot be completely ruled out here thus influencing the
4 1
achievement of targets, such as the ventilation or heating behaviour of residents, in
which case empirical averages can be assumed . The impacts of measures to be
determined in connection with category 4 are related to 1 via 2 thus leading to delays. It
is also true of all the relations mentioned that the declaration will probably be
incomplete with respect to the specification of causes . Thus for example, the emission
reductions achieved according to 3 do not only depend on measures implemented in
the past according to 1 but also, for example, on "autonomous technical progress", on
sectoral economic development etc .
Returning to the IKARUS system and similar approaches, it can be said that they may
be applied for verification with respect to existing relations between the declared
categories 2, 3 and 4 (where in the case of 4 the impacts to be compared with the
targets are meant) if the additionally required, undeclared information can be procured
elsewhere.
The above-mentioned "submodels" are primarily suitable for modelling relations
between 2 and 3 since together they cover a considerable proportion of the energy
system and also (in contrast to the model of the overall energy economy) permit
nonlinearities, cover inventory changes and represent the technology in a very detailed
manner so that the implementation of measures can be adequately simulated.
Concerning the necessary degree of detail, it should only be mentioned that energy
consumption and emission behaviour, e.g . of a heat source or a driving engine, do not
only depend on design details but also to a high degree on the control system, apart
from the behavioural component "operational mode" of the system . The inputs of these
submodels are the technologies described in detail, their application characteristics and
their distribution . The results are extrapolations of energy consumption and emissions
for the industrial sectors covered . According to the present status of the instruments,
sectors not included must be covered by the model of the overall energy economy
operated as a simulation model with a considerably lower technical resolution.
For relations between 2 and 4, i .e . the measures currently implemented and the impacts
estimated for the future, and thus a review of the plausibility of whether the declared
targets can be achieved, it would be more appropriate to apply the model of the total
energy economy combined with the macroeconomic input-output model so that the
consistency of the individual developments is retained for future estimates. As a
qualification, it should be noted that this consistency is only statically supported . The
coarsening of the technology description associated with the model of the overall
energy economy does not appear to be a serious obstacle to these estimates .
Data from the declaration and / or independent sources
-input . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
	
macroeconomic modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . output * . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
input . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., 1 demand generators . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., output * . . . . . . . . . . . _
-input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., model of the overall energy economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. output * . . . . . . . . . . .
input .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
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submodels . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., output *. . . . . . . . . . .
- space heat
- electricity & district heat
- industry & small consumers
- transport
data base J comparison
(consistency verification)
* final or intermediate result
Fig. 2: On the possible application of the IKARUS instruments for
consistency review within the framework of verification
Furthermore, there is also the possibility of using the submodels for differentiation
purposes, which is, however, only meaningful if their detailed input information can
actually be reliably estimated . The development of the models' exogenous data must be
predefined . In applying the model instruments for this task it may even be meaningful,
as envisaged in the IKARUS Project, to operate the model of the overall energyeconomy as an optimization model. An estimate is then obtained of whether in the most
favourable case, i.e . with an optimum allocation of funds, the emission targets can beachieved, thus representing the upper limit of attainability.
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By way of summary, it can be said that the application of mathematical models for
verification tasks within the framework of the climate convention, if the necessary
additional information can be procured, is possible to the same extent and with the
same restrictions as for other tasks . The results must be applied with the necessary
critical distance, taking into consideration the necessary conditions and avoiding
overinterpretations .
3.2.3
	
Implementation control
Within the framework of the climate convention, the industrialized countries as parties
to the treaty must
- lay down national strategies, programmes and measures for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions,
- compile national GHG inventories,
- prepare reports on national measures and GHG inventories.
Reporting by the parties provides the Conference of the Parties with the opportunity of
- obtaining information on national measures and GHG inventories,
- becoming informed about the time sequence of their development,
- making comparisons with information from other parties and their own
considerations,
- making estimates of conformities or discrepancies with respect to compliance with
agreements or commitments.
With respect to intended verification, the question arises of whether mechanisms or
instruments can be specified with which the correctness of national data can be judged
on the basis of reports . The type and scope of controls would depend on the object to
be investigated . In the case of implementation controls, the objects to be verified are the
measures officially announced by a party within the framework of the climate
convention .
Implementation is taken at this point to mean a process to be observed which is passed
through one or more times before the measure in question is properly established . The
aim of controls should be to determine with a degree of certainty on the basis of the
reports whether implementation has taken place or the implementation process has
been set in motion . This may be followed by an analysis of possible enforcement
deficits and the effectiveness of measures in the sense of emission reduction or
stabilization .
The essential condition for an appropriate verification by the Conference of the Parties
is the' application of appropriate information structures and the communication of
corresponding information within the framework of reports by the parties. To this end, a
conceptional problem-solving approach should be developed referring to the
information and safeguards aspects of the implementation of measures.
3.2.3.1
	
Information opportunities
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As is already the case today in the energy sector with the IEA/OECD, the Conference of
the Parties could obtain a picture of the situation in connection with a party's measures
from existing publications and their own experts - if necessary on site . Dispersed
measuring stations or networks and/satellite observations are conceivable as further
sources of information suitable for recording the impacts of measures .
According to the initial definition, the assessment should, however, depend on the
available information communicated as a report by a party. Other - independent -
channels of information are not considered in the first instance .
Over and above the mere naming of measures, further demonstrations of
implementation are also required, which may concern the fact of whether a measure
has been effectively implemented in the sense of the declared intention .
The information aspects of implementation safeguards make it necessary to envisage,
to an appropriate extent, contents and structures for the information agreed upon and
exchanged between the national level and international safeguards for reporting
purposes (communication) . A largely standardized form of report content and scope of
reporting obligations is appropriate for reasons of comparability and transparency . The
relevant information elements of significance in the structuring, realization and
implementation of measures must be selected and laid down in accordance with
conceptional approaches for implementation safeguards .
This includes the development of forms and instructions for reporting in detail in order
to acquire the required information in a uniform and unambiguous manner. If the scope,
In order to take the various properties of the measures into consideration, the reports
will probably consist of standardized and measure-specific sections. The determination
of the corresponding data structures with their attributes, characteristic features and
ranges should be oriented towards the technical possibilities and limitations of the data.
A suitable system of information management must be conceived on an international
level for the totality of the information communicated ensuring the recording,
management and evaluation of the information . Such a system can also be used to
simulate and monitor the situation with respect to measures as already practised by
international organizations in other sectors, in the course of which different problem
areas can be considered providing the basis for specific perspectives and interests .
3.2.3.2
	
Catalogue of measures
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content and periodicity of the reports are initially insufficient for detailed and
comprehensive application in the verification methods proposed in the following,
agreements may have to be reached to make additions and improvements more specific
in steps.
It may be assumed that an overview of possible measures provides a precondition for
determining the information to be communicated . It therefore seems meaningful to
(successively) establish a complete and comprehensive collection of proposed and
conceivable measures which may be used as a catalogue. A compilation of this kind
can moreover serve as a starting point and reference for commitments and declarations
(official statements) if it is recognized and updated in an international framework. The
required regulative framework can be developed in the form of a taxonomy permitting
the classification of concrete measures according to determinable properties .
As a means of GHG reduction/stabilization, measures are appropriate which bring
about a change in technological and procedural structures and in patterns of human
behaviour. The structuring, introduction and realization of measures expected to
provide specific effects or impacts will depend on the boundary conditions and
reduction potentials of the parties. In order to achieve the stipulated targets, measures
of a fiscal, legal, regulatory, financial and administrative nature have been proposed in
the highly developed industrial countries.
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The measures may represent components of political programme ,-, and strategies as
required within the framework of the Climate Convention. An overview of the type,
orientation and contribution to the target of the available possiblities of action forms one
of the basic conditions for developing strategies . Furthermore, the introduction of the
necessary (packages of) measures for individual economic sectors, energy carriers and
plants should be accompanied by detailed conceptions of their practicability and
efficiency .
As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, the application in particular of
economic, fiscal and regulative instruments is under discussion . The following
breakdown can be made for a general classification of the envisaged measures :
- free-market,
- regulative
-
	
and other measures .
A catalogue of measures thus represents a list of measures and instruments capable of
being used for GHG reduction . The list may serve as a clear basis for making a
selection of measures . By way of example, a few measures will be mentioned in the
following from a specific compilation [BMU 1993a] for the Federal Republic of Germany
- now updated by National Report for the Climate Convention [BMU 1994a] as well as
the Third Report by IMA COZ [BMU 1994b] :
Thermal Insulation Ordinance . Amendment of the Ordinance within the framework
of the Energy Savings Act which in future will be based on a low-energy-house
standard both for new buildings and also more extensive renovations to existing
buildings (heating energy requirements 54 to 100 kWh per m2 and year,
depending on the building type) [example 1]
Energy Industry Act. The following basic points are to be considered in the
planned amendment of this act : firstly, expansion of the target catalogue to include
environmental protection and conservation of resources; secondly, equal
consideration of these goals in all decisions by the Energy Supervisory Board ;,
thirdly, closer definition of the legal basis for authorizing the enactment of decrees
in view of the target catalogue ; fourthly, introduction of a uniform national licensing
procedure for overhead power lines of at least 110 kV rated voltage (example 2) ;
fifthly, the most extensive possible exploitation of deregulation potentials to
support the utilities' entrepreneurial latitude ; sixthly, the special energy
supervisory activities should only be retained for electricity and gas to the extent
that this is really necessary ; seventhly, if a supervisory board has to be maintained
then it must be bound to criteria ensuring the predictability of supervisory
decisions .
Transport taxes : first stage: annual motorway users' fee (example 3) .
3.2.3.3
	
Control approaches
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The control of implementation of measures makes use of information generated on the
national level and subsequently communicated by reports . The reports must contain
corresponding statements about national intentions within the framework of
commitments and also indications of their realization . The examination of the
completeness, transparency and reconstructibility of these statements on national
procedures, particularly the implementation process, can be used as a methodological
verification approach . The extent of certainty on the implementation of measures can be
derived from the amount, degree of detail and quality of the corresponding information
in the national reports . The assessment of compliant behaviour is thus based on the
evidence and indications required for a corresponding appreciation of the report
content. Over and above the announcement of concrete measures and the final
declaration of their application, further information may be required depending on the
type and scope of the verification methods .
A party's reporting should be based on three different conceptional steps differentiated
according to the extent of safeguards or the number of information elements applied .
Firstly, national reports on the application of a measure in some form or another may be
sufficient . Secondly, a report would have to be made on the course of the
implementation process at consecutive points in time in a structured/formalized manner .
Thirdly, statements should be communicated on the verifiable effects of a measure on
certain impact fields, making use of qualitative and quantitative indicators on agreed
standards . These three steps requiring increasing communication efforts for a system of
monitoring the realization of instruments and measures for reducing GHG emissions
can be characterized as follows :
- unstructured concept (cf. declaration)
- time-structured concept (cf. phase method)
- content-structured concept (cf. cellular method) .
3.2.3.4
	
Verification possibilities
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The precondition for every type of verification is determination of the object to be
verified . This should be the data supplied in the national reports or other information
from the countries relevant for fulfilling the targets set in the convention . Within the
framework of the climate convention, the member states commit themselves to present
such reports at regular intervals . Verification will initially be of a more general nature,
e.g. verification of the extent to which the national measures announced in the reports
have actually been realized (implementation monitoring) . However, a verification of
numerical data from the national reports, such as the emission inventories of radiative-
forcing gases, can in principle also be undertaken quantitatively . The corresponding
data are usually taken from generally accessible sources such as statistics on the
production and import of fossil fuels or the national energy consumption statistics . This
logical chain cannot always be transparently retraced to the acquisition of the input
data, i .e . quantitative determination of the volumes of fossil fuels used for combustion
and the respective fuel composition . It is thus very time-consuming for these data
acquisition steps to be reconstructed by an international institution, if it is possible at all .
It has been assumed to data that the agreed information is made properly available to
the international safeguards organization in accordance with the parties' commitments .
In contrast, or as a supplement, international safeguards may also select the approach
of collecting their own information . In accordance with the possibilities of enforcing
information gathering, this information is to be found in an extension of the national
reports as well as in the additional independent collection of information (impact
analysis, intrusiveness, degree of detail) . Further sources of data (monitors, measuring
networks, satellites etc.) from the range of information and choice of information
elements can then be taken into consideration in order tö provide suitable information.
Verification is thus based on the review, comparison and evaluation of the available
information . An essential prerequisite for the selection and orderly compilation of
information elements is an appropriate structuring of information . In considering the
information, different aspects can be regarded, a number of which are listed in the
following :
3.2.3.5
	
Information structures
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Official reports are information sources . They can be critically screened by means
of specific control inquiries, by independent information, e.g . press, secrect
service, by inspections and information from independent instutions such as LINO,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), chartered accountants, the "Council of
Wise Men", trust company, fact-finding missions etc .
Various collection methods comprise official determination methods, alternative
determination methods, point measurements, measuring networks, airborne
observation stations, remote sensing .
Comparison with similar structures and standards (compatibility check) which may
refer to: groups of countries, population figures, GNP, level of supply and
saturation with technical systems, economic and energy supply structure,
production and release processes, investment and subsidy expenditure, tax
revenue .
Comparison with existing information as well as background knowledge
(plausibility) : including transparency, comparability, reliability, validity and
statistical methods .
Information evaluation : reconstructibility, completeness, integrity, consistency,
accuracy, range .
Implementation safeguards concern information on the establishment, notification,
structuring, classification and implementation of emission-reducing measures .
Accordingly, the definition and structuring of information should be appropriately agreed
for the purposes of reporting on the implementation of measures in the FCCC protocols
and annexes . The implementation process can then -be assessed by means of the
defined information elements, taking into consideration features typical of the measures .
The conceptional steps mentioned above should serve 'to obtain the necessary degree
of certainty that the implementation of a measure has been performed in the sense of
the commitment/convention .
Only the parties' own data on their compliance can initially be used as an information
source . Surveillance will then aim at verifying the conformity of national data with the
norms selected by the states or agreed upon within the framework of the convention .
Considerations of plausibility and consistency, inferences by analogy as well as
knowledge of the known subsequent effects can be used to assess the statements .
The compilation, integration and evaluation of information as part of international
surveillance should be based on the following ordering and structuring modes in order
to permit an evaluation of the implementation progress and draw conclusions on the
performance and impact of reduction measures:
-
	
catalogue of measures
- taxonomy
- commitment and declaration
- phase method
- cellular method .
3.2.3 .6 Commitment and declaration
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The minimum process of commitment and implementation required by safeguards can
be covered by a concept which establishes the connection between national measures
and international safeguards in a simple manner with modest efforts . On the one hand,
a report is merely made on the measure envisaged to achieve the target . On the other
hand, the current implementation and realization of the measure on the national level is
declared . The basic data for verification are thus available without any further details
being required .
This concept concentrates on a few data about the intended introduction of instruments
which are then verified within a certain time horizon . The steps in this concept can be
interpreted as follows :
- commitments, i.e. the establishment of strategies, programmes, measures to be
performed on a national level ;
- declarations, i .e . the communication of corresponding national data on measures
and targets already undertaken or planned for the future ;
- verification, i .e . the assessment of the national report on these strategies, goals
and measures passed on to the international authority (Conference of the Parties) .
Data, targets and commitments with respect to the reduction goals must be available asa necessary precondition for safeguarding national GHG emissions . The periodic
declaration of country-specific GHG emission inventories and the announcement of
measures to influence them serve to demonstrate that efforts are being made to achievethe goals . These data must verified at certain time intervals with respect to their
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approximation to the predefined target . As soon as the commitments and their
safeguards are agreed in a convention by the parties, there will also be the possibility of
international safeguards within the framework of the agreements .
It can be assumed that the commitments will be renewed, modified or extended in the
course of time thus establishing dynamic behaviour with respect to declaration and
verification. After national commitments in the measure sector have been specified,
implementation safeguards may be oriented towards a general course divided into the
following sections : formulation of policies and strategies, introduction of measures,
resolution of laws and guidelines, enactment of decrees, performance of measures,
observation of impacts, assessment of effectiveness.
3.2 .3.7
	
Phase method
The phase model can be used to structure a process sequence . It subdivides the life of
an overall process into individual sections (phases) . The phases may be passed
through once or several times during a life cycle. The completion of phases is marked
(milestones) in order to assess the process of a development step and to decide on
whether to continue with the next phase. This subdivision of the implementation process
seems appropriate since indications of the time-specificity and periodicity of the
verification of measures are already available in the wake of FCCC:
- dynamics and time horizon
- regular verification and adaptation .
The phases are formed from task-oriented sections in the course of a measure, the
conclusion of which provides a starting point for safeguards or an indication of their
fulfilment. In this connection, aspects have already been discussed such as how the
realization of implementation safeguards can be undertaken within the framework of the
concept of commitment and declaration : periodic commitments (strategies, programmes,
measures, scope and details of sectoral strategies) ; verification of the resolution and
introduction of corresponding steps (preparation process, announcement, formal shape,
legal enactment, implementation of measures).
The concept can be extended by providing details of the progress of the process of
implementing the measure at certain (fairly short) intervals and thus achieving an
improvement in the supply of information for the safeguards authority. Modifications and
3.2.3.8
	
Cellular method
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revisions of the procedure must be reported again in the course of time . One possibility
of the procedural definition of phases will be presented in the following describing the
section-wise subdivision of the implementation process .
The procedural definition comprises the sections (phases) of consideration, planning
(hearing), draft (proposal), presentation, consultation, preparation, formal shape,
passage, legal enactment, introduction, implementation, realization, verification of
realization, amendment. The examples mentioned have already passed through the
following phases:
Example 1 - consideration, planning, draft, presentation, consultation, preparation,
formal shape, resolution (19.05.1993) .
Example 2 - consideration, planning, draft .
Example 3 - consideration .
A further possibility of subdividing the general time course into individual verifiable
sections for improved control and transparency in the phase model is provided by the
formulation of general development tasks . Considered as an object that passes through
several development steps from the idea up to its realization, the following sections
(phases) could be considered for an individual measure or package of measures . The
impact-oriented definition comprises the following phases: source-specific problem
definition ; analysis of possible solutions and anticipated effects ; design of the (elements
of, package of) measure(s) ; formulation of the specific measure ; introduction and
implementation as well as enforcement ; impact analysis, verification, evaluation ;
feedback with context, field ; retention, modification or abolition of the measure .
A further conceptional step consists in deriving support from the observation of suitably
selected impact fields. It is assumed that the general impact area of the measure
contains identifiable fields on which information is available . It is then expected of a
measure that its effects with respect to various elements of the impact area can be
determined . The form, realization and implementation of the measure should then be
accompanied by the designation of corresponding cells or impact fields of the
environment or the impact area in order to permit an impact analysis and, if applicable,
performance review (effectiveness and efficiency) . The cellular method can be
employed for implementation safeguards in order to make use of impact-orientation of
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the process of implementing the measure and to increase the information quality for
safeguards . The concept of the cellular method is selected on the basis of grids,
networks and tables in which a subdivision into cells is undertaken. Detailed statements
in the sense of the cellular method can only be made by fixing impact fields for concrete
measures. Some of the proposed measures with examples of impact fields and possible
indicators will be presented in the following to give a rough sketch of the approach:
Example 1 .
	
Building type (impact field) and related indicators (number of new
buildings per year and building type, number of renovations per year and building type,
enclosed space : cm3/year and building type, floor space: m2/year) .
Example 2. Licensing procedure (impact field) and related indicators : number of
licensing procedures per year, of power lines constructed in km/year .
Example 3 . Motorway tax disc (impact field) and indicators : number of motorway tax
discs issued per year, revenue in DM/year.
On the basis of the three examples it can be seen that the measures are characterized
by a direct impact with respect to C02 reduction, whose subsequent impacts are difficult
to assess before implementation . Only a more detailed impact analysis of the
application of measures can provide reliable information about their effects.
Approaches to implementation safeguards were considered in the present contribution
mainly under the aspects of information and control. Various conceptual approaches
were discussed which could be used to safeguard the implementation of measures with
respect to GHG emissions as well as to the international safeguarding of these
measures . This basis should make it possible to examine the acceptability and range of
the conceptual ideas discussed as a function of the treatment of concrete measures and
the empirical knowledge to be thus obtained .
3.2.4 Measuring and surveillance techniques
In this section, the attention is concentrated on techniques, technical systems and
methods which can be directly applied for emission accounting - at least for large point
sources - or else can make an indirect contribution to accounting . In order to explore
the basic usefulness and the conceivable application potential of such techniques,
direct measuring systems and their applicability for balancing C02 emissions were also
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investigated . It is very probable that this application option will not be applied as a
general verification instrument under foreseeable circumstances . The use of direct
measuring techniques would only be conceivable for measuring campaigns at large
power stations for a limited period, for example within the framework of joint
implementation . As will be shown, the utilization of (existing) measuring networks for air
quality control is a verification instrument of only extremely restricted effectiveness,
which could perhaps be used as an "attendant measure" for verification .
3.2.4.9
	
Application of measuring networks and dispersion models
Several measuring (monitoring) networks exist on the international level, largely on the
initiative of UN suborganizations and special organizations [UNEP 1990 ; UNEP 1991 ;
WMO 1991], whose members exchange information about the local quality of
environmental media on the basis of voluntary cooperation or have information
collected and evaluated by a central organization with the aim of compiling the most
universal possible data base . These measuring networks are essentially restricted to
environmental monitoring and their institutional organs do not provide any
recommendations for measures to be taken . By means of the data base, the participants
are able to make a comparative classification of the status of the environmental media
in their own region and undertake measures to reduce pollution . Furthermore, the data
base provides insights into the effectiveness of regional measures to reduce the
pollutant input . The subject of the measurements is largely pollutant concentrations at
predetermined locations as well as supplementary status parameters relevant for
evaluating the pollution of environmental media (air, water and soil) . The aim of these
initiatives by the UN organizations is the protection of public health and ecosystems in
polluted regions.
With a view to the verification of GHG emission inventories with aid of individual
measurements at the source or with the help of measuring networks, interest is focused,
in contrast, on the absolute emitted masses (quantity) of these gases released from the
most productive sources in the region per time unit, e.g, per year . In principle, this could
also involve an aggregration of sources from different emission sectors, to the extent
that they are limited to a certain regional area. The difficulties in solving this task are
immediately apparent .
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Task of existing measuring networks
The range of tasks of some measuring networks is very extensive and comprises the
acquisition of data on the quality of the environmental media of air, water and soil . In
the medium of air, the subjects of the environmental measuring networks are above all
the most important atmospheric pollutants S02, NOx , CO, ozone, lead and aerosols . In
relation to the number of measuring stations, the essential radiative forcing gases,
carbon dioxide, C02 and methane, CH4, have only been of minor significance to date.
Most of the atmospheric pollutants investigated have only a limited residence time in the
atmosphere, are precipitated out of the atmosphere at an early point, or are chemically
converted and deposited, and thus only make a slight contribution towards changes in
the average global atmospheric concentration. The major attention of these measuring
networks is therefore mainly focused on local and regional impacts . The concentrations
in the air and in precipitations are measured as well as their development over time and
the prevailing meteorological data.
Emission inventories of pollutant sources are not the subject of these measurements . If
they are available they are based on data from local or regional institutions, or the
operators of the emitting plants themselves . With the aid of dispersion and transport
models, emission inventories enable the expected distribution of pollutant
concentrations over time and space to be calculated, taking into consideration the
prevailing meteorological conditions . Vice versa, in the case of pollutants with a limited
lifetime in the atmosphere and thus also a restricted range, conclusions may be drawn
about the emission inventories of a region with the aid of dispersion and transport
models . If there is only a single emitter for a specific pollutant in a region then it is also
possible to estimate its emission inventory.
3.2.4 .1 .2 Function and technical form of measuring networks
The essential components of measuring networks are the actual measuring stations for
data acquisition and the communication channels to the other measuring stations or a
central institution for evaluation and further processing of the measured data . In
principle, a central collecting point for the data is not necessary, although it is useful for
coordinating the methods of data collection and the information derived from the data .
The atmospheric measuring stations of the existing measuring networks are mainly
located in very polluted industrial conurbations and in order to determine the natural
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background pollution, if this is possible at all, in regions far removed from human
activities . Their major task is compiling data bases on pollution in the regions under
consideration . Depending on the density of the measuring stations, atmospheric
pollutant dispersion can be traced . Statements on atmospheric pollution, i .e . pollutant
concentrations, on a regional scale can also be made with the aid of dispersion and
transport models incorporating meteorological data .
Only the concentrations of individual atmospheric pollutants can be determined directly
at individual measuring stations in a measuring network. Essential complementary data,
apart from time and place, are all relevant meteorological data such as temperature,
atmospheric pressure, atmospheric humidity, weather situation, solar radiation, wind
velocity and direction . These data may . be used as input parameters for dispersion
models . The results of the model calculations enable rough conclusions to be drawn
about the relative emission strength of a source . If several sources are present then it
will probably only be possible to differentiate according to emitter in the most favourable
exceptional cases, i .e . for pollutants with a short residence time in the atmosphere and
correspondingly limited spatial dispersion .
The measuring stations have the task of providing the actual data . This may be
undertaken by continuous measurements directly at the measuring location or else
discontinuously by collecting air samples at the measuring location with a subsequent
analysis of these samples in a laboratory . The latter method is particularly applied for
concentration determination whenever the entire range of possible atmospheric
pollutants is to be covered . In contrast, most meteorological data must be directly
determined on site .
Established methods for continuous measurement are already available for a large
number of atmospheric pollutants. If the most significant gases with respect to quantity
and radiative forcing, carbon dioxide and methane, are to be detected by the existing
measuring networks, then their concentration is largely determined by optical methods .
The measuring methods3 are essentially based on non-dispersioe infrared photometry
(NDIR) . Alternative methods of concentration determination are frequently also
available in analytical laboratories .
3.2.4 .1 .3 Models
Cf . the contribution "Measuring Techniques for Radiative Forcing Gases"in the present report .
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A consideration of the prevailing meteorological conditions and the chemical
degradation ensures that the data are dependent on the quantities of pollutant emitted
per time unit in the vicinity of the measuring stations . Nevertheless, the functional
relationship may be extremely complex . The source emissions and the meteorological
conditions are generally not constant but rather time-dependent variables . If the time
course of these variables is determined by additional measurements then a functional
relationship between the concentration data and the emissions can basically be
determined, on condition that at least one measuring station is always in the region of
the wind vane emanating from the source . In principle, this could be achieved by a high
density of measuring stations . It would be possible to calibrate the model by making
measurements in all conceivable emission and meteorological states . However, all
possible states would also have to be exactly covered by measurements . Apart from the
impracticability (due to the large number of measuring points in all three spatial
dimensions) of such a calibration, it would undoubtedly be simpler to determine the
emissions of each individual source directly at the source location .
Atmospheric dispersion or transport models are being developed in order to describe
the spatial and temporal distribution of airborne matter emitted from a defined source,
taking into consideration the respective meteorological boundary conditions . The
attempt is therefore made to predict the concentration of these substances at each
location within the range of these substances with the aid of models . This task is
simplest when stable meteorological conditions prevail over a wide area .
The transport mechanisms in the medium of the atmosphere are essentially based on
diffusion and convection, i .e. on being carried along in the air streams . Detailed
knowledge of the meteorological conditions between the source and measuring location
are required for reliable statements, which also includes the topological features of .the
earth's surface between the source and measuring location . Furthermore, consideration
must be given to the atmospheric stratifications and the corresponding distribution of
the pollutants both at the source and along the transport path to the measuring location,
and also to exchange processes between the layers .
Conditions become more complicated if the substance in question is already present in
the atmosphere as so-called background, independently of the source, which is
particularly the case for long-lived gases of natural or anthropogenic origin . The
complexity is further increased if several other sources with similar emissions
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additionally influence the concentration at the measuring location, particularly if
anthropogenic and natural emissions are superimposed . Increasing the number of
measuring stations with a suitable distribution corresponding to the local situation can
provide further relevant information in this case . Model statements about regional air
pollutant distributions can be qualitatively improved with the aid of this information .
From the aspect of verification, an inverse application of the dispersion and transport
models would also be desirable, permitting conclusions about the absolute source
inventory of individual sources on the basis of the concentration data for radiative
forcing gases determined at the individual measuring points . For example, this problem
gained particular significance in connection with the Chernobyl fallout . The conditions
for estimating the source inventory were relatively favourable here since they involved a
pulsed release of pollutants which do not occur in nature, or only in very small
concentrations, and which can be detected with great accuracy, and which were largely
completely washed out by precipitation and deposited at some measuring locations .
Furthermore, the meteorological data were well known and information about the
maximum source strength and the distribution of releases in the atmospheric layers at
the source location was also available . It was possible to estimate the released
inventories of individual radionuclides on the basis of model calculations . It has not yet
been possible to independently verify the reliability of these estimated values since the
complementary residual inventory is still not available in full and therefore an
independent verification of the model statements has not been possible to date .
Conditions are considerably more unfavourable for the major radiative forcing emissions
since the relevant gases, e.g . C02 and CH4, have comparatively long mean residence
times in the atmosphere and are thus able to intermix on a global scale . Furthermore,
considerable natural inventories of these gases are present contributing to a high
background concentration . The boundary conditions for model calculations are thus
much more difficult to determine. On the transport path between the source and
measuring location a volume element of the emitted gases loses a significant part of its
information content with respect to the source . There are practical limits to
compensating this information loss by the addition of further measuring points . The
transfer of conclusions from individual measured concentration values to emission
inventories with the aid of dispersion models therefore has little informative value and
an estimate of the error bandwidth seems to be rather unreliable . Attempts at
determining the origin of GHGs with the aid of isotopic analysis and the isotopic
relations thus obtained and of separating the natural and anthropogenic fractions in this
3.2.4 .1 .4 Evaluation
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manner, or of drawing conclusions about the emitters, have not yet led to any useful
results.
Strictly speaking, a system for verifying the emission inventories of radiative forcing
gases requires a continuous measurement of the quantities released into the
atmosphere, specified according to gas type. This is particularly true of sources whose
operating behaviour depends on human behaviour or on technical requirements, that is
to say where normal operation with emissions constant over time and in quantity is not
the rule . Sampling measurements for verification purposes in the vicinity of individual
sources therefore have little informative value if a verification of the emitters' operating
states is not undertaken at the same time .
The transfer of conclusions drawn from atmospheric concentration values obtained from
measuring networks to the emission inventories of individual sources or local source
aggregations can only be of a qualitative nature even with favourable boundary
conditions and the inclusion of detailed dispersion and transport models . Statements on
tendencies can at best be made for a few individual substances on account of their
favourable properties . The application of measuring network data and their further
processing with dispersion and transport models does not seem to be an appropriate
instrument for verifying the source inventories of the major radiative forcing gases.
3.2.4.2
	
Measuring techniques for radiative forcing gases
In order to assess the entire spectrum of possible verification measures with increasing
verification density, it also appears helpful to discuss those verification methods which
are based on direct and indirect measurements . The possible contribution from
currently available measuring techniques to an independent verification of emission
inventories in a dynamically developing climate protection regime will be investigated
here. Such measures can, at best, only be considered on a large scale for an advanced
stage of a climate protection regime . A comprehensive implementation of such
measures would represent a state of high verification density.
In the case of the emission inventories, the object to be verified is the mass of radiative
forcing gases emitted per year, broken down according to gas type and emission sector.
The corresponding data in the national reports, as already mentioned, are gathered
from economic or energetic statistics, which cannot always be transparently retraced to
the collection of source data . An alternative to this procedure is the basic possibility of
directly measuring the masses of major radiative forcing gases emitted per year.
In practical national emission monitoring of other atmospheric pollutants, corresponding
to the Federal Emission Control Act (BImSchG), only the pollutant concentrations are
recorded in Mg/M3. Verification is thus restricted to evidence that certain pollutant
concentrations only exceed a predetermined limit in a certain fixed period with a limited
frequency. However, the verification of emissions within the Framework Convention on
Climate Change requires absolute emitted quantities . In the case of C02 verification for
fossil-fuel-fired power stations, this also means, in addition to continuous
measurements of C02 concentrations, recording the entire mass flow of the flue gases .
Additional safeguards measures are therefore necessary in order to ensure that all the
waste gas flows from a firing system are covered, that is to say the measuring point is
not bypassed .
The further discussion will be restricted to C02 and CH4 since .according to the present
state of the art a verification by measuring technology seems possible here to a limited
extent due to their source characteristics .
3.2.4.2 .1
	
Verification suitability
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Approximately 80 % of anthropogenic C02 emissions originate from the combustion of
fossil fuels, i .e . in the energy sector. Together with the other radiative forcing gases
arising during the utilization of fossil energies, the C02 emissions from the energy
sector are held responsible for approx. 57 % of the additional (anthropogenic)
greenhouse effect [Lashof 1990] . Apart from C02 , methane also plays a decisive role
amongst the greenhouse gas emissions influenced by human activities from the aspect
of quantity and radiative forcing . The most important contributions arise from coal
mining, rice cultivation, stock breeding and domestic refuse dumps .
The wide range of source configurations becomes apparent even with this brief list .
However, the possibility of making a selective quantitative record of greenhouse gases
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greatly depends on the nature of the respective source . The technical preconditions for
verification directly at the source with the aid of measuring instruments are considerably
restricted by the nature of the source configuration . From the aspect of verification
suitability it is therefore meaningful to initially consider only those sources which make a
major contribution to the total emissions of greenhouse gases and for which it appears
basically technically possible, also with respect to economic considerations, to apply
quantitative measuring techniques for verification purposes. These are all point
sources, i .e . sources which release the radiative forcing gases into the atmosphere in a
controlled manner and in line systems. The richest point sources for COz are fossil-fired
power stations and for CHa the waste air shafts of hard coal mines . The technical
conditions for continuous and direct measurement of radiative forcing gases are most
favourable here.
Apart from the above-mentioned point sources, there are a number of other source
configurations which are less accessible, or not accessible at all, by direct
measurement. For instance, the private household and transport sectors consist of a
large number of small point sources which cannot be individually covered by measuring
technology on account of their number. Such sources are aggregated to mass sources
in conurbations. The third major source category comprises agriculturally utilized areas,
which are therefore termed area sources .
Although emissions from these source configurations are also measurable,
nevertheless this requires the assistance of models since the boundary conditions,
which alter over time, cannot all be covered simultaneously by measurements .
Measurements are restricted here to the determination of typical emission parameters
and also typical boundary conditions . Together with the models, it is then possible to
make an estimate of the annual emissions .
In the case of the agricultural areas, characteristic emission features and their annual
variation can be measured for specific types of use . The measured data can be
correlated with other emission-determined factors, such as soil type, application of
fertilizer, vegetation sequence etc . As in the case of mass sources, it is frequently
possible to compile emission inventories with the aid of models . The measured data
may then serve as input values for model calculations or may be used to calibrate the
models .
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Apart from the strong point sources, it is probably not possible to balance the other
sources by measuring technology due to their complicated characteristics . In this case,
the potential of measurements is to be found in extending knowledge about the source
features and based on this modelling a source with the goal of obtaining the best
possible estimate for the source inventories .
3.2.4.2 .2
	
Integration into existing measuring systems
It appears meaningful in designing a measuring procedure for verification purposes with
radiative forcing gases at large point sources to make use of experience gained in
implementing the provisions of the GFAVO (Großfeuerungsanlagenverordnung - Large
Combustion Plant Ordinance), especially since measuring instruments are used here
which, with respect to their technical design, could be used to measure at least C02
and CH4 concentrations after minor modifications without a great deal of effort .
Furthermore, the measuring instruments used in implementing the GFAVO are licensed
throughout Germany . The modular design of these measuring systems permits them to
be easily extended, e.g . to determine the C02 concentration .
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that there is an essential difference in the
measuring philosophy for fulfilling the GFAVO and that for verification purposes . On the
one hand, the conditions of the GFAVO are concerned with observing concentration
limits which may only be exceeded by a fixed amount on a restricted number of
occasions otherwise penalties will be incurred . On the other hand, measurements for
verification purposes are interested in the overall quantity of radiative forcing gases, in
particular C02, emitted into the atmosphere during a certain time interval with the aim
of setting up a balance . Furthermore, it must be remembered that the institutional target
groups for the respective data are probably different institutions and that for this reason
a strict division might be desirable . The collection of data required by the GFAVO is
undertaken solely on the basis of national legislation . In contrast, there is at present no
legal framework for greenhouse gas emissions measured exclusively for the purpose of
an independent verification. There is a need for regulation here in connection with
anchoring international verification measures in national legislation . These
considerations should therefore only include the measuring technology in the GFAVO
provisions as a model, the institutional and organizational division (interface) should be
discussed in connection with a possible implementation of a verification system .
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With respect to the requirements in designing a measuring system for verification
purposes, i .e . from sampling up to presentation of a digitized signal for the
concentration of a radiative forcing component of power station emissions, conditions
are found analogous to those for a system to record GFAVO-relevant pollutants. The
extent to which one or more components for determining radiative forcing gases should
be modularly integrated into the existing system or installed completely independently
of it depends on whether interventions in the system, i .e . for calibration, can be
coordinated on an organizational basis .
3.2.4.2.3 Requirements made on a measuring system for verification purposes
The analogy between measurements for verification purposes and those to fulfil the
GFAVO requirements is restricted to concentration determination . As already discussed
above, the differences between the two tasks are to be found in the volumetric flow rate
measurement necessary for verification and in the treatment of the data . The technical
possibilities of implementing volumetric flow rate measurements at point sources with
large emission cross-sections are restricted . Most methods are based on an extension
of classical measurement procedures . In current practice, volumetric flow rate
measurements are only performed in exceptional cases and then only for a limited
period . The major problem is the lack of knowledge about the representativeness of a
parameter, e.g . a pressure value, determining the local volumetric flow rate measured at
one point in the flow cross-section . According to experience, a gas flow in a stack has a
certain velocity profile over the cross-section, whose maximum is usually at the centre .
This velocity profile need not generally be rotationally symmetrical . Although it is
technically possible to measure this profile with the aid of network measurements,
nevertheless this is very complicated and is thus out of the question for verification
measurements . The currently established methods have already been described in
detail [Kolke 1993] . Their suitability for volumetric flow rate measurements are shown in
Table 7.
A further, but less problematic, difference between existing emission monitoring
systems and verification requirements is to be found in data evaluation . Whereas the
GFAVO requirements are restricted to documenting concentration data, the aim of
verification measurements is to record the quantities of a radiative forcing waste gas
component emitted during a fixed period . To this end, the emitted greenhouse gas
components must be calculated and incrementally cumulated with the aid of certain
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average concentration values determined at short time intervals (short in comparison to
changes in the operating state) and average volumetric flow rates measured in the
same interval . Accordingly, the difference in the two systems only affects the evaluation
algorithm and does not make any special demands .
Existing emission monitoring systems contain, to a limited extent, measures designed to
prevent a falsification of the results. This is generally achieved by sealing the
measuring instruments . More extensive steps may possibly be necessary for verification
measurements capable of revealing intentional interference in the entire measuring
system from sampling up to the evaluating computer, at least retrospectively . The
greatest possible transparency of the measuring system is of assistance here. There
are numerous examples of possible authentication measures in the field of IAEA
safeguards . In the same way as existing emission monitoring systems, measuring
instruments envisaged for verification tasks should be subjected to a quality assurance
programme . Although failure or malfunction of a measuring instrument would not have
the same serious consequences as in the case of nuclear material safeguards,
nevertheless frequent mismeasurements could undermine the credibility of a verification
regime based on measuring technology . Furthermore, it could be conceivable that the
functional status of the measuring system could be verified by remote interrogation . In
the same way, the cumulative data could be transmitted at the end of a balancing
period . Measures of this type could perceptibly relieve inspection efforts on site and
inspections could possibly be reduced to random sampling . Public data- networks,
telephone networks or satellites could be used as channels of communication .
An alternative possibility basically consists in measuring emissions at a certain distance
from the source . Corresponding systems are currently being developed or tested . These
are essentially mobile systems capable of determining the pollutant concentration at a
distance of several hundred metres after emerging from the source . Supplementary
measurements of the gas velocity by laser anemometers could also permit a
measurement of the volumetric flow rate [Tank 1991] . A development project with this
aim in mind was sponsored by the BMFT between 1990 and 1992 [BMFT 1990] . The
concentrations were measured with the aid of a modified Michelson interferometer in
which the optical wavelength changes were not achieved by linearly sliding mirrors but
by rotating retroreflectors . With broadband light sources, the result is an interferogram
from which a wavelength-dependent spectrum can be calculated by a Fourier
transformation . The measured volume is determined with the aid of the spectrometer
field of vision and the geometrical position data of the measuring location determined
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relative to the emission location . It is also possible to measure the velocity at the gas
outlet with a laser anemometer . In order to determine the volumetric flow rate it is only
necessary to know the cross-section of the source opening .
3.2.4.2.4 Proposals for further development
There are a wide range of gas analysers available on the market to determine the gas
concentrations. On the basis of experience in the field of emission monitoring,
absorption photometers operating according to the NDIR principle also seem suitable
for verification purposes . Corresponding photometers are also available for carbon
dioxide and they are used for example in the global measuring network to determine the
concentration of atmospheric C02. Since, like all other greenhouse gases, methane is
infrared-active it can be detected by NDIR photometers . Appropriate gas analysers for
this purpose are also commercially available .
As a competing instrument, in the past few years several designs of Fourier transform
infrared spectrometers (FTIR) have been developed and, starting from the original
Michelson interferometer, have been modified in such a way that they are of
manageable size and have also proved their worth in field applications . The advantage
of this technology is its ability to cover the entire infrared spectral range with one single
measurement, i .e . to determine as many infrared active gas components as required
simultaneously . Furthermore, FTIR spectrometers can measure both emission and also
absorption spectra. However, the evaluation requires a powerful computer and,
depending on the number of components to be analysed, complex evaluation algorithms
to implement the Fourier transformations . FTIR spectrometers have already been tested
in a combined heating and power station [Wülbern 93] .
Both measuring principles, NDIR and FTIR, can also be used for all other greenhouse
gases . Measuring techniques based on the FTIR principle already provide information
about the greenhouse gas concentrations of all greenhouse gases with each
measurement . Detection of a specific greenhouse gas essentially only depends on the
evaluation algorithm .
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Table 7 : Established methods of volumetric flow rate measurement
Method Absolute Continuous Temperature Demands on Design Calibration Suitability
accuracy measurement dependence flue gas features forthe task
rotating-cap
anemometer t3 % not possible no dry, dust-free only manual none no
network (contamination) measurements
measurement
differential *3% notpossible yes dry, duct-free requires effort not no
pressure (contamination) in thechannel applicable
measurement,
pressure tube
network
measurement
differential approx . yes yes not wet, requires effort pressure tube in part
pressure t 4 - 5% without sticky in the channel network
measurement particles measurement
WILSON
pressure grid
differential >±5% yes yes none simple in the pressure tube yes
pressure channel network
measurement measurement
ITABAR probe
eddy frequency < t 10 yes in part (MB none easy to handle pressure tube yes
measurement % initial value) network
VORTEX measurement
sensor
ultrasonic approx. easy to handle pressure tube
measurement t 4% yes no none (probe conta- network yes
mination) measurement
laser-Doppler difficult
LDAnetwork ±3% yes no fume-free traversing none yes
measurement
laser-Doppler
LDA single <t 10% yes no fume-free easy to handle none yes
measurement
output not possible homogeneous
measurement inaccurate (contamination) no completely - - no
at suction draft clear,
Considerable development efforts would still have to be invested in volumetric flow rate
measurements . In flue gas ducts with large diameters, the data obtained by classical
methods involve very large errors . It may be presumed that estimates of volumetric flow
rates by the plant operators, with the aid of operating parameters and fuel throughput,
are of much higher quality than the results of corresponding measurements .
Qualitatively comparable measurements (network measurements) can only be
implemented with unacceptably great efforts and are not appropriate as a continuous
method .
Optical methods, e.g . laser-Doppler anemometry, have a considerable development
potential . It should be possible to modify existing systems in such a way that the
averaged flue gas velocity can be determined via the cross-section of a flue gas duct.
When the problem of measuring the volumetric flow rate has been satisfactorily solved,
a test programme should be implemented with a system developed from an existing
emission monitoring system, e.g . by utilizing the existing sampling system . Such a
system requires its own evaluation computer with corresponding software in order to
calculate the accumulated output of radiative forcing gases from the measuring signals
of the concentration measurement and the volumetric flow rate measurement in
incremental steps . A suitable test field for the first field experiment would be a large
coal-fired power station .
3.2.4.3
	
Satellite remote sensing systems
7
After the energy sector, other important sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions are destruction of forests (land clearing, burning off), agriculture (fertilizers,
rice paddies, stock breeding), as well as landfills . If an agreement on specific goals for
the reduction of GHG emissions from these emission sectors were to be reached then
the problem of verification would also arise. This would apply equally to an agreed
expansion of GHG sinks, for example by afforestation programmes . (The possibility of
afforestation is already available within the framework of the net emission concept .) The
question here is contribution which remote sensing by means of satellites could provide
for verifying such agreements . Remote sensing does not at present play a part in
monitoring the FCCC (not even for the verification of afforestation) ; the agreed
systematic application of remote sensing would only be conceivable within the
framework of a denser verification system.
3.2.4.3 .1
	
Methods and procedures for determining emissions
Direct methods of determining emissions from the above-mentioned sectors (by means
of techniques for measuring mass flow) cannot be applied in practice since the emission
sources are characterized by large area, great number of emitters and in part
intermittent character . The quantities of emissions released from these dominant diffuse
or area emission sources must be calculated, i .e . indirectly determined . Nevertheless,
measuring programmes on determining emissions from small, definable areas provide
first indications of plausible estimates on which the calculations are based .
Such indirect methods of determining emissions are widespread and ideally based on
two data sets : firstly, directly measured parameters and, secondly, emission factors .
These indirect methods will be outlined very roughly with the example of determining
C02 emissions released by deforestation . The destroyed areas are determined (in the
ideal case) with the aid of measurements on the ground, from the air and/or from
space." The composition and quantity of vegetation per comparable unit area is then
estimated . Depending on the age, density, species variety etc. of the vegetation, an
estimated content of carbon stored in the biomass is allocated to the areas . If an
oxidation factor (completeness of combustion) is taken into consideration, multiplication
of these values indicates the released quantity of carbon, primarily in the form of C02
and CO.
In the case of such procedures, the uncertainty margins for emissions are rather large
simply because the often very specific emission factors are not easy to determine and
the effort required for their determination is considerable and continues to increase the
more precise and specific the factors should be . This problem can be reduced by
specifying emission factors upon which the states have reached mutual agreement,
even if they only approximate to reality. This permits transparency and comparability of
the emission calculations . The calculation of emissions by a country becomes more
6 8
In practice, the data are not obtained area-wide for all forested areasin a country, or indeed in the world since the efforts required would beextremely great . Instead, the data are obtained from representativesamples and extrapolated . For supporting institutions and methods offorest industry cf . the succinct representation in [Bundestag 1990] .
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complicated if the states declare their net emissions, that is to say if sinks are
considered . Areas must be determined and factors specified for them as well, thus
defining the removal of GHGs from the atmosphere per unit of time (e.g . year). These
topics have been touched upon in connection with the Framework Convention on
Climate Change and IPCC has presented proposals for such agreed emission factors
[IPCC Draft Guidelines 1994] .
From the perspective of verification, the determination of direct parameters is the
decisive point in the process of verifying compliance . Great efforts must be expended
here to verify the correctness of the national data. In contrast, if the emission factors are
specified by mutual agreement, verification is restricted to merely reviewing the actual
application of these factors in calculating the national declarations . Whether they are
factually correct, i.e. whether the emissions factors indicate the actual quantity, for
example, of carbon stored per unit (e.g. hectare) on a certain area is admittedly of
significance with respect to the material regulatory goal of the conventions , but is
irrelevant for verification purposes. Emission factors are conventions, laid down by
mutual agreement, and as such are to be regarded as valid for the verification process .
Studies of global environmental change would be unthinkable without remote sensing
satellites (cf. [CEOS 1992]), which may also make an important contribution to the
verification process by providing direct parameters . They already do this to a certain
extent: their sensors provide, e.g ., data on the forestry sector (area and structural
surveys, deforestation and afforestation, forest decline), land use (area structure),
agriculture (agricultural structure, set-aside ,schemes, harvest estimates), nature
conservation (identification and observation of protected areas), regional planning
(infrastructure, planning of transport routes) and they are capable of identifying landfills .
Their application for the verification of a climate convention (and of protocols),
particularly in the forestry and agricultural sectors, would not be a basically novel task
from the technical perspective (cf. [Hdnsch 1992], [Gastellu-Etchegorry 1991]) .
Nevertheless, this would require the solution of general problems of remote sensing and
the fulfilment of specific demands on satellite systems and the politico-institutional
boundary conditions for their application, and on the use of information thus obtained
[Lanchbery & Salt 1993] .
Such factors should be as precise as possible so that emission reduction
strategies may be optimized .
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A country's emissions cannot be balanced by satellite sensors . Sensors can at best
determine the chemical composition of the atmosphere in a column of air since methods
are not currently available by means of which conclusions could be directly drawn about
the total quantity of GHG released by a country . The major strength of satellites is
(amongst other aspects) the identification of areas and, to a certain extent, the
discrimination of the features of specific, small-area objects or structures in these areas .
Naturally, there are also inadequacies in the practical application of satellites for
specific tasks, as shown by the lack of agreement about the size of the forest area
destroyed in Brazil and other regions (cf. [Tropical Forests and Climate 1991]) . For the
satellite sensors are neither optimally designed for this task nor are the definitions of
"forest", the survey methods or the methods of evaluating satellite pictures standardized
(cf. [Kenneweg 1992]) .
Even if the basic feasibility of monitoring forests by means of satellites for verification
purposes has been demonstrated ([Lanchbery & Salt 1993] ; [Hönsch 1992]), the
general problems encountered by all users of satellite data with the information
gathered by remote sensing systems should not be ignored and need to be solved on a
national and international level .
-
	
The data only in part satisfy requirements with respect to spatial, temporal and
spectral resolution .
- The continuity of remote sensing is not guaranteed (primarily for cost reasons) .
- Methods of data interpretation and classification are in need of improvement .
Information on existing data sets and access to these data must be improved .
In general terms, the interaction between the manufacturers and operators of
satellites and the various user groups is still inadequate . Nevertheless, the
necessity of paying greater attention to user interests in designing satellites has
already been recognized .
In spite of these problems, satellites offer good opportunities of determining relatively
reliable parameters, particularly for the emission sectors of forestry, land use and
aspects of agriculture, for example about the area of forest destroyed . This ability
influences the conception of a verification system .
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3.2.4.3.2
	
Benefits and problems of satellite remote sensing systems
The Framework Convention on Climate Change stipulates that states should determine
their emissions of GHG and declare them, if possible according to sectors, i .e . to
disclose them to the international community of nations . Even if this is not yet a
constituent part of contractual obligations, nevertheless as part of a fully developed
climate regime the states should not just declare these (net) emissions but rather also
the directly measured parameters on which they are based, i .e . the size of the
deforested or afforested areas, tree species, size of the paddy fields, number and
location of landfills . This information can basically be confirmed or falsified by satellite
remote sensing (admittedly in combination with air- and ground-based activities) . If
there is a lack of this basic information then verification has no real starting point .
The critical variable in emission declarations is therefore the areas and their change,
and this is the advantage of satellite remote sensing in comparison to other surveillance
procedures .
All satellite observation systems for identifying changes on the earth's surface depend
on the accuracy and reliability of the base line, from which changes (e.g . forest area,
tree species) are determined . Such data are in part already available for the sectors of
forestry and agriculture compiled above all by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) (cf. [Tropical Forests and Climate 1991]) . This is particularly true of
the forest areas and in part of their status . If one turns to the technical side of
verification capability then fulfilment of the verification task and solution of specific
remote sensing problems requires a space-based verification system which should
comprise at least two categories of satellite [Lanchbery & Salt 1993] . The first category
continuously observes the earth's surface with low resolution, whereas the second
provides discontinuous pictures of greater resolution to identify small-area changes. All
satellites should be equipped with both radar sensors and also sensors to detect visible
light and near-infrared . There are currently some operating satellites which fulfil these
conditions in part (IRS, LANDSAT, Spot, ERS, with high resolution, and EOS, Meteosat,
TIROS-NINOAA with low resolution) . An increase in the number of available satellites is
in preparation within the framework of "Mission to Planet Earth" activities . The launch of
Earth Remote Sensing Satellite (ERS) 2, serving amongst other aspects for global
vegetation observation, planned for 1995 could also represent a module in such a
verification system . Table 8 summarizes the minimum requirements for such a satellite
system .
The flow of information required to fulfil the verification task can be broken down into
the phases of data collection, data processing and data evaluation . In the Vertic study
[Lanchbery & Salt 1993], the problems to be expected in these three stages are
discussed.
Data Collection Problems
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The identification of areal forest destruction is relatively unproblematic . However, this is
not the case for the observation of changes in forests due to selective deforestation .
The specific removal of individual trees ist difficult or impossible to observe by means of
satellite sensors since the sensor resolution is not high enough . A further problem is the
differentiation between selective removal and natural tree death. In both cases, a
specific assessment by air- or ground-based activities may be necessary. Furthermore,
cloud cover, particularly in tropical regions, prevents continuous observation. It might be
necessary to make increased use of radar satellites here . In the agricultural sector, it
would require too much effort to count cattle etc. by satellite so that other procedures,
such as statistical recording, should be preferred here . Radar sensors, in particular, are
suitable for determining the area of rice paddies but they should be supplemented by
measurements in the range of visible and infrared light.
Table8:
	
Minimum requirements for a satellite system
TASK SENSOR TYPE NUMBER OF
SATELLITES
REQUIRED
SATELLITE TYPE
infrequent visible I infrared 1 IRS, JERS, LANDSAT,
observation SPOT
with high radar . 1 MOS
resolution ERS, JERS, Radarsat
frequent observation visible / infrared 1 EOS, FY-B, METEOSAT,
with low resolution TIROS-N, NOAA
radar 1 ERS (?)
Data Processing Problems
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These problems are not of a basically novel character but the cost of installing such a
system to process large data quantities is very high . Even today the quantities of data
provided by scientific, non-military satellites exceed that which can be used . As both
operators and users of satellites have recognized there are already considerable "data
graveyards", which threaten to continue growing since the information supply from
satellites continues to increase. There are estimates according to which at the start of
the 21 st century such satellites will provide one terabyte of information per day. In order
to be able to utilize the information at all, the greatest priority should be given to the
specific data processing, evaluation and provision of user-specific information .
Data Evaluation
In order to determine changes an exact definition must be given of what is to be
designated as such . For this reason, input data about areas and their utilization must be
precise . It is also necessary to determine the frequency with which changes are
measured. If the intervals are too long then a small, correctable alteration may turn into
an unacceptable change. On the whole, a data evaluation system based on digitized,
three-dimensional information about forests and agricultural land use seems particularly
suitable to compare data obtained at different times and draw reliable conclusions.
3.2.4.3.3 Technical aspects
Apart from the geometrical resolution of satellite pictures, the spectral resolution also
plays a significant part in verifying land use and particularly in the differentiated
allocation of vegetation cover. Of the civilian satellites in operation to date,
Landsat 5 TM provides the most useful data for this purpose with respect to spectral
resolution . In addition to the three spectral channels in the visible region, Landsat 5 TM
has four further channels in the infrared part of the spectrum providing essential
additional information to determine the vegetation status of the observed section of the
earth's surface . In this way, different reflection properties in the invisible region can be
used to represent surface cover which cannot be differentiated in the visible region by
allocation to a certain colour or grey level .
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In each spectral region a picture is composed of individual points (pixels) for which a
corresponding intensity value, representable by grey levels, is individually stored on a
scale of 256 channels. This intensity value is a measure of the reflectivity of the object
field observed on the earth's surface corresponding to the pixel . If one considers the
frequency distributions of the grey levels in all available channels then correlations are
observable for many objects which cannot be differentiated in the visible region alone
permitting conclusions to be drawn on the type and state of vegetation . Corresponding
investigations were performed by Klaus and coworkers [Klaus 1994] in a test area near
Bonn, where in addition to Landsat 5 TM data aerial photographs and reference
information obtained on the ground were also available . Average grey values for the
individual spectral channels were calculated for specially selected test areas of known
area coverage . Various functional linkages of these average grey values for different
channels permit the compilation of so-called vegetation indices characteristic of a
certain land use form . The possible functional linkages are differentiated by the level of
accentuation or suppression of various undesirable interferences which differ from case
to case . The calculated vegetation indices can be represented again on a 256-level
grey value scale and by a pixel-wise adaptation to the aerial photograph they can be
combined into a synthetic satellite image in which features of special interest are
accentuated . The fluctuations, measured in the form of the standard deviation, of the
synthesized grey values provide, furthermore, a measure of the homogeneity of the
area coverage . The following figure gives an example of the frequency distributions of
the grey values for a certain vegetation index in the labelled test regions .
If the allocation of the vegetation indices and the corresponding actual area coverage
have been fixed by verification on the ground then this provides a type of calibration .
Due to different external factors of influence, such as different exposure conditions or
vegetation forms, it appears necessary to undertake an on-site calibration if the
described method is used in other regions .
For verification purposes it would be desirable to have universal vegetation indices . The
great variability in the possible area coverage in various regions of the world makes it
necessary to determine the most appropriate vegetation index or a combination of
several indices for one region by determining and evaluating reference areas scattered
throughout the world . The application of neuronal networks would be conceivable here,
which on the basis of the information obtained in the reference areas, learn the ability to
apply the respective optimum vegetation index . This all comes down to recognizing
patterns with a variable appearance. Some of the algorithms have already been tested
This type of space-based system for verifying the compliance of states displays a
number of features with important political and economic implications . First of all, it must
be clarified whether it is necessary to entrust an international organization with the tasks
of implementing verification with its own satellites or whether in view of the growing
number of national satellites it would not be more appropriate to make use of their
information . Practical considerations and the minimization of cost are points in favour of
the utilization of satellites already installed even if they are not optimally tailored to
verification purposes . The necessary information could conceivably be purchased from
the satellite operators if required . A more acceptable approach is the evaluation of
pictures and information at an international safeguards organization in order to ensure
independence and comparability. Such a verification system should also include
agreements between an international organization entrusted with this task and the
states granting the organization the right, if required, to itself gather further clarifying
information in the country concerned . This requires close cooperation with the
competent national agencies . It seems imperative to achieve a fair distribution of costs
between the states, who must fund the construction and operation of the satellite
monitoring system, and existing systems should be integrated as cost-effectively as
possible . On average, these satellites only remain operational for a few years so that
there is always a danger that the design and operation of a new satellite monitoring
system specifically constructed for verification purposes would come to grief due to high
costs . It cannot be expected that complete global surveys of the forests and their
changes could be implemented frequently and regularly . Surveillance will have to be
restricted to hot spots of forest destruction and selected regions in other emission
sectors .
in practice, e.g . in recognizing handwriting . A research project is currently being jointly
performed in this field by the University of Bonn and the Programme Group Technology
Assessment at the Research Centre Jülich .
3.2.4.3.4
	
Political and economic aspects
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Whether the establishment of a comprehensive verification organization is
necessary at all is discussed elsewhere . it would be conceivable that
essential work on procuring the information necessary for verification
could be delegated to existing organizations engaged in collecting
similar information (for example the FAO but also other organizations and
research institutes with remote sensing programmes) .
Since, as discussions in the run-up to the Rio Conference (UNCED) have shown, a
number of states have considerable reservations both about obligations on the
protection of forests and also concerning satellite remote sensing by an international
body, it seems meaningful to develop an evolutionary concept based on existing
activities to determine the status of the global forests (e.g . compilation of inventories by
the FAO), to first implement individual projects in order to dispel scepticism about
monitoring and develop incentive systems encouraging countries to participate in
agreements and verification measures . Such incentive systems should not only include
programmes on the protection and sustainable utilization, e.g . of forests (cf.
[Tropenwaldbericht 1993]), but also the more extensive transmission of such
information arising from remote sensing to the cooperating countries. This would not
only provide them with assistance in implementing their national climate protection
policies' , but also their economic development projects, such as exploitation of raw
materials, could be implemented more efficiently and in an environmentally friendly
manner. In this connection, it would also be meaningful to reinforce the capacities of
national space institutions in order to identify and enlist new user groups for satellite
information [Lanchbery et al . i n preparation] .
3.2.5
	
Digression :joint implementation and verification
The achievement of the goals of "reduction of greenhouse gas emissions" and
"sustainable economic development" requires large amounts of capital which have to be
raised primarily by the industrial nations . National budgets will not suffice to comply with
this task. In order to use the available capital as efficiently as possible and to raise
additional capital for the achievement of the goals of the climate convention, the basic
principles in (Art . 3(3) of the Climate Convention) implicitly point the way to the concept
of Joint Implementation (JI), i .e . joint action by states for the implementation of policies
and measures . At least amongst the industrialized states, this concept is receiving
increased interest since it seems to represent a cost-effective way to realize at least
part of the national commitments on emission reduction. However, it has not yet been
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This does not only refer to countries of the "South", which experienceconsiderable problems in the internal enforcement of their policies, forinstance on the protection of national parks or areas of indigenouspopulation . Satellites could also help to monitor, for example,compliance with the limit envisaged by the Canadian government ofrestricting clear-felling areas to 60 hectares (currently up to severalthousand hectares) .
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possible to win international agreement for such a procedure and to agree on the basic
features - let alone details - of JI . For although in parts of the political and economic
discussion the concept was basically welcomed, nevertheless the proposals for defining
the boundary conditions for practical application display numerous points of
disagreement [Loske & Oberthür 1994], although JI basically offers advantages to all
those involved . The following consideration will therefore only deal with a subaspect,
inasmuch as this is linked to the possibilities of the climate goals realizable in
connection with JI . The term JI will be used restrictively here and exclusively applied to
agreements between states.
3.2.5.9
	
Basic principles of the Jl concept
The concept of Joint Implementation in connection with the Framework Convention on
Climate Change proceeds on the economic maxim that given resources should be used
to achieve the greatest possible effect in view of the basic goal which, in the present
case, is a reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. This is based on the justified
assumption that the costs per avoided mass unit of emitted greenhouse gases or
greenhouse gases additionally bound in sinks will vary greatly from state to state. This
particularly true if industrialized countries are compared with "developing countries" .
The emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere has so far been free of costs
from an economic point of view . Tools for the enforcement of obligations undertaken
upon accession to the Framework Convention on Climate Change with respect to a
limitation of emissions are regulatory or fiscal measures at the national level, which
allocate a monetary value to the quantity of emitted greenhouse gases. Regulatory as
well as fiscal measures for emission reduction assign a value to the emitted mass unit
of greenhouse gases which, in the first case, may be determined by threatening
production restraints and, in the second, by taxation .- The mass unit of greenhouse
gases saved is thus given a capital equivalent and provides an incentive for
investments in measures reducing emissions. In industrial countries with highly
developed technologies, the potential for low-cost reduction measures (no regret) or
those achievable with a limited capital input will probably be exploited before long . From
a global perspective, it therefore appears meaningful to achieve a much greater effect
with the same capital input in another state with unexploited low-cost savings potentials .
In consideration of the capital input, the provider of capital will be credited a percentage
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of the emissions saved in the receiving country against savings obligations in the donor
country . With respect to COZ , this principle is termed carbon offsetting .
The expectation that the JI concept will provide an effective incentive for wide-ranging
global emission reductions is not so much based on the implementation of individual JI
projects, but rather on the perspective of a progressively developing global market
whose actors are providers of capital looking for emission rights on the one hand and
sellers of emission rights on the other . At the end of such a development, a
comprehensive market could be established in the sense of a comprehensive approach
including all greenhouse gases, considering sinks in addition to sources and involving
all member states of the Framework Convention on Climate Change . However, such an
approach must never lose sight of the ultimate goal of global emission reduction .
While the basic idea of joint implementation appears simple and clear, there is at
present no distinct picture concerning detailed practical application, especially with a
view to the comprehensive approach envisaged.
For example, the acquired right to unreduced emissions on the part of the provider of
capital after having exploited all low-cost reduction possibilities in his own country
conflicts with the seller's obligation to make corresponding relative reductions on his
territory. This becomes a problem when the receiving partner is a developing country
whose emissions are likely to rise in the course of its economic development. This state
then runs the risk of being restricted in its future economic development by selling its
emission rights. This risk should be minimized if a limitation of the national reduction
commitments in the donor state capable of being fulfilled by JI projects to a defined
fraction of its overall commitments is agreed upon globally in a mandatory manner.
However, a precondition for this is the commitment, at least by the donor states, to
observe quantitative upper emission limits within a certain time frame .
3.2.5.2
	
Framework criteria for JI
Although the basic idea of JI is simple, its application implies a complex comprehensive
concept. The secretariat of the International Negotiation Committee (INC) has put up for
discussion a proposal for framework criteria to be fulfilled by a JI project . The aim of
these framework criteria is to avoid undesirable developments in connection with JI . It isdifficult to evaluate these framework criteria with a view to possible consequences since
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no extensive experience is so far available . Some aspects of the framework criteria for
JI have been discussed in detail in recent publications, see e.g . [Kuik 1994], and at the
Groningen International Conference on Joint Implementation [Spradley 1994] . These
aspects will therefore only be mentioned in Table 9 but not discussed in detail .
Compliance with the framework criteria for JI should be a prerequisite for the pro rata
crediting of emission savings on foreign territory against the obligations of the provider
of capital . An essential criterion is the requirement of actual and measurable results
relative to the goal of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, compared with
defined reasonable reference values. No problems should arise for states with clear
reduction commitments in contrast to those without any obligation to reduce emissions
or those who are even entitled to emit additional amounts of greenhouse gases as part
of their foreseeable economic development . In these cases, the reference values can
only be based on future internationally recognized projections within the scope of
economic development planning as drawn up, for example, by IWF or the World Bank .
However, an investor in a JI project wants to be certain about the equivalent value in
the form of a reduction credit before making any investment . The prospect of an
uncertain investment could reduce the incentive for participation in JI projects. Lost
investments in JI projects could discredit the whole JI concept . Investment protection
measures are therefore conceivable, but this would not fulfil the goal of an optimum
allocation of resources set by the Framework Convention on Climate Change . Projects
only allowing a precise quantification of the reduction effect after their completion could
be the basis for speculative investments with prospects of future profit, but also a risk of
loss .
In order to provide as many chances for JI as possible, efforts are being made to
establish a comprehensive JI regime, i.e . including all greenhouse gases, sources and
sinks and, if possible, the participation of all signatory states to the Climate Convention .
This comprehensive approach increases the complexity of a developing regime and
makes it more difficult to set up detailed guidelines for the implementation of concrete
measures . Excessively narrow framework criteria could be counterproductive in that
they deter potential partners from participating in JI projects.
2.
3.
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
JI exlusively refers to joint action in the implementation of policies and
measures but in no case to a modification of commitments by one of the
parties involved .
JI is not the same as providing support for other parties .
JI is voluntary action on the responsibility of two or more parties ; this action
should be performed by the governments in question or with their agreement.
JI should be carried out in connection with measures in one's own state.
JI should be of advantage for all countries involved and in keeping with their
national priorities for sustainable development .
JI activities should provide actual and measurable results relative to
reasonable basic assumptions .
JI activities should be evaluated both with respect to their economic and
social impacts as well as to environmental effects .
JI activities should, if possible, be accompanied by measures for ensuring
long-term environmental advantages .
JI activities may concern any greenhouse gas or any combination of
greenhouse gases .
The parties should primarily pursue JI activities resulting in a restriction of
emissions .
The advantages of JI may be divided between the parties involved .
Every party involved in a JI activity must communicate relevant information
on this topic to the Conference of the Parties .
3.2.5.3
	
Problems of Quantification
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Table 9 : Criteria proposed by the INC Secretariat
The main problem seems to be the quantifiability of effects aimed at by the Climate
Convention, at least for part of the possible JI projects, since these effects should be
ultimately creditable against a defined monetary service or in the equivalent form of a
transferred economic service . These difficulties increase in proportion to the
comprehensive nature of JI projects, i .e . including all greenhouse gases as well as
sinks in addition to sources and permitting JI projects between all categories of states .
In order to include all greenhouse gases (comprehensive approach), internationally
recognized equivalence values (global warming potentials) must be defined for radiative
forcing greenhouse gases . However, this is in any case required for future commitments
also comprising greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide and containing concrete
emission reduction goals . The same applies to the establishment of uniform quantitative
evaluation criteria for sinks .
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The third problem area already mentioned above comprises JI projects involving states
with quantified emission reduction goals, e.g . industrialized countries on the one hand
and developing countries without obligations or even entitled to increasing emissions
within the scope of their economic development on the other.
In the first instance, there is no reference basis whatsoever for quantifying the emission
reduction achievable by JI projects . Apart from simple cases, such as replacement
investments using modern technology, the evaluation of a measure can generally only
be based on the targets of economic development plans. If the planning targets are not
reached or are exceeded, a new evaluation of the creditable emission units could
become necessary ex post .
3.2.5.4
	
Need for verification and verification measures
The crediting of saved emission units or greenhouse gas units additionally bound in
sinks against investments in corresponding measures can only be effected with the
consent of the members of the Framework Convention on Climate Change or an
institution acting on their behalf. Every partner in a JI project must furnish the necessary
information to an institution still to be determined, in accordance with standards to be
defined and by analogy to the parties' obligation to present reports as part of the
Climate Convention . Reporting on JI projects may be undertaken in connection with
national reports within the Framework of the Climate Convention, although sufficient
transparency should separate the JI-related information from information on other
national measures. To the same extent as in connection with the verification of national
reports, independent verification could also be required here although the
organizational and technical possibilities, apart from JI projects of low complexity, e.g .
the replacement of old inefficient power stations by more modern ones, cannot be
defined in advance but must be specifically adapted to each individual project . A more
complex situation is encountered, for example, if investments for modernizing a natural
gas industry are to be credited against emission reductions of C02 in the donor state . A
verification regime based on evolutionary development and increasingly stringent
commitments in the course of time, as well as on the technical possibilities of
evaluation, also seems to be appropriate for JI .
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The basis for a verification of JI projects, as of national reports, is the contents of
reports presented by the project partners involved . These reports should be based on
uniform methods of inventory determination for sources and sinks, e.g . on OECD or
IPCC guidelines . In this case, too, the first step could be a verification of the
consistency and plausibility of the reports presented by the project partners involved
and a comparison with the contents of national reports and of additionally available
information . If the receiving partner in a JI project is a developing country, the national
report will probably be the essential basis for verification of the reference values used to
determine the creditable emission units .
The application of further verification measures should decisively depend on the
specific design of each individual JI project, i .e . on whether sources and sinks, radiative
forcing gases other than carbon dioxide, locally limited or nationwide impact regions are
included .
Technical verification measures are currently only available to a limited extent . As in the
case of inventory taking, their application potential depends on their suitability for
verification, i .e . on the characteristics of the sources or sinks under consideration . In
connection with JI projects, the verification of land use by satellite or aircraft
observation will probably be of significance [Lanchbery & Salt 1993] . The discrimination
ability of satellite images is currently not really sufficient to differentiate the
characteristics of different vegetation types for verification purposes so that
supplementary verification on the ground is still considered necessary . Direct
measurements of emitted gas masses (quantities) [Lauppe 1994] can only be performed
at present for point sources, i .e . power plants, industrial plants and to some degree for
locally limited sources such as coal mines or coal extraction and oil or gas fields as well
as refuse disposal sites .
Apart from the specific source or sink characteristics, the suitability of ii projects for
verification decisively depends on the possibility of clearly delimiting the effects of a
project from the impact of other national measures and other JI projects to be
implemented in any case .
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Table 10: Graduated concept for the verification of Joint Implementation
A graduated concept oriented towards the time phases of a JI project is proposed as an
approach for JI verification measures . The verification intensity should similarly be
adapted in stages with increasing emission reductions achievable by JI and the
associated crediting . Table 10 shows a rough graduated concept . A comprehensive
verification procedure is envisaged in stage 3, whose basic elements can be seen from
Fig . 4 in the final chapter. Table 11 attempts to describe in more concrete terms
verification possibilities as examples of possible JI measures . It becomes apparent that
verification will probably be particularly difficult and expensive if on the basis of
individual decisions and preferences concerning the handling of technology etc ., which
is provided within the framework of JI, the savings effect may be cancelled or reduced .
Verification will then require considerable efforts in order to estimate the impacts of
individual behaviour fluctuations on the (savings) target . This may also lead to
considerable problems in crediting the savings achieved by JI measures.
Stage Task Solution
1 st stage analysis of the reduction potentials " estimates
of techniques and measures in a JI " model calculations
project - energy economy
- sector-specific
2nd stage establishment of specially adapted " quantities of GHG emission
balancing for techniques and reductions
measures in a JI project " time perspective
" costs
3rd stage verification of implementation on " comprehensive verification
the basis of the national report J
84
Table 11 : Examples of JI projects and possible verification measures
Two examples, if modern power station technology is supplied then it is to be assumed
that a company run on good business principles will aim at optimum operation of this
power plant technology . In this case, verification concentrates on establishing the actual
status before and after modernization . Later operation does not need to be monitored.
Such optimizing behaviour cannot necessarily be assumed for individuals, e.g . those
using energy-saving lamps. They may keep the lamps on longer since their
consumption is so low thus eliminating part of the savings. If the supplier (or funding
Emission sectors and sinks Examples of Possible
measures verification
energetic nonenergetic in JI projects measures
extraction of sealing of gas balancing, random
primary energy pipelines, in-situ verification,
methane separation in acquisition by direct
hard-coal mining measurement
power stations newpower plant tech- direct measurement,
nology, modification process simulation +
of the fuel mix calculation
industry industry innovative conversion process simulation,
and production direct measurement
processes
households introduction/promotion indicator analysis :
of energy-saving - sales figures
cookers - pattern of use
small consumers introduction/promotion . indicator analysis :
of energy-saving - sales figures
lamps - pattern of use
waste disposal waste disposal modern refuse in- direct measurement,
technology technology cineration, utilization modelling +
of landfill gases measuring
agriculture change in land use on-site verification
forestry afforestation remote sensing
3.2.5.5 Evaluation
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state) declares a theoretically derived savings unit (or part of a unit) then it may happen
that verification, which attempts to compare the actual effect with this declaration,
discovers a difference . Can this difference be subtracted from the supplier's credit
although he is not responsible for it ?
In order to avoid such problems, JI should primarily be applied to such cases where the
results can only be influenced by individual decisions to a minor extent. This also
reduces the demands made on verification .
The incorporation of the JI tool into a global greenhouse gas reduction strategy offers
the possibility of also raising private capital for individual emission reduction measures
in addition to national expenditures, combined with the intention of achieving maximum
effects with limited resources from a global aspect. The corresponding design of a JI
regime should be evolutionary and, in the course of time, merge into the comprehensive
approach .
The possibility of an independent verification, not only for implementation control of
measures under JI projects, but also for the quantitative verification of the effectiveness
of measures, is of essential significance for the functioning of such a regime. The
intensity of verification measures should be oriented towards verification requirements,
which will presumably increase with growing flows of capital, and towards the
availability of instrumental and technical methods . The selection of JI projects should be
made dependent on the feasibility of effective and economical verification measures .
From this point of view, all measures in the sector of power plant technology and
industry, as well as primary energy production, appear suitable .
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4.
	
Institutional Aspects of Verification
Verification includes the institutional facilities and organizational provisions on a
national and international level which serve to prepare the declaration and the
verification activities related to it .
All considerations concerning a verification concept for the Framework Convention on
Climate Change proceed from a two-stage design of the verification system . The FCCC
also envisages such a structure : determination of the national emissions is delegated to
the competent national institutions and organizational units . The data thus obtained are
communicated to an international institution (national declaration), which is then
essentially concerned with verifying these reports . A differentiation must be made on
the international level between a technical process and a political verification process
which are allocated to different institutions. 'Technical" verification is the mission of a
dedicated verification body which has the tasks of:
- receiving the national declarations,
- verifying these declarations with respect to completeness and plausibility,
- calling for additional information from the member states, and
- summarizing the results in a technical report to the Conference of the Parties.
As the political decision-making body, the Conference of the Parties has to undertake a
political assessment - based on this report - of (non)compliance with the Convention .
In the states party to the FCCC, provisions must be made for drawing up the national
report, i .e . compiling information, processing it in the form of country reports and then
passing it on . A national "organization" (infrastructure) is necessary to draw up this
report, whose actual form can, however, generally be decided by the states themselves.
Responsibilities for this task were not laid down in the climate convention, nor can it be
made binding for all states .
The FCCC does not only (in effect) commit the states in group 1 to reduce GHG
emissions but also to formulate national strategies and policies for climate protection
and to introduce corresponding measures . These commitments are also subjected to
international verification, which, however, is restricted to an assessment of whether the
parties have undertaken such steps (implementation safeguards), To this end,
information on the realization of the corresponding laws, ordinances etc. can be
gathered by the states, the impacts observed and the effectiveness estimated .
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Within the framework of efforts by IPCC and OECD to achieve uniformity of methods for
the reporting system on national GHG emissions (inventories) to be established
worldwide, a verification of these reports is also envisaged . However, IPCC and OECD
concentrate on violations due to false or incomplete national declarations, which are an
expression of a lack of capacity on the part of the states . In this respect, verification
should have an implementation-oriented and corrective effect. With the current status of
material commitments in the FCCC, major emphasis is given to this form of supportive
implementation monitoring . Nevertheless, over and above the unintentional errors and
falsifications in the information to be communicated, we do not rule out the possibility
that states or actors in the states in question deliberately falsify their emission data . As
already discussed, this is not completely improbable if the provisions are tightened up
by amendments to the FCCC itself or by means of protocols . Furthermore, a game-
theory investigation shows that within the framework of joint implementation, whose
usefulness basically starts with the Climate Convention, both partners could be
interested in a false declaration [Walker/Wirl 1994] . As a countermeasure for intentional
deceptions, verification must become more intensive and detailed in order to be in a
position to expose such violations . For this reason, the applicability and usefulness of
intrusive verification instruments is being examined, which would lead to a higher
verification density. The spectrum of verification possibilities may then range from an
estimate of the completeness and comparability of the national reports up to and
including a critical analysis of the information communicated . In addition to a detailed
analysis of the reports, further verification methods may be applied requiring extensive
access to the national information gathering and information processing systems .
Should this not be sufficient then, if necessary, further information channels will be
required based on the verification elements of surveillance and measurement.
With higher verification density, demands on the national organization and on the
international review body entrusted with verification also increase . Declarations by the
states should then also, for example, contain information on the information gathering
and processing paths so that, if applicable, inspectors commissioned on an
international level with verification of the declaration can make specific inquiries .
Pointers for estimating the reliability of the information could thus be obtained . A
well-structured organizational infrastructure with precisely defined tasks would have to
be provided on both sides for such extensive verification activities .
4.1
	
National surveillance system
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As a consequence of FCCC membership, organizational provisions must also be made
in the Federal Republic of Germany to ensure the realization of and compliance with the
commitments undertaken in the Convention as well as institutional support for the
reporting system. For pragmatic considerations, the organization and functions of a
national surveillance system for GHG emissions should be largely conform to existing
federal and subsidiary structures of environmental legislation and safeguards in
Germany and the European Union.
In the course of the further progress of integration within the EU on the basis of the
Maastricht Treaty, it would be conceivable that within the framework of the FCCC (and
protocols) the EU would not only draw up one report on common GHG emissions but
that this report would also take the place of the national reports . This - rather
improbable - possibility has not been systematically studied with respect to its impacts
on the national systems . However, indications point to the fact that even in this case
information on the EU member states would primarily be transmitted to the EU via
national information channels or institutions, whose role would thus not be diminished in
this respect .
A national safeguards system should be in a position to reconstruct GHG release
processes to such an extent that the effectiveness and impact of measures to reduce or
stabilize emissions can be monitored and evaluated in detail . Furthermore, it would
probably be the mission of a national or regional system (within the framework of the
European Union) to provide adequate proof of compliance, in case of doubt, with the aid
of its documents on reporting, production, use and operating procedures .
The reliable data sources include (in the old) federal states of the Federal Republic of
Germany, the energy balances on the macrolevel of the national economy
[Fritsche 1992] . These data provide an adequate information basis for determining the
energy-related GHG emissions since the energy flows have already been observed for
years both in the production as well as the conversion and consumer sectors in order to
assure the energy supply .
4.1.1
	
Emitter structure
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The basis of a comprehensive emission determination is given by the completeness of
coverage for all emission-relevant processes, accuracy in determining the associated
mass flow rates and representativeness in defining the emission factors . Appropriate
structuring of the area to be studied forms a decisive precondition for the degree of
detail of any possible statements with respect to the objects under surveillance . An
extensive fine-structuring of the data bases and the data collection on a national level
by means of appropriate object definitions therefore appears both meaningful and
necessary . Since the data for individual cases cannot simply be determined or defined,
uncertainties may result in verifying whether the target has been achieved . The national
surveillance system therefore has the task of compensating for such deficits and
bridging the gaps in the system . In this task, the OECD/IPCC classification should be
applied as far as necessary, thus ensuring structural uniformity, transparency of content
and ease of information handling in the national reports.
4.1.2 Aspects of a national GHG surveillance organization
The national system should enable a whole package of targets to be fulfilled, going
beyond reporting to the international community on greenhouse gas emissions . This
system should receive comprehensive and detailed information on GHG release
processes on national territory. (The inclusion of emissions occurring outside national
territory but directly attributable to the state has not yet been clarified internationally .) In
this connection, it appears meaningful to link this task to existing systems and
requirements . For example, there are already systems for environmental monitoring and
reporting concerned with the compilation of information on environmental pollution by
atmospheric pollutants, but which would have to be correspondingly "upgraded" . The
range of tasks can be regarded within the following boundaries :
- identification of all sources and data for GHG emissions ;
- verification and evaluation of efforts to reduce or stabilize GHG emissions .
Taking into consideration the specified requirements (gathering and transmission of
information), five essential spheres of action can be identified to achieve the efficiency
required of a national GHG surveillance organization . These comprise the fields of
development of methods, safeguards methods, information management, information
dissemination and evaluation of effectiveness.
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The sphere of development includes both the creation of the necessary conditions for
implementing the surveillance system as well as the permanent further development of
its elements in accordance with the state of the art :
The first mission in this connection is standardization . Apart from the technically
admissible designs of the emission sources (e.g . standards, guidelines) and the
requirements for restricting environmental pollution, special agreements are
required in the field of methods, processes and information . Efforts should be
made to achieve a harmonization between existing methods and processes for the
calculation, collection and transfer of information on other atmospheric pollutants
for safeguards on national emissions . All relevant institutions should participate in
achieving generally applicable and binding agreements on the organizational and
operative implementation or enforcement of surveillance measures in an orderly
and appropriate manner in order to establish a uniform basis .
Secondly, standards must be established . Attention is focused here on the
definition of reference values and processes . Reference and guide values enable
deviations from the terms of reference (requirements) to be determined . Boundary,
maximum, average, total values etc . can be established for the plants or
processes causing the emissions . Recourse can be taken to experience, the state
of the art or to agreements. This task also includes rules and methods for
calibrating measuring instruments . It should thus be possible to make reliable
statements with respect to comparability, information content, reliability etc . in
evaluating data from measuring and monitoring .
Emission-relevant objects and activities can be licensed, i .e . it may be made
binding that they fulfil technical and process-related conditions and requirements .
A new criterion could be compliance with certain GHG emission limits, in the
course of which a differentiation can be made between operating licence, licensing
by the surveillance authority and authorization, within the framework of which
responsibility and obligation to exercise due diligence passes to the operator. All
facilities, devices, processes and goods making a major contribution to GHG
emissions could be licensed for the national market after exhaustive examination
or under certain conditions . Licensing may be oriented towards process-related
characteristic data and emission limits . Measurements to determine the emission
situation can be performed by authorized agencies. The measuring
methods/measuring stations may be licensed .
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Definitions, classifications etc . must be selected and justified (data structures) for
a description of the object-specific source data . The features should be uniformly
determined for reasons of comparability, and must be specified together with their
range of values . The interfaces with the data bases must be examined and set up
with respect to compatibility, validity, completeness and reliability . Due to its
complexity and the possibly large number of actors involved, this task must be
regarded as a consensus-oriented process capable of achieving compromise .
Practicable and regulated collection methods are required in order to permit an
appropriate acquisition of data and information . Methods are oriented towards
information generation, the available data formats, the established data structures,
the possibilities of data transfer as well as the existing aggregations and
aggregation stages . Suitable data carriers and adequate collection formats for the
regular flow of information must be established by the investigators and applied as
correctly as possible. Technical details for data surveillance tasks such as
inspections, reports, verification of the book and operating records must be laid
down .
Computer methods in the form of accepted data processing models could be used
for the aggregation and evaluation of the information on hand . The utilization of
computerized calculation models can also be envisaged for processing emission
data generated on the microlevel as well as for calculating emission inventories
from energy consumption statistics . To this end, agreement must also be reached
on uniform evaluation principles and standards (cf. standardization) . Since
aggregations from (unreliable) primary data are frequently used, statistical test
methods should be applied to assess the propositions .
The informational and organizational structure of the national surveillance system
should be subjected to,a corresponding verification and assessment (evaluation)
procedure during its development and adaptation phase . Primarily the data and
information on which this system is based should be verified with respect to
usefulness, practicability, context, quality etc . Accepted evaluation procedures
should serve for a rational consideration of the surveillance measures, their goals
and efficiency .
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Monitoring the GHG emissions represents a permanent task for the national
surveillance system in order to ensure compliance with current limits, regulations and
commitments . Detailed coverage of the emission values and subsequent aggregation
according to emission sources, energy sectors etc . forms an essential basis for
surveillance measures. The necessary harmonization (target/performance relation) of
the terms of reference defines the further tasks and subsequent activities :
The necessary precondition for comprehensive and complete surveillance
measures is inventory taking, i .e . a determination of the population of sectors,
subsectors, emission sources or emission-relevant activities to be monitored .
Calculation or estimation of the emission sources as well as the measurement, or
a different form of determination, of the emission data provides the inventory of
national emissions to be monitored by the surveillance system . Various
procedures and methods, corresponding to the source definitions, can be used for
this purpose, such as the application of key variables based on national primary
and secondary data sources (e.g statistics) .
As part of the reporting obligations, operator and association reports and statistics
as well as notification of changes to inventory management are envisaged at
certain intervals (reporting) . Harmonization of the structures and categories (cf.
standardization, data structures) facilitates the assessment of reports both on a
national and also an international level . As a function of the emitter structure
and/or the error range of the emission sources and data, the reporting system may
display various degrees of detail . In accordance with the experience obtained, an
increasing density of the reporting systems (more extensive, in-depth) may be
desirable . Report verification and monitoring can then also be performed on an
object-specific basis .
Detailed surveillance measures require that the data from the operator, producer
or user can be verified by (at least) one further actor in accordance with the
existing regulations or the assigned credibility . The specific, random control or
inspection of the licensing values, the characteristic data or verification of the
operating records (e.g . tachograph etc .) can be performed as a function of the
emission sources . The inventory data of the surveillance system can be compared
with the currently determinable data by independent measurements etc . (e.g . also
by environmental measuring and monitoring systems) .
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The results of on-site inspections should be combined with the inventory of
emission data and emissions in the form of inspection data or results as
surveillance messages. A comparison with the inventory data may lead to the
detection of deviations and to a correction of the inventory . Feedback to the
operator (polluter) should be ensured .
The surveillance system should also permit an assessment of the validity of its
information inventory so that data on the credibility of the data sources and on the
quality and error range of the data bases are required (validation) . Verification of
plausibility and consistency should be performed with respect to the evaluation of
the inventory and the inspection data . Furthermore, estimates are required of the
error propagation for the aggregation procedures .
The inventory data represent the most important precondition for the national
declaration, the forms of international reporting as well as the verification of
emission inventories . They may provide the basis for monitoring the actual
development of the GHG emissions . It should be possible to retrieve and evaluate
the inventory of emission data and sources in an appropriately aggregated and
informative form at any time, in which connection accessibility for (international)
third parties may also possibly be selectively granted .
Taking into consideration the quality of the information, deviations from or
violations of commitments can be determined and revealed with the aid of
surveillance measures . In the case of continuous, accumulated demonstrable
violations of the agreements, sanctions may be considered by the safeguards
authority or another body appointed for this purpose . Suitable procedures should
ensure the stipulation and enforcement of sanctions .
Well-ordered information management represents a central mission for surveillance in
order to make available up-dated and comprehensive monitoring knowledge . The
acquisition, storage, updating and evaluation of the necessary information can be
performed by modern data-processing-aided methods . These methods enable a specific
selection, accumulation and aggregation of information even from large data
inventories. Information management includes the following aspects :
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Although the availability of the required data should normally be assumed,
situations may arise in which appropriate access is made difficult because of the
inadequate accessibility of the information sources due to legal, organizational,
operational or other regulations . For reasons of data protection or national
jurisdiction, it is even possible in the Federal Republic of Germany that the
available information cannot be evaluated .
The various surveillance principles and approaches should be supported by
recording the various objects in the population to be monitored. Within the
framework of an object-oriented perspective, details of the surveillance measures
should be oriented towards the agreed definitions of the emitter structures and
object-specific characteristics of the emission sources . Registration should ensure
that these object categories and objectives are incorporated in the surveillance
system together with the licensing data as well as the producer, operator and user
data .
In connection with registration, corresponding descriptions are required for the
plants etc . providing more detail on the emission source (technical facility
description) . If a licensing procedure is mandatory, these characteristics should be
appended to the licences as documentation . In relevant cases, it should be
possible to obtain this information for operation from the operating manual,
environmental protection manual or from the quality manual/emergency manual .
The admissible emissions are laid down with the licence or approval as
characteristic or licensing data as part of the technical facility description
(predefined reference/design values) . The actual emissions within a period of time
should be appropriately determined for the monitored facilities and reported by the
operator etc . These data can be supported by documents, such as operating and
book records, which may also be used in the inspection, verification and
evaluation of the emission declaration .
Changes in the operational status of a plant should be reported to the competent
bodies by means of modification notices, if they influence the emission
declaration . Data on any changes must be processed in order to maintain the
status of the inventory.
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Quantitative data from various information sources, such as inventory
management, reports, inspections, may differ from each other even if they concern
the same facilities . Apart from system-related tolerances, errors and uncertainties
are possible resulting from the methods and processes of information
determination . The investigation and clarification of such deviations (anomalies,
discrepancies etc .) are among the essential tasks of a surveillance system . On the
one hand, it would have to be established whether a deviation can be attributed
with (statistical) certainty to a violation of commitments ; on the other hand, the
consistency of the data must be maintained within the framework of inventory
management . A more precise verification can be achieved by an audit or by
statistical calculations .
On the national level, the diffusion of innovative techniques and methods of GHG
reduction or stabilization should be prepared and supported by information
dissemination . Apart from the legal guidelines, directives and regulations, which are in
any case known to the user, a wide range of instructional information should be made
available to influence behaviour :
An important mission is the dissemination of knowledge on new techniques or the
state of the art for the spectrum of potential users (e.g . GREENTIE - Greenhouse
Gas Technology Information Exchange, initiated by the International Energy
Agency and OECD). The information can be spread through the corresponding
media and via existing channels . Information about the application of new
technologies, particularly their contribution to the GHG reduction potential as well
as their subjective perception by the user, may initiate or reinforce strategies
aiming at a change of behaviour.
Advisory services should refer to suggestions for emission-reducing measures and
the application of specific techniques, The justification for the positive effects of
new technologies could be based on the extensive know-how provided by the
evaluation of the information inventory available in the surveillance system . Details
of successful possibilites of GHG reduction can be obtained from the entirety of
information available by means of longitudinal considerations (time series), which
may also provide feedback for the advisory services .
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Furthermore, direct support is required for the application of new techniques . The
provision of suitable human, technical and investment potential may be regarded
as a necessary prerequisite . A major contribution can be provided by the training
and secondment of experts .
The evaluation ofthe effectiveness of energy-policy measures could be undertaken on
the basis of the collected information inventory of a surveillance system based on an
adequate data basis for reliable jugdements . An internationally agreed catalogue of
possible measures performed by an independent, neutral body may make an essential
contribution towards a generally accepted evaluation . The following must be considered
in an evaluation of effectiveness :
The formal introduction of individual measures (e.g . laws, directives, official
gazettes etc.) may become an object of implementation checks . After a certain
time it should be possible to estimate the effectiveness of a measure on the basis
of the emission data . An exhaustive assessment should include the concomitant
monitoring of the economic environment (e.g . price relations, shopping basket,
relation to cost of living etc .) in order to evaluate the subsequent impacts .
A suitable combination of measures (package of measures) may possibly be
easier to implement and can achieve greater effectiveness than individual
measures (synergistic effect) . On the one hand, a consideration of the pros and
cons (trade-off) and a possible balancing of burdens and relief (e.g . yield-neutral)
could be performed and, on the other hand, compensation possibilities could be
envisaged. A review of the quantitative emission curves taken from the data base
of the safeguards system may be of assistance in subsequently justifying
measures .
The acceptance of compulsory measures representing a serious intervention in
the individual's self-determination behaviour (e.g . speed limit) could be
problematic . The information basis of the surveillance system can provide
indications of whether the degree of potential reduction of GHG emissions is
commensurate with the level of intervention .
4.1.3
	
Organizational provisions
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Organizational provisions must be made for monitoring the implementation of and
compliance with the agreements reached in the Climate Convention for the Federal
Republic of Germany. In order to solely satisfy the obligation to present reports, the
reporting system has to be backed-up by appropriate organizational and mission
structures on a national level . Furthermore, the national monitoring system could fully
cope with the above-mentioned tasks (cf. Functions) .
In establishing the organizational structure, it appears meaningful to incorporate
existing institutions and take them into consideration in allocating tasks . The
participation and cooperation of the institutions should be oriented towards their
statutory mandate and to the possible contribution they are capable of making to the
joint target of comprehensive and detailed monitoring and surveillance of all GHG
release processes in the Federal Republic of Germany. The selection of exploitable
information will be based on reliable information sources also including, apart from their
own surveys, data from operators, licensing and municipal authorities, interest groups,
statistical bureaus etc.
In setting up or allocating various organizational units to the functions of the national
authority, existing structures and inherent structural features should be exploited as
optimally as possible . The possibility of conflicts of targets and interests which could
lead to collision or blockade tactics among the participating institutions must be
considered . In allocating functions to the corresponding institutions, a distribution
among the following groups should be made: government agencies (e.g . licensing,
supervision, sanctions etc.) ; semi-public, private-sector and neutral authorities (e.g .
measurement, expert opinions, review, estimates, assessment, support, training etc.) ;
non-profit organizations actively pursuing environmental goals (e.g . public relations,
defining problem areas etc.) . The (subsidiary) principle of staggered responsibility could
be applied for the cooperation of the executives. This means that decisive contributions
to the surveillance mission would be provided on both a municipal, local and district
level . The following examples of governmental agencies can be mentioned : heads of
district administrations, trade supervisory officers, local authorities, regional agencies
for emission protection, statistical bureaus, licensing authorities, Federal Environmental
Agency (UBA), Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
Safety (BMU) etc. The following neutral agencies would come to mind : national
research centres (GFE), technical control boards (e.g . Tl1V, DEKRA etc.), industrial
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standards institutes, DIN standards committees (e.g . coordinating office for
environmental protection at DIN), Stiftung Warentest (consumer goods testing
foundation), experts etc . The following interest groups could also be mentioned :
Institute for Energy and the Environment (IFEU), industrial associations (e.g . BDI),
nature conservation groups (e.g . German Association for the Environment and Nature
Conservation - BUND), consumer organizations etc . The approach taken by those
involved should depend on the possibilities for cooperation and consensus, the
significance of the environmental protection concept, as well as the priorities in
reducing/stabilizing the relevant GHG emissions . A procedural model can thus be
developed also taking into consideration, in addition to the apportionment of tasks, the
phases required for structuring a national monitoring system for GHG emissions .
Existing concepts from the international sector could be harmonized (cf. International
Institutions) .
4.2
	
Tasks and structures of international verification
The "counterpart" of the national systems is the international verification system . In
principle, in developing this system there is the option of allocating the organs and
functions of verification to a new organization or to existing organizations . The decisive
factor seems to be whether work can be carried out in, as far as possible, a technical
and nonpolitical manner in collecting, processing, harmonizing and technically
evaluating information on national emissions, greenhouse gas sinks and
implementation steps by the national legislation . In the discussion of the institutional
form of a climate convention in the past few years, as a rule world organizations such as
UNEP and WMO have been mentioned, as well as organizations yet to be established,
which would also be responsible worldwide . In view of the fact that basically all
countries will be affected by the climate changes predicted in model calculations, it
appears self-evident that executive authorities acting worldwide should be entrusted
with the institutional functions . There is also the possibility of assigning verification
tasks to a number of international organizations .
A broad consensus is now in favour of the Subsidiary Body on Implementation being
responsible for the politically sensitive task of verifying the national reports within the
FCCC framework . It is open to all parties and, if one compares its position with the
Implementation Committee of the Montreal Protocol [Lang 1994], it is a working group
with very restricted competence, which does not work independently but rather under
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the supervision (and probably de facto under the direction) of the Conference of the
Parties . There is still a long way to go before achieving such an independent
examination of compliance as is already the case today in the Montreal Protocol .
Relevant "technical" problems in connection with the analysis of states' behaviour in the
FCCC; for example methodological questions connected with preparing the national
reports, will probably be dealt with by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific Technological
Advice . The evaluation of the results of the activities by both bodies is undertaken by
the Conference of the Parties, which thus takes on the central political assessment and
decision-making function [Victor/Salt 1994] . To this extent, there is no basic discussion
about the organizational structure of verifying national reports in the FCCC, even if
major aspects of the mission still await specific definition . The outstanding questions
are to be answered at the first Conference of the Parties in Berlin .
As a consequence of the evolution of a dynamic climate protection regime with
protocols, more stringent commitments and an extension of obligations to limit GHG
emissions to include further countries, it would be conceivable that more, and also
broader-based, tasks and authority to act would be necessary for the international
verification bodies . In the search for organizational features, two ideal extreme forms of
a verification organization would be conceivable : a decentralized, emission-sector
specific system or a centralized, hierarchical organizational system responsible for
GHGs in general .
The difference between the two organizational models is to be found in the fact that in
one case the states' compliance is verified both with respect to the Framework
Convention as well as to the protocols in one uniform organizational structure, whereas
in the other case the respective protocol provisions are verified by the special
verification organizations and only the political assessment of their results is
coordinated on the level of the Framework Convention. However, a superordinate
verification agency would also be conceivable as -an organ of the Framework
Convention, whose activities would have to be implemented by cooperation and
coordination with the protocols of the Climate Convention . The technical efficiency of
such an institution would permit rapid, time- and resouce-saving information collection,
information processing, structuring of information flows and finally information
evaluation . Proposals allocation the verification of commitments to the protocols would
perhaps enjoy greater acceptance on the part of the member states . At least the final
stage in the verification process, the political assessment of the collected and
processed national data, should be undertaken in a transsector manner by the
institutions of the Framework Convention .
Since almost all environmental media are characterized by one common feature - the
ability to have a transboundary impact, also frequently on a large scale - a certain
organizational superstructure on environmental media-specific international problems is
recommendable . Consequently, organizations separated according to environmental
media would be preferable to a central environmental body .
Various model concepts can be developed for verification with respect to the structure
of the organization and the communication lines for international surveillance . As
already mentioned, two different models are conceivable : a centralized hierarchical
model (Model 1) as well as the contrasting example of a decentralized emission-sector-
specific alternative organization (Model 2), see Fig . 3.
Model 1 assumes a verification system which regards the convention and protocols as a
unified set of agreements . It therefore represents the verification process in a linear
organizational sequence with a hierarchical institutional structure . A joint verification
system of this type would require the unanimous consent of the respective parties in
order to realize verification or surveillance of the implementation of commitments in a
joint system . Major restrictions would arise for this system if at the outset various
framework agreements were required for the individual sectors influencing the
anthropogenic warming of the earth's atmosphere as emission sources or greenhouse
gas sinks .
It is characteristic that the national sector is not included in the organizational sequence
(national declarations in segment C), that, furthermore, all information relevant for the
greenhouse effect (from segment B) is fed into the sequence of segment A (centrality of
data collection and processing), and that finally the 'information flow in segment A
proceeds in a strictly linear bottom-up manner. All sequence steps and communication
channels in segment A are within the sphere of an international climate institution . An
international verification body receives the national reports on emissions or
implementation, verifies the completeness and plausibility of these reports, and
communicates the results of this review to the Conference of the FCCC Parties .
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A proposal entrusting the Conference of the Parties with operative technical verification
and monitoring tasks must meet with reservations . Although as the supreme
decision-making body of the Climate Convention, the Conference of the Parties deals
with all important topics (and makes decisions, submits assessments), nevertheless it
may be assumed that the Conference of the Parties hardly has the necessary time to
effectively undertake such time-consuming occupations as the verification of national
reports. Furthermore, the Conference of the Parties is not a body which is permanently
in session, but meets periodically (i .e. probably annually) . It is thus clearly more
appropriate to entrust a specialized and permanently operative body (e.g . the so-called
"Review Body") with verification and implementation tasks . However, it should be
emphasized that the political assessment of the results which is the final stage of the
verification process should in any case come within the competence of the Conference
of the Parties .
In contrast, Model 2 emphasizes decentralization. In this model as well,
	
national
authorities declare data on emission sectors and greenhouse gas sinks to an
international verification institution . An essential difference is to be found in segment B
of the system where only one sector is represented . In this example, verification is
undertaken in a decentralized manner as part of the protocols to a framework
convention and ideally only deals with one sector, one sink or one GHG.
The flow of information from the Review Body of a sector-specific agreement to the
Conference of the Parties of a convention on comprehensive climate protection is
naturally no longer possible if various conventions exist or are planned from the outset .
The aim should in any case be an organizational structure enabling a political
evaluation of the national reports on the implementation or development of emissions
from individual trace gases and sinks in an integrated form by a responsible body such
as the Conference of the Parties .
Information channels and rights are regarded as important starting points for
organizational and institutional provisions and preparations for a verification system .
These information channels and information rights may exist independently of and
parallel to a verification system in a system for monitoring the environmental climate
medium and its important subsectors.
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Activities on observing the relevant environmental media (climate, tropical forests, land
use etc .) are also termed monitoring . The organization plan for information flows in a
climate monitoring system proceeds in a manner similar to that in a verification system .
The segment designated B in the organization plans of the centralized (Model 1) and
decentralized (Model 2) verification systems is in this case relatively insignificant. Data
acquisition or collection still proceeds at measuring stations located on the territory of
the national states or else the objects to be monitored are on national territory .
Nevertheless, in the case of environmental monitoring there is usually no or only little
resistance to providing data .
Enhanced environmental consciousness increases the parties' willingness to include
more extensive commitments in the protocols . A verification of compliance over and
above implementation safeguards by bilateral or multilateral safeguards or else by an
international organization can only be established as verification if correspondingly
accepted . Furthermore, the idea of self-regulation for national measures and national
declarations on topics of relevance for international environmental protection treaties
cannot be dismissed out of hand .
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5.
	
Considerations on International Verification Acceptance
It was apparent to anyone with personal or scientific experience of the negotiations on
drawing up the FCCC and discussions in preparation for the first Conference of the
Parties that regulations and measures for verifying compliance attracted hardly any or,
as soon as they became more intrusive, no consensus or were indeed vehemently
rejected . International verification has enjoyed little acceptance to date . This is probably
also true of most of the methods and techniques described in the previous chapters .
Can this acceptance be increased ?
The (international) acceptance of verification in the climate issue area depends on three
"systemic" factors:
- the significance of the issue area and the density of the material contractual
regulations, i .e. their content,
- the general estimation of compliance on the part of the states by the respective
actors as well as the estimation of the cause of violations,
- the "political culture" of a country, its understanding of sovereignty and experience
with verification .
Situation-specific factors are also involved and must be analysed from case to case .
The interaction of these factors may lead to both identical and also different concepts of
the role of verification and a willingness, ranging from congruent to contrary, to accept
verification . However, the factors do not all act in the same direction, i .e . conflicting
goals are conceivable and not all factors are regarded by the actors as equally
important, or their significance may change during the political process . For example,
considerations of sovereignty may receive great weight under domestic pressure but be
of minor significance in the case of little domestic interest and a greater preference for
verifying the compliance of other states . The sequence of the three factors tends to
reflect their relevance, with the first two factors being necessary conditions but the third
merely a sufficient condition . Nevertheless, only a concrete and systematic investigation
can determine their actual influence in the political process . The situation-specific
factors must also be taken into consideration .
Acceptance problems only arise for verification if these factors have a different weight in
the relevant states and do not all act in the same direction . If all parties either
unanimously require verification or reject it, then there is no problem . The problem
arises from the different notions of the necessity, weight and intensity (density) of
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verification, which are the results of these three factors and impinge on each other in
the international political process . Acceptance problems therefore result if some states
desire (a certain density of) verification, while other states reject it.
If one takes previous insights about the acceptance of verification as a basis, largely
originating from arms control [Chayes 1993, Efinger 1990], then everything seems to
indicate a clearly different willingness to undertake verification commitments arising
from the three "systemic" factors and concrete, specific political configurations at the
time of negotiations on conventions and their verification rules . Roughly three groups of
states emerge, which accept verification to different extents :
The willingness of the group of OECD states is most highly developed, since they
already have a lengthy, close incorporation in international agreements and some
experience of verification.
The states in transition from planned economies, which in the past demonstrated a
somewhat reluctant or unsympathetic attitude to verification . This was particularly
true of the USSR until well into the seventies. Nevertheless, the attitude of these
European states, partly including Russia, is approaching that of the OECD
countries or in the case of some central and eastern European countries is already
identical . Furthermore, some of the "southern" countries seem to be moving
towards this group of cautious proponents of verification, at least in some points .
The majority of "southern" countries . On the one hand, they are only marginally
incorporated in conventions with verification commitments, and on the other hand
they have very strong sovereignty reservations which preclude verification .
The composition of these three groups varies, i .e . learning processes take place, and
even within the groups the willingness to accept verification is not identical . One merely
needs to recall the lack of willingness on the part of the USA to accept fullscope
safeguards within the framework of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Nor is the verification
acceptance by a state identical in all issue areas, and may indeed vary within one issue
area. All previous experience in discussions on the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and preparations for the first Conference of the Parties in Berlin shows that a
similar, even if somewhat more complex structure, of different degrees of acceptance
for verification measures can be perceived in the issue area of climate protection .
Nevertheless, the sting is taken out of the problem due to the generally low demands on
verification of compliance made in the Framework Convention on Climate Change .
5.1
	
Analysis of governing factors
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Re 1 : The significance of the issue area and the density of material contractual
regulations
The acceptance of verification is decisively influenced by estimates of the need for
verification and the verification density considered necessary by the political actors .
Game-theory investigations provide initial insights into the issue area of arms control
[Efinger 1990] and climate protection [Efinger/Breitmeier 1991 ] . The demand for and
willingness to undertake verification commitments tends to be higher in issue areas of
great significance for national policy than in issue areas of lower priority. If security
problems are involved then the desire for more, and more precise, information on the
actual behaviour of other states is considerable and, if national technical means are
inadequate, leads to an agreement on bi- or multilateral verification . Naturally, each
state would prefer that only its counterpart should be verified . However, in an
international system in which as a rule reciprocal commitments prevail in worldwide
conventions, the price of verification is one's own acceptance of verification
commitments . If, therefore, national actors desire a political regulation of an issue area
regarded as important by them then they are subjected to equivalent commitments and
if they are of the opinion that the success of the regulation depends on agreed
international verification then they must also be willing to accept verification
themselves . In the present, non-hegemonic international system it is no longer
conceivable that there could be two classes of verification as in the Nonproliferation
Treaty . Whoever demands verification for others but does not accept it for himself,
loses credibility, relinquishes political influence and prevents treaty agreements .
It may be assumed that most of the important decision makers in almost all countries do
not perceive the climate issue as a direct security-relevant problem . Although an
economic dimension was added to the concept of (international) security after the first
oil crisis and today many sectors of declaratory policy and some scientists emphasize
the "ecological dimension of security", not least with a view to the consequences of the
climate problem, nevertheless practical action by states and international law
demonstrate that this perception does not prevail and that the climate issue area tends
to be regarded as a rather secondary topic with only slight, very long-term direct
relevance to security [Fischer 1992, Daase 1992] . Estimates of the significance of a
violation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change must also be viewed against
this background : relative to the individual event, it would be of less objective
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significance than a violation of treaties on arms control . "Clandestine" emissions of
several million tonnes of C would therefore be of marginal significance in view of global
anthropogenic releases in the order of six billion tonnes of C . A verification system for a
climate convention therefore need not display the same density as considered
necessary for arms control, where every nuclear missile and every carrier system
counts . Only serious, permanent violations would probably represent a major problem .
The desire for verification is thus less pronounced and, correspondingly, the
acceptance question requires a low-key discussion . A medium-level need for
verification can only be analytically derived in perspective lying somewhere between
arms control or disarmament (high) and previous environmental protection conventions
(low) [Efinger/Breitmeier 1990] .
In summary: since the political relevance and regulation density of the climate
protection issue area is still fairly low, the "demand" for verification also remains slight .
This is also shown by previous activities within the FCCC, which concentrate on
"supportive implementation surveillance". Where there is hardly any verification there
will hardly be any conflict. For this reason a serious acceptance problem is not yet
perceptible.
Re 2 : Perceptions of compliance by states and estimation of the causes of violations by
the actors
The perception of the general verification problem and its causes by government actors
is also of significance for the acceptance of verification [Mitchell 1992] . This concern,
firstly, the mutual estimation of motives for and interest in a convention by the
respective actors ("outsider image") and, secondly, the "self-image" of national
interests, i .e . the estimation of the significance of verification for enforcing one's own
interests . The effective verification of a convention may be judged to be of central
national interest . It has been indicated above that the , majority of states fulfil most of
their contractual obligations, in part also in the environmental sector, more or less
reliably even if the reasons for this are controversial . Furthermore, violations are not
only committed intentionally but can often be attributed to a lack of capacity and delays
in realization arising from a number of causes . It is apparent that the actors' perception
of the reasons for violations is also influenced by their willingness to accept verification .
If actors from country A wish to monitor the other states B, C . . ., which basically appear
"suspicious" to them then, as a rule, they cannot avoid also subjecting their country, at
least formally, to the same verification rules . This will be the case simply because actors
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from other states, even if they assume that other countries comply with the treaty, will
nevertheless insist on verification for reasons of political symmetry . In practical
implementation, differences in the frequency of verification measures and intensity may
arise between countries even though a multilateral verification organization, as can be
seen from the example of the IAEA, would have to pay great attention to the aspect of
formal non-discrimination .
The intensity of verification is also influenced by such perceptions. If noncompliance is
regarded above all as a consequence of inadequate capacities and a time lag then one
must assume an interest in a less dense, corrective and not - as in the case of
intentional violations - unmasking verification system, which will probably receive
greater acceptance simply because the administrative and other costs will be relatively
low and because the assistance of third-party states in constructing a verification
system will be easier to achieve due to the lower costs . The "manual" for emission
declarations developed by the OECD and IPCC in connection with the Framework
Convention on Climate Change already represents an attempt to prevent such
unintentional violations . The intergovernmental conflict about the necessity and
practical application of such a system is therefore smaller, and consequently also the
acceptance problems . But this is not universally the case ; it can be seen from a number
of environmental conventions that many states with a lack of capacity are reluctant to
admit this - compared with international treaty violations - actually quite harmless
inadequacy in order to avoid losing prestige . They therefore have a generally negative
attitude even to fairly trivial verification demands [AusubelNictor 1992] .
In summary, the climate convention contains several regulations to prevent or eliminate
unintentional violations . This corresponds to the trend in international conventions
whereby agreements with the aim of identifying capacity shortages and time lags have
become standard and receive increasingly broad acceptance . Furthermore, there is
only rudimentary experience with "verification", i .e : with systems and methods
concerned with verifying the correctness of the declared data themselves . These
systems remain almost exclusively limited to the OECD states and other European
countries (see below) .
Re 3: The influence of political culture anddomestic factors
Domestic and foreign policy are closely linked and the respective strength of these two
factors, whose impacts may be antithetical, can only be determined by a concrete policy
analysis . In the case of economically and politically influential states, however, internal
political processes tend to gain the upper hand in determining political goals whereas in
the case of small, economically weak states external forces are more important .
Nevertheless, the result of a political process cannot be predicted by the solution of an
"equation with two unknowns" because "compulsion" is not an objective category . If a
country regards itself as compelled to accept something put forward by an external
force (e.g . the demand to reveal compliance) then this is not predefined objectively but
is rather dependent on the state's ability and willingness to accept defeat . Maintenance
of national sovereignty may mean so much to the actors that they are prepared to
accept high political and other costs in order to avoid giving way to external pressure .
Particularly the "sovereignty-phobia" encountered in many "southern" countries and
also in the remaining planned economies generally reduces their acceptance of
verification . This may be observed throughout almost all issue areas although this
phobia repeatedly collapses in the face of problems regarded as important . One
example is the regional verification system for nuclear material concluded between
Brazil, Argentina and the IAEA within the framework of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for
reasons of regional stability and cooperation, although both states have a basically
sceptical attitude to verifaction .
This strong emphasis on sovereignty, particularly in the "south", can also be explained
by these countries' lack of experience with verification . Compared, above all, with
European OECD states, the density of incorporation into international treaties is low for
these countries . Furthermore, they are not party to most of the treaties with, rather more
prominent verification activities $ , or are, as in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the
chemical weapons convention, little affected by verification activities in practice . They
still have to "learn" how to deal with verification and experience the (relatively slight)
depth of interventions in their sovereignty .
This is aggravated by the fact that in most of these countries social groups (NGOs) who
regard verification as a strengthening or guarantee of their interests in the solution of an
internal problem (e.g . environmental pollution) are missing or are still weak . In contrast
to OECD states these groups have little influence on policy and in view of the
9 Above all, the arms control treaties within the framework of theConference (now : Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) and the closely associated Convention of the Conference forConfidence Building and Disarmament in Europe ; furthermore multilateralenvironmental treaties such as the Geneva Convention, its protocols andthe Antarctic Convention .
dominance of traditional interest groups their political relevance is marginal .
Furthermore, the sovereignty concept is much more emphasized by "southern" than by
"northern" NGOs. This hampers the formation of coalitions, as became apparent during
prepartions for the Rio Conference [Oberthür 1993] .
In summary: in the political system and its guiding norms, there is a structurally
anchored reluctance in many states, particularly in the "south", to accept serious
verification commitments since the latter are regarded as a curb on sovereignty .
However, there are also first indications here of learning through cooperation .
As a result it can be established that the willingness to accept verification commitments
is only well developed if a favourable constellation arises : an issue area has a high
priority for all important states, there is interest in (and a possibility of) regulating the
problem by a consensus, there is more or less agreement on the need for verification,
potential motives for violations and thus on the "density" of verification and domestic
considerations do not stand in the way. At the same time, unmistakable progress has
been made in international policy . The basic necessity of verifying compliance is
accepted today by considerably more states than was the case in the past .
These conditions do not yet prevail, or only in part, in climate protection so that it is not
surprising that there is as yet no "problem with the acceptance of verification". There is
no serious, let alone a universal, verification system in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change . Even the commitment to provide reports differs for states in groups 1, 11
and the majority of "southern" countries and no verification of the data is envisaged.
Therefore there is no acceptance problem in the strict sense . Present and foreseeable
verification is largely oriented towards violations resulting from capacity shortages or
time lags in realization . One reason for this is also the low regulation depth of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which only contains a few, fuzzily
formulated material commitments without any time schedule thus providing few starting
points for verification . However, if a dynamic climate regime should develop and
protocols with extensive, precisely timed and onerous commitments on the reduction of
greenhouse gases should be agreed then a greater need for verification would probably
arise and elements of intentional violation would also have to be increasingly
considered . Verification density would increase and the correctness of national data on
emissions etc. would become an issue. The acceptance problem would only then really
crop up . It lies dormant in the clauses of protocols conceivable in future and will be
awakened if they and related verification systems become a subject of serious
discussion . This will probably be particularly true of direct measurements of emissions
at large point sources and satellite surveillance (possibly to a lesser extent in joint
implementation programmes) .
5.2
	
Considerations on acceptance in a developed climate regime
Strict material commitments in treaties are necessary for verification, without them there
is no object to be verified . Such commitments are only envisaged by states if they
regard this as a really urgent problem also for their country and their interests .
Discussions on the acceptance of verification in climate protection therefore also
require insights into the interest of the states in climate protection . Only in connection
with this interest can the sufficient conditions for accepting verification be considered,
which are to be found above all in the process of domestic policy.
Whereas for the OECD states and also as a tendency for transition economies, greater
acceptance for the verification of climate agreements can be accepted, this must be
regarded with greater scepticism for the third group, the "southern" countries . This is
shown by analyses of the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian climate protection policy
- central for the entire "south" - and their hesitant attitude to "restrictions on national
sovereignty" and the comparatively small experience of these countries with
international environmental cooperation and even with simple reporting systems on the
implementation of agreements . As shown in Table 12, the integration of these countries
into the set of international environmental treaties displaying some approaches to
verification is relatively weak. Much still remains to be learned about international
cooperation .
By way of summary it must be noted that before posing the question of the acceptance
of verification (and receiving the answer) the question must be put of the content and
acceptance of the material regulations of the convention . Verification will only have an
object if the states' commitments are substantial, capable of receiving consensus and
placed within a time frame . However, even then there need not be any verification or
acceptance problem . The optimum situation from the perspective of actors interested in
minimizing costs is a constellation where everybody pursues one goal and no one
distrusts the other. A contrary situation arises if some parties require a substantial
convention with dense verification and others demand the opposite. 9
Serious acceptance problems are to be expected in particular if the former states
attempt to force the latter to relinquish their demands . Between these two poles there
are situations in which, for example, everybody wants the regulation but some states
want no or only weak verification . The states demanding dense verification must then
decide whether the agreement on the material regulations remains meaningful from
their point of view if verification is dispensed with .'° For it is possible that in spite of
some violations the effect of the convention may be regarded as positive on the whole .
(In the same way, effective verification says nothing about the value of a convention
measured against the extent to which a problem is solved : a convention with inadequate
commitments may be easily verifiable but does not present a satisfactory regulation of a
problem area).
Table 12 The integration of states into international environmental protection
Membership of important multilateral treaties and organizations on environmental
protection
io
Naturally, the logical extreme would be "nobody wants anything" - but
in that case there would be nothing to discuss!
The question arises for the second group of whether they can afford to
let the agreement collapse .
Country Environmental Convention Organizations
ratified signed
Brazil 19 7 11
China 10 11 8
Germany 25 15 19
UK 24 13 21
India 18 5 13
Russia 22 10 10
USA 23 9 21
The initial political situation for the climate issue is still fairly clear : no important actor
really wants binding, extensive commitments within a fixed time frame. For this reason
the discussion of the acceptance of verification remains necessarily somewhat abstract .
Instead, the discussion must concentrate on future material regulations and the
possibilities of developing them further. Undoubtedly, willingness to accept effective
verification will not arise of its own accord . However, in this case the first two governing
factors mentioned at the beginning will exercise a stronger effect and clearly show the
necessity for verification and also increase its acceptance . However, it may also be
supposed that in the course of a further development of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change into a real "regime" a number of intrusive verification concepts could be
sacrificed to sovereignty reservations. Thus, for example, a broad application of direct
measuring systems as well as a worldwide international satellite surveillance
organization could meet with resistance for this reason . Nevertheless, a whole range of
future options is conceivable below this level if the climate problem becomes a real
issue.
Cost is an important factor for acceptance : on the one hand, this is true of the cost of
domestic implementation of the convention . Experience from other environmental
conventions shows that the willingness to accept costly commitments is influenced by
the level of the GNP per capita. Table 13 demonstrates this for the complex convention
on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping from ships . Even the costs of national
monitoring of this implementation and the possible costs of international verification
may have a deterrent effect on some countries . If the significance of this aspect is to be
reduced for climate protection then the verification costs for poorer countries should be
reimbursed at least in part, verification systems should make use of existing structures
and systems or multifunctional services as far as possible, i .e . they should not only
serve for verification but also for the performance of other tasks . An (international)
satellite verification system can also provide information on resource planning and
management, for instance .
Table 13 Ratification of the MARPOL Annexes by states according to group of
countries
(Percentage of states from the respective group)
As of: 31 .5.93; source : Peet 1994 ; the figures refer to the per capita gross national product in
current US dollars
MARPOL 73/78 Annexes
Group of Countries I II III IV V
developed market economies 92 92 77 50 85
(former) planned economies 48 48 39 39 42
developing countries > $ 1500 /capita 53 53 25 22 28
developing countries $ 500-$1500/capita 26 26 21 21 24
developing countries < $ 500/capita 20 20 12 10 12

6	
A Graduated Verification System: Summary and Outlook
6.1 Demands arising from the need for verification
Verification is defined as a political process by of means which the parties to a
convention wish to obtain "certainty" on whether the contractually agreed norms,
regulations and targets are complied with by all parties or whether they have not been
observed (noncompliance) . Use is made of technical and other instruments, procedures
and methods for this purpose . Based on this understanding of verification, a graduated
verification system is developed in the present study . Graduated means that there may
be different degrees of "certainty" towards which the system is oriented . The degree
which appears appropriate must be established and further developed in the course of a
dialogue between the parties to a climate convention .
A need for verification arises if the governmental actors are not prepared to rely on a
mutual assurance of compliance with contractually agreed norms etc. The need for
verification is decisively influenced by the causes which, in the actors' view, are
decisive for noncompliance on the part of the other parties. The reasons may be :
A lack of capacity in implementing treaties and time lags, i .e . a lack of ability to
implement the commitments in spite of good intentions .
Intentional violations. These represent an intentional, considered act of
government policy to achieve advantages or avert disadvantages which
(subjectively or objectively) could result for the state from its commitments .
A third cause of violations, which can be located somewhere between the other
two, can be termed unwillingness, a lack of readiness to implement commitments .
Nothing is falsified here, nor is there a lack of ability to implement the
commitments but rather a passive refusal (without letting this become too
apparent) to initiate the necessary steps, or of not performing them with the
required firmness of purpose . The national reports are correspondingly
inadequate .
The need for verification is currently low in the issue area of climate protection, and this
springs from the expectation that violations only arise due to capacity shortages or time
lags . OECD and IEA activities on verifying national reports also seem to be based on
this assumption . It is fairly improbable that intentional violations will result within the
framework of the FCCC and violations due to unwillingness are not to be expected
since the material regulation depth of the Framework Convention on Climate Change is
not very great and it only contains a few fuzzily formulated commitments for just one
group of states, without moreover any time frame . More extensive national voluntary
obligations on climate protection are only political and not binding commitments
according to international law so that they are not subjected to verification . The FCCC
therefore does not provide any reason for falsification and there are few starting points
for verification .
Nevertheless, if, as demanded by many scientists and some countries, a dynamic
climate regime should develop and protocols with extensive, precisely timed and
onerous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be agreed for more
countries, a need for verification would probably arise, which would then also have to
increasingly consider elements of unwillingness and intentional violations . This does
not only lead to an increased need for verification but also poses the question of
institutional consequences . It could then prove necessary to establish a special
organization to undertake verification tasks on an international level, beyond the terms
of reference of the FCCC. This organization would receive the national reports by the
states, in which they describe what they have done and achieved, or intend to achieve,
in the climate protection sector, and would verify these reports. Models could be the
Vienna International Atomic Energy Agency or the organization currently being
established to monitor the prohibition on the production and possession of chemical
weapons .
If the dynamic development of climate protection is in the realm of the possible or is
politically desirable, then a graduated verification system would suggest itself and
would be adaptable to this dynamic situation . The system should comprise three stages
oriented to the three causes of noncompliance and based on the following central
positions:
1st Stage: The verification organization takes cognizance of the states' declarations
with respect to their GHG emissions and climate protection measures . Verification is
only carried out concerning the formal correctness and completeness of the information,
its content is, however, not verified . The organization believes the states' declarations .
2nd Stage : The verification organization makes use of additional generally available
information to verify the consistency and plausibility of the information provided .
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3rd Stage : The organization verifies the correctness and completeness of the
submitted declarations on the basis of additional information obtained independently.
Fig . 4 illustrates the structure and content of this graduated verification system . The
stages correspond to the three causes of noncompliance . If apart from unintentional
violations intentional violations are also assumed then additional verification methods
and techniques must be applied, which may be very intrusive and thus express high
verification density . This is particularly true of on-site inspections and direct, selective
measurements of GHG emissions . In Fig . 4, the verification density thus increases from
left to right .
In this graduated model verification serves various purposes. It may aim at drawing the
attention of well-intentioned states to gaps and problems in realizing the agreements
and therefore offer them assistance in overcoming these weaknesses . Secondly,
verification may contribute towards identifying reluctant states and leading them back to
the straight and narrow. Finally, verification may deter violations by the (latent) threat of
detecting intentional violations, making them public and thus possibly initiating
sanctions .
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Fig . 4 : Elements of a graduated verification system
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6.2
	
Quantitative and qualitative climate protection goals
Climate protection measures and targets comprise two levels, both of which are the
object, of declaration and verification .
The quantitative level refers to the compilation of greenhouse gas inventories, for which
certain terms of reference are necessary and have already been agreed within the
Framework Convention on Climate Change . These inventories are the basis for
stabilization or reduction targets, which can then be laid down on a time axis .
Furthermore, there is a qualitative level with a view to measures and policies for climate
protection . This describes the sequence, implementation and expected impacts of the
measures and policies concerning the emissions of greenhouse gases .
A double goal thus arises for verification: on the one hand, of ensuring a verification of
the implementation of measures and policies (implementation monitoring), and on the
other hand, of guaranteeing the verification (also central in other verification fields) of
the quantitative targets of commitments .
6.3 Qualitative level - measures and policies
The national declarations also contain information on measures and policies which the
states intend to implement to limit or reduce their GHG emissions . These are also
subjected to verification . Verification is graduated here to the extent that over and
above the formal verification or rough estimation of consistency and plausibility,
systematic, in part formalized, verification of the data is made by recourse to more
sources of information and to complex methods, in the case of increased verification
density .
6.3 .9 Verification ofthe information basis for measures andpolicies
A wide range of national measures or policies are being discussed for the reduction or
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions including, for example, measures in the
household sector to improve thermal insulation, speed limits or specifying the average
fuel consumption of new motor vehicles (fleet mix) . The principle of joint implementation
also belongs in this category . In analysing the information provided by states on such
measures and policies, it is important to identify their legal status, i .e . are laws and
directives involved or merely non-binding guidelines . Knowledge of their status is a
necessary condition for a more extensive evaluation and estimate of their enforcement
and effectiveness .
6.3.2
	
Verification of implementation
There are two concepts for analysing the enforcement of measures by means of
implementation monitoring . The first approach is to analyse whether the time targets for
realizing a measure have in fact been fulfilled. The second method of implementation
monitoring is based on indicator analysis . In order to assess whether measures have
been implemented suitable indicators are identified providing appropriate indications .
Thus, for example, in order to estimate whether energy-saving measures have actually
been implemented in the thermal sector, sales of insulating material can be used as an
indicator, or sales of energy-saving domestic appliances in order to estimate the
reduction of electricity consumption .
6.3.3 Verification ofthe impact of measures
In order to plan a measure and estimate its impact with respect to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the efficiency and costs required to achieve this
reduction, it is necessary to perform extensive and methodologically transparent
analyses . One possibility is provided by sector-specific computer models, such as the
submodels of the IKARUS instruments for industry, transport or small consumers and
households . These simulation models enable reduction potentials and the costs, of
measures to be assessed in the energy sector. The question of whether and to what
extent these measures have actually taken effect can only be determined on the basis
of current statistics or actual emissions, but in any case only ex post facto . This leads to
the question of verifying quantitative data on GHG emissions .
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6.4
	
Review of quantitative commitments
Quantitative commitments are at the core of agreements, and measures and policies
must also finally be reflected in quantities, i .e . in amounts of GHG emissions . The
graduated verification of these figures set out in the national reports is at the heart of
verification .
6.4.1 Formal verification
Formal verification involves the correctness and completeness of the form in which
information is provided by the states. This form must, for example, satisfy certain
predefined demands with respect to category and sector formation . Thus, for example,
the question arises within the Climate Convention of whether all greenhouse gases
have been covered, whether the various relevant sectors have been properly described
and whether an aggregation can be adequately reconstructed . A formal analysis also
includes verification with respect to arithmetic errors .
A further aspect of formal verification refers to the data collection procedures and
methods . It must be established whether given standards have been appropriately
considered and the extent to which individual elements of these procedures, e.g .
emission factors for CO2 , can be internationally accepted, and whether they are
transparent or not.
6.4.2 Verification of content using information from published sources
A large number of data bases on atmospheric pollutants and also greenhouse gases
are available within the framework of the UN, OECD, or EU . Information from these data
bases can be used to verify the consistency of national declarations . Further relevant
information available in national data banks concerns export or import data on fossil
fuels, information on population trends, energy consumption, industrial development or
volume of traffic in a country. These data can also be used to verify the plausibility of
greenhouse gas emissions. Computer models linking all this information and
considering both the energy and also the economic aspect can be applied for the
national or regional analysis of the greenhouse gas situation . Examples are the IMAGE
or IKARUS models .
12 3
Information available internationally from measuring networks for determining the
concentration of atmospheric pollutants can also, to a limited extent, provide indications
which can be used to verify the declarations by states on the fulfilment of their
commitments as part of the Climate Convention . Internationally available satellite
pictures provide a great deal of information by means of which climate protection
measures in the agriculture or forestry sector can be analysed .
6.4.3
	
Verification of content with information obtained independently
The two stages in the verification of declarations described so far have been exclusively
restricted to a formal verification by the international surveillance organization and to
the use of information already available from other data international bases . A new
stage in the verification process would also include the autonomous and independent
generation of information by the international surveillance authority itself.
This independent generation of information includes, for instance, the random sampling
of emissions of greenhouse gases by various measuring techniques . This could
comprise the measurement of emissions at large coal-fired power stations in order to
verify emission factors and to assess the credibility of national declarations for
emissions from such plants . Remote sensing (combined with on-site inspections) can be
applied for verification purposes in the sectors of forestry, land use and agriculture if
special agreements on GHG limitation or the expansion of sinks have been resolved . A
further important method of obtaining information can be visits to national institutions of
importance for monitoring greenhouse gases. Such inspections could include, for
example, an energy-generating plant where greenhouse gases are emitted (on-site
inspections) . Such inspections could also include visits to the "national authority"
responsible for compiling the national report in order to obtain insights into the way it
works, its information sources and data processing .
Information is the keystone of a verification system. This is true both of the national
declaration and also of verification . Nevertheless, the mere quantity of data etc.
provided is not a criterion for the quality of the national report nor is the quantity of
information obtained independently an indication of the effectiveness of the verification
system . A flood of trivial information may indeed hamper verification . The decisive
aspect is that the verification organization provides a data plan which must be filled in
by the states and which is optimized for verification purposes . The organization must
concentrate on the verification of key information .
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6.5
	
Acceptance of graduated verification systems
The initial political situation is still quite unambiguous for the climate issue area . Really
binding, extensive and scheduled commitments to reduce GHG emissions cannot (yet)
be politically achieved for a large number of states . The discussion of the acceptance of
verification is therefore necessarily abstract since weak material regulations do not
leave much room for verification . Even the need for verification seems low as yet .
Political attention must be directed to future material regulations and their possibilities
for further development. The willingness to accept effective verification will undoubtedly
not be automatic. However, the necessity for verification will become clearer and its
acceptance will grow . It may, nevertheless, also be assumed that as part of the further
development of the Framework Convention on Climate Change into a genuine "regime"
a number of intrusive verification concepts will be sacrificed to sovereignty reservations .
For this reason alone (quite apart from the question of cost) a broad application of
direct measuring systems or specific remote sensing by states as explicit internationally
agreed measures for the verification of commitments to climate protection will probably
meet with resistance . Nevertheless, even below this level a great deal of that depicted
in Fig . 4 can still be realized if the climate problem really becomes an urgent political
topic .
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